

**Roman Dodonov**

Doctor of Philosophy, Professor,  
Acting Head of the Department of Philosophy  
of Donetsk National University,  
Head of the Department of intra-civilization conflicts of  
Ukrainian Institute of Global development strategies and adaptation

## **THE PROCESS OF PACIFICATION IN UKRAINE: TRANSJNIESTRIAN AND CHECHEN OPTIONS**

*Статья посвящена осмыслению существующего мирового опыта выхода из внутрицивилизационных конфликтов и поиску оптимального варианта для Украины. В зависимости от сохранения или не сохранения территориальной целостности страны возможные сценарии разрешения конфликтов обобщаются в две модели, условно названные «приднестровским» и «чеченским» вариантами. Хотя в настоящий момент в Украине преобладают «приднестровские тенденции», чреватые отделением ДНР/ЛНР, более желаемым является «чеченская модель», суть которой заключается в сохранении территориальной целостности посредством продуманной и целенаправленно осуществляемой государством политикой замирения. Доказывается, что процесс замирения жизненно необходим для социального и духовного здоровья нации, без него возможны рецидивы конфликта.*

**Ключевые слова:** Украина, Донбасс, конфликт, замирение, Приднестровье, Чечня, стратегия.

*The article is devoted to the understanding of the existing world experience out of the intra-civilization conflict and the search for the best option for Ukraine. Depending on whether the country's territorial integrity is saved or not save the possible scenarios of conflict resolution are summarized in two models, tentatively called "trans-dniester" and "Chechen" options. Although at the moment "trans-dniester trends" dominate in Ukraine fraught with the separation of the DNR/ the LNR, the more desirable is the "Chechen model", the essence of which is to preserve the territorial integrity through a well thought-out and implemented by the state policy of pacification. It is proved that the process of pacification is vital for the social and spiritual health of the nation; recurrences of the conflict are possible without it.*

**Keywords:** Ukraine, Donbas, conflict, pacification, Transdnestrria, Chechnya, strategy.

According to calculations of L. and M. Bressler, over the past five and a half millennia, humanity has gone through 15.000 wars and armed conflicts that have claimed the lives of more than three billion people. Beginning with 3600 BC and ending with 2008, when the results of these calculations were published, only 292 years had been peaceful, accounting for 5% from this chronological interval. The rest of the time the mankind constantly fought. But, despite such expressive figures, not

the war, but the peace is the normal state of society. There are no doubts that the conflict in the Donbas we are witnessing will end up with peace. In an effort to approximate the time of completion of the fratricidal carnage, in this article I would like to draw attention to the important point that the act of the cessation of fire would be irreversible only if it is accompanied by procedure of real “pacification” of the parties.

Everyone is familiar with a beautiful ritual of the North American Indians, strengthening exit from the state of war and the transition to the peace: the chieftains and elders of the warring tribes gather around the fire of the board and smoke the “pipe of peace”. At the same time they utter conciliatory speeches to the address of yesterday’s enemies and vow to live in peace forever.

Grueling hours-long negotiations in the “Norman format” in Minsk on February 12, 2015 ended with the signing of the ceasefire agreement in the Donbas, withdrawal of heavy equipment and a number of other activities, consistently leading to the exit from the “hot phase” of the East-Ukrainian conflict. The optimistic assessment of the results of Minsk-2, as the summit became known, in the press quickly gave way to disappointment. As entry to Ukraine of dozens of Russian tanks followed the negotiations, the attack of militias and output of the APU parts from Debaltsevo projection, the incessant barrage of Donetsk and attacks near Mariupol largely neutralized the reached agreements. The two sides do not trust each other, continue to conduct information warfares and seek the best use of the lull to regroup and build strength. Obviously, it is far from the “fire of the board” and “pipe of peace” in Ukraine.

However, pacification is not only a declaration of presidents and diplomats, but also a complex and contradictory process of reciprocal adjustments at all levels. This is a search for compromise, finding ways to justify moral position not only of the won, but of the lost party as well. Pacification is the art of living together of those who completely excluded this possibility yesterday.

Pacification policy is a long and costly process for the budget, but it is vital. Without this long-term strategic direction the conflict relapses are possible, which can negate all the intermediate successes and achievements. The history suggests that if brothers-Slavs somehow learned to fight, their pacifying experience is miserable. The Russian Empire and then the Soviet Union, leaving the war as the winner, sought the complete destruction of the enemy and in case of defeat – did not bring into subjection, but saved their strength for the subsequent revenge.

For example, chronologically adjacent to the First World War the Civil War in Russia was not marked by the spiritual reorientation of society toward peace at the end of it. The “Reds” won, “white” were defeated, interveners are expelled, but the peace did not come. The tension did not decrease; the losers did not know the grace. Interested in total mobilization of the people for the accomplishment of plans for the construction of the socialist party the Soviet elite immediately organized a hunt for the numerous “enemies of the people”, “unexposed” and “not disarmed”. Wave after wave endless comb-out covered the party and administrative apparatus. Collectivization and industrialization, constructions of the first five-year industrial plans were carried out at the backdrop of the ongoing class struggle. The repressive machine that emerged from the dictatorship of the proletariat untwisted the flywheel, involving new strata of the population to the millstone of GULAG.

Unlike the United States of America, which also went through a bloody civil war of 1861-1865, but gradually managed to overcome a deep internal split into the “northerners” and “southerners”, the Soviet Russia has not conducted a deliberate policy of pacification. Moreover, the apotheosis of the latent ongoing war a “theoretical” conclusion of I.V. Stalin became that as we move towards socialism the class struggle will not weaken, but only intensify. Having perfectly cleaned the country from “class alien elements”, and then – from all dissidents, the Bolsheviks spread to neighboring countries: Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, thus providing the social basis of nationalism in the Baltic States, Western Belarus and Western Ukraine. And the inhabitants of Lvov, who met “liberators” with flowers in 1939, having tasted all the delights “of increasing class struggle”, massively went into the forests, swelling the ranks of Melnik and Bandera, taking revenge for the destruction of fates.

Relapses of the unfinished civil war in Russia made themselves felt during the Great Patriotic War in the form of a huge number of collaborators: Vlasov, Krasnov, police goons and so on. And even after more or less peaceful decades of “Khrushchev’s Thaw” and “Brezhnev standstill period” the historical memory of unpacified society at every opportunity has fueled resentment, aggression, hatred.

S.B. Stankevich, one of the Russian right-wing politicians, answering questions about the anniversary of the August coup of 1991, said: “The civil war in Russia is not ended. It continues. Although there are no visible barricades and actual tanks, but people are still willing to kill each other for ideological reasons. Give the will to them, and they will begin now. Hence, there is an attitude towards August – it is formed through the prism of the civil war. The “Reds” do not go to the holidays of “white” and vice versa” [1]. The current conflict in the Donbas can be easily interpreted, inter alia, in terms of the paradigm of “unfinished civil war”.

In fact, we are talking about the hidden and lingering illnesses of society, and therefore the pacification after the conflict, war, and aggression is the essential procedure for the social health.

Today, it is still difficult to imagine that this process can begin – the chasm dug by the media and communications between “We” and “They” is too deep. Those who diligently deepened it, irritated hatred among the people, appealing to the long sunk into oblivion images of the Nazis and Bandera, who came up with all these “slaves”, “crucified boys”, “shot bullfinches”, “Hitler’s image on one thousand hryvnias bill” were not aware of the wound in the hearts of people that they leave and how much time will be needed to heal it. They just had other purposes. And obviously, not they will be engaged in the procedure the opposite to pacifying. It is also possible that at the end a complete change of generation will be required.

Analyzing the numerous intra-civilization conflicts of the late XX – early XXI centuries, we try to pick up the analog, the most suitable to the current events in the Donbas. Despite the apparent diversity, there are not a lot of basic options of conflict resolution emerging from the “hot phase”. Using as a criterion the sign to save/ not save the integrity of the state in the process of emerging from conflict, we will offer two speculative models.

***The first model*** assumes that during the armed conflict, the central government, as well as the breakaway regions managed to retain more or less large areas of the country, capable of independent social reproduction. Of course, we are talking about

the decay of the pre-conflict states, new public formations appear. As a rule, the center standing as the assignee of the pre-conflict state, is gaining recognition of the international community, and a “grey area” appears in the separatist regions with a very problematic prospects for effective development. The standard of this model is the Republic of Moldova, from which Moldovan Transdniestria Republic (MTR) distinguished itself as the result of the war. Earlier united political space received various civilizational “poles of attraction”: Kishinev is focused on Romania, and through it – on Europe, while Transdniestria – on Russia, without military, financial and economic assistance of which it would hardly have existed for such a long period. With some reservations to this particular model all conflicts should be included, ending with the loss of territorial integrity of the country, including Yugoslavia, which new Balkan states came from (Slovenia, Bosnia, Croatia, and so on); Azerbaijan that lost the Nagorno-Karabakh districts; Georgia that lost Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and so on.

MTR emerged as a splinter of the Soviet Union and is a perfect example of a “frozen conflict”. In his interview to the TV channel “Rain” the Russian analyst, senior editor of the portal Slon.ru Alexander Baunov reasoned: “Transdniestria has already lived for 23 years with some unknown Holy Spirit. We do not understand what is happening there. There are experts, it is necessary to ask where Transdniestria gets the money. I think it gets part of it from us. But the size is different. Transdniestria is a strip of land with a population of several hundred thousand people, just a couple of hundred thousand. And here (i.e., in Donbas) we are talking about millions. And completely different territories with very different destructions. The war in Transdniestria was not so destructive. But the Transdniestria option is something more preferable for Ukraine, because it does not contain the region, and most importantly – Transdniestria formally remains on all maps as a part of Moldova, but has no impact on the Moldovan politics. It is such an esoteric thing in itself. It lives on its own” [2]. We will only add that after the rejection of Moscow in January 2015 to allocate 100 million dollars to MTR as financial aid the row broke out, largely dispelling the mentioned “esoterics” [3]. And the German Chancellor Angela Merkel has put Transdniestria in line with Abkhazia, South Ossetia, the DNR and the LNR, calling these formations as the Russian tool in destabilizing the situation in the countries opting to sign an association agreement with the European Union [Op. by: 4].

***The second model*** is based on the premise that the central government manages to overcome the conflict, without losing the final breakaway region. After the active phase of the conflict, a period of adaptation on both sides to the new conditions comes, requiring significant and, more importantly, a conscious effort to address the whole range of political, economic, military, social and humanitarian problems. As a reference of this model the Chechen Republic should be indicated, which, after two bloody wars with Russia has remained in the Federation.

As you know, the second Chechen war ended up with a military defeat of the rebels. When it became apparent some pragmatic Chechen leaders showed their willingness to cooperate with Moscow. Then, in early 2000 several major federal programs were taken to restore Chechnya’s war-ravaged economy. Among them we should highlight the federal target program “Restoration of economy and social sphere of the Chechen Republic (2002 and afteryears)” and the federal target program

“Socio-economic development of the Chechen Republic in 2008-2012” changed it. 41. 540. 470.000<sup>1</sup> rubles were allocated from the federal budget for the implementation of the first of these programs Chechnya. The main result of this program, as it seems to us, is the transformation of formerly rebellious Highlanders, irreconcilable fighters for freedom of Ichkeria, at least in Kadyrov’s men loyal to the Kremlin. And to be perfectly honest, in the national division of labor Chechens occupy niches related, first of all, not to the work places within the established program, but to the police service, security business, drug trafficking, racketeering and outright looting, which we see nowadays in the Crimea and Eastern Ukraine.

So, in the above two models the process of “pacification” is provided either through the establishment of borders and divergence-insulation of the conflicting parties (Transdnistria variant), or through the corrupt practice of the elite and recreation of the social basis for the peaceful development of the region (the Chechen variant). Returning to the East-Ukrainian conflict, we will try to compare it with the experience of the armed conflict in Transdnistria and Chechnya.

In fact, the situation in the Donbas is developing according to the Transdnistria scenario. This is evidenced by the proclamation of the new state formations – the DNR and the LNR, the establishment of their militia that went to war with the “Kiev junta” with the active support of the Russian Federation, conduction of the referendum and elections to the supreme authorities in the republics.

Kiev in response to the blatant looting of the state property in the Donbas decides to terminate the activities of state institutions, including financial, on the uncontrolled territories, stops servicing bank accounts of businesses and households in the area of the ATO, strongly stimulates the evacuation of organizations and individuals, finally introduces significant restrictions for free movement of citizens between Ukraine and the unrecognized republics. Deepening of the incipient “Transdnistria scenario” will contribute to: the establishment of borders with the introduction of a special border and customs control, disabling Ukrainian mobile operators, making notes in the passports of inhabitants of Donetsk and Lugansk about their new “citizenship” or, alternatively, the exchange of passports, the transition to payments in rubles or the introduction of its own currency, payment of debts on wages, etc.

It seems that in the case of the implementation of these measures by the DNR/ the LNR Kiev will not stop them, but will even aggravate the situation by counter moves in the same direction, prohibiting, for example, to enter its territory to owners of new passports. As a result of the refusal of Kiev “to fight” for its eastern regions of the humanitarian, economic and social fronts, millions of Ukrainian citizens for the

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<sup>1</sup> Under the federal program 5.473 facilities have been restored or commissioned: residential units with the total area of 679.1 thousand sq. meters, 71 schools for 23.521 pupils, 70 health care facilities for 9.750 beds and 10.785 visits, 6 institutions of social services, 7 typography and printing facilities, 48 kilometers of long-distance heating mains, 201 electrical and distribution substations and over 484 kilometers of electrical networks, 5 industrial enterprises with the production capacity of 458.7 million rubles, 428 communication objects, 4 enterprises of the construction industry and 23 enterprises of agroindustrial complex. 21.316 jobs are created, including 9.700 – in construction, 6.752 – in health care, 2.104 – in education, 1.186 – in industry and 1.574 – in the agricultural sector [5].

time being loyal to the center, will turn away from the Kiev authorities, surrendering to “the mercy of the victor”. And then “new Transdnistria” appears on the territory of Donbas – a grey area with a fake national identity, a high level of crime, always aggressive and hostile, financed by unknown people and surviving not knowing how.

Is not it the ultimate goal of the Ukrainian authorities?

Even acknowledging the natural reluctance to finance the uncontrolled territories, Kiev is hardly dreaming of legitimation of the DNR and the LNR. After all, there cannot but understand that Kharkov, Dnepropetrovsk, Odessa and other “people’s republics” join the queue. The “Chechen variant” seems more preferable to us in this situation, where the required peace is though “drawn” in time, but is more reliable.

Let’s note that the proposal to follow the “Chechen scenario” in resolving the East Ukrainian conflict was made by Russian President at the talks in the Australian city of Brisbane on November 15, 2014. As the “Financial Times” notes, V.V. Putin said to Angela Merkel that Kiev should conduct the same policy in respect of the self-proclaimed republics, which Moscow led with regard to Chechnya: to buy their loyalty in exchange for money and autonomy. Merkel was shocked and refused to consider such a possibility. A. Baunov commented on this passage: “The Chechen option is when Putin says to the West: “What you have done to me, so let’s do with Ukraine. Why do I keep the former separatist region at the expense of the national budget, and Ukraine does not want to keep its breakaway region, which agreed to make peace at the expense of the national budget” [2]. And then there is a very important, as we can say, key thought: “Of course, the whole story with separatism in eastern Ukraine *has been started* (emphasis added) to create a region in Ukraine with a blocking stake in the decisions, some territory, which has its political weight and does not let Ukraine into NATO, where we are most afraid to let it go” [2]. In other words, the Russian analyst admits conscious, planned and directed nature from the Russian side of the East Ukrainian conflict.

Offer to take the “Chechen variant” was done by V.V. Putin and directly by P.A. Poroshenko, but it was rejected as well. Putin has hinted on the “Chechen scenario” at the press conference after the Australian summit. Criticizing the failure of Ukraine to pay pensions to Ukrainian citizens on the territory of the DNR and the LNR, the Russian president called it a mistake and said that Moscow “even in the darkest days” did not stop the funding of the Chechen Republic and this ultimately yielded positive results.

Here, however, we must take into account two important factors that fundamentally differ the situation in Chechnya and the Donbas. Firstly, the “Chechen variant” was made possible thanks to the victory over the rebel region of Centre, Loyalist and federal – over the separatists. Moscow was at the peak of military success and its policies in Chechnya were held from the positions of strength. The state border was closed, large garrisons of federal forces were located in Grozny and other towns, the Russian air fleet dominated in the air. The very essence of the “Chechen variant” lies in the fact that the Centre that has kept the breakaway region is committed to its pacification in economic, social, humanitarian relations.

And what about the situation in the Donbas?

Kiev has no control over any significant stretch of the Ukrainian border or territories of several districts of the eastern regions. The loss of the two regional

centers of Donbas by Ukraine, the offensive of militias and the Russian “volunteers” to Novoazovsk and Mariupol in August 2014, Illovaysk “trap”, later – the destruction of the Donetsk airport, the withdrawal of troops from Debaltsevo projection – all this cannot testify victorious for Kiev during the conflict. If to draw an analogy with Chechnya, it is only since August 1996, when separatists seized Grozny and detained. Then-Russian President B. N. Yeltsin ordered to withdraw federal troops from Chechnya and start talks. The result of the latter was Khasavyurt agreement that has become a symbol of the failure of Russia in the North Caucasus.

Secondly, the scenario of the conflict resolution in Chechnya did not assume the presence of any state entities in Russia, conducting separatist policies and hatching plans to “march on Moscow” with the active support of the hostile superpower. The constitutional order was established on the whole territory of the North Caucasus, and the Chechen Republic was entirely within the legal framework of the Russian Federation. In our case, the exact opposite is happening: the rebellious republics declare going beyond the constitutional framework of Ukraine to determine its laws and are openly supported by the Kremlin, and obviously are financed by it. The leaders of the “independent” Donbas – regardless of the legality of their election, wittingly or unwittingly, will always be puppets of Moscow. The question of the profitability of the base region of the coal industry has been problematic in the past, and without the support of the center and additional investments these areas will become a “grey area” for many years.

The desire of Putin to create a “black hole” here absorbing money from the Ukrainian budget is unlikely to be implemented, if only because that Poroshenko has no such opportunities that are offered to Russia by its oil and gas industry. According to Mikhail Minakov the lobbying of the “Chechen variant” for Ukraine by Putin is nothing as “forcing to a soft option of surrender to the rebels and supported Russia. Ukrainian politicians are aware that the signing of the “new Khasavyurt” threatens not only their own careers, but also will lead to the incitement of separatist appetites and growth of centrifugal tendencies in the east of the country” [Op. by: 6].

In other words, the experts are inclined to think that the purpose of the Kremlin in the east-Ukrainian conflict is the permanent destabilization of the situation, and the “Chechen variant” is the optimal legalized version of this destabilization. In our opinion, for these faithful, but deep situational output that constructive beginning of the “Chechen variant” is lost which is its essence, namely – the preservation of the territorial integrity of the country and the process of pacification. The “Russian Spring” in the Donbas became possible after the annexation of the Crimea, and if it gets more autonomy where is the guarantee that this parade of sovereignties of “people’s republic” will end?

If Ukraine in relation to the Donbas will choose not the “Transdnistria”, but the “Chechen” version of the resolution of the conflict, then we should all have patience and wisdom, because the process of pacification cannot be quick and painless.

Such process would need to be started from afar, correcting those distortions in the perception of the Donbas by the mass consciousness of Ukrainians who were formed long before the Maidan and the “Russian Spring”. Virtually every election some political forces were under the slogan of “features”, “exclusiveness” as a minimum “otherness” of residents of Donbas to the residents of the central and western Ukraine. Of course, the real reasons for the regional peculiarities of

Ukrainians exist, but they are built on a much more powerful layer of mythology. Cultivation of these myths became a fertile soil on which the election programs of political parties often polar grew. Some went under the slogans “The sun rises in the Ukrainian Donbas” and “Donbas does not drive empty”, while others – with the slogans “Bandits – to prison!” and demands to enclose the entire area with barbed wire. There were also “scientific” justifications of the axiological incompatibility of western and eastern Ukrainians developed by sufficiently authoritative Ukrainian scientists (P.P. Tolochko). Speculations on this issue fairly quickly escalated from harmless jokes into an ideology of hatred that largely supplies the East Ukrainian conflict.

Therefore, the first step that needs to be done in the direction of reconciliation is a rejection of the use of division of the citizens of Ukraine on the first-class and second-class in the struggle for the electorate.

As a next step, the government should clearly define its strategy for the Donbas. It, according to Eugene Shibalov, may say: “We are fighting to win, until the DNR, the LNR and all of their formations will not be completely destroyed”. Or: “OK, we have seen that you are not with us, we are aimed at the separation of these territories”. Or: “We accept the political reintegration plan, we put forward the only condition – the preservation of the territorial integrity and all the rest – the status of region, autonomy, its linguistic, cultural, economic rights – we are ready to discuss” [7]. Of course, for the process of pacification the last strategy is the most suitable, though nowadays we are forced to conclude that Kiev has not a clear vision of the future of post-war Donbas. Those clear messages that reach the population indicate a strong influence at the highest levels of the Kiev authorities of subjective factors affecting old grievances, a desire to get even. And at the same time – a rational understanding of this dead-end path for Ukrainian national identity. Hence there is a shy in the strategic sphere, combined with the lack of a realistic assessment of their own strengths and capabilities. But still they will have to decide.

And then it will be necessary to produce “the dismantling of insolvent doctrines and projects from the mental space, with which violence begins and which give rise to new cycles” [8]. This quotation, by the way, is taken from an article by Russian ex-minister for nationalities, director of the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Valeriy Aleksandrovich Tishkov, who oversaw the humanitarian aspects of the post-conflict adaptation in Chechnya. Many of his expressed concerns are applicable to modern Ukraine. Taking the “Chechen variant” out of the conflict, we must stop talking about joining the Donbas to Russia, about Novorossiia, the DNR and the LNR as unrealized or implemented policies until the end of projects, focusing on the construction of our all-Ukrainian home. Paraphrasing V.A. Tishkov, we note that the independence and self-determination of Donbas are two different things. The full state independence of Ukraine’s Donbas is impossible for many reasons, in particular because:

- according to the recent case studies<sup>2</sup>, most of the population of Donbas does not want that, including those who are forced to leave its territory;

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<sup>2</sup> According to the poll conducted in January 2015 by the “Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation” and Ukrainian Sociology Service, only 20% of the inhabitants of the Donetsk region would like to secede from Ukraine and gain independence, 15% wanted to join another state, 58% of respondents would like Donbas to remain in Ukraine: 30% – as the autonomous region as part of a federal Ukraine and 30% – in the unitary Ukraine, but with more powers, and 2% are satisfied with the current powers of the regions [9].

- the majority of the population of Ukraine does not want that<sup>3</sup>;
- by virtue of geography and composition of the population the independent Donbass cannot have unconflict-borders with neighbors and a self-sustaining economy;
- population that has moved to other areas of Ukraine, Russia and CIS countries will not return to the independent Donbas and without it a legitimate government cannot be formed;
- it is impossible to provide normal conditions for economic recovery, if the conflict has “frozen” status.

We can and should discuss the self-determination of Donbas, its forms and methods. It is clear that there will be the need to make concessions to all – both Moscow and Kiev, and self-proclaimed republics. Submissions that political goals in the XXI century can be achieved by force are dangerous illusions. Only dialogue and tolerance will provide the desired peace.

An important issue of the pacification policy is the problem of consolidating force in this area of social forces. The so-called associated “subject of the peace” is to be collected. Today it is weak, scattered with the crumbs, and is obviously inferior to the importance of the collective “subject of war”. Let us not dissemble – the war is profitable for many: the oligarchs, dividing ownership of the “Donetsk bandits” in a gambling chill; and generals that are for many years undervalued by the state and now have got the chance to “catch it”; and yesterday’s unemployed that have lost faith in everything, but suddenly “found themselves” in the military service; and “noble” soldiers of volunteer battalions that send via “Novaya pochta” “trophy” home appliances from the Donbas... While the war is cost-effective, while it attracts people by the possibility of plundering this rich region, “the subject of the peace” will be in the minority. Unfortunately, it will be formed only at the cost of deaths, miseries, blood and the impoverishment. But the state is able to accelerate the process of the formation of the “subject of the peace” or at least not impede it artificially.

And here the representatives of the “fourth power” – the media may play the important role. They have already demonstrated their power of inciting hatred; they can also use the manipulative technologies at their disposal to promote peace. It is necessary for people to believe in the possibility of peace, to talk about it as a reality. As the same was rightly pointed out by V.A. Tishkov, “speaking on the topic of peace affairs and plans is peacebuilding” [8].

In summary, we will note once again that the armed conflict in the east of Ukraine will end sooner or later, but you need to think about the world now. The “Transdnistria trends” currently dominate that are fraught with separation of the DNR/the LNR from Ukraine after the Crimea. A more desirable for our country is the “Chechen scenario”, the meaning of which is to preserve the territorial integrity at the expansion of the powers of local authorities. The process of “pacification”, so necessary for the social and spiritual health of the nation will be more effective as earlier it starts. The specific forms of the postwar country can be discussed; the main thing is that this debate will take place, that our leaders will not lose the ability to light this notorious “pipe of peace”.

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<sup>3</sup> According to the same poll, only 11.5% of Ukrainians agree that Donbas secedes. [9]

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*Стаття присвячена осмисленню існуючого світового досвіду виходу з внутрішнівілізаційних конфліктів і пошуку оптимального варіанту для України. В залежності від збереження або не збереження територіальної цілісності країни можливі сценарії вирішення конфліктів узагальнюються в дві моделі, умовно названі «придністровським» і «чеченським» варіантами. Хоча зараз в Україні переважають «придністровські тенденції», чреваті відділенням ДНР/ЛНР, більше бажаною є «чеченська модель», суть якої полягає у збереженні територіальної цілісності за допомогою продуманої і цілеспрямованої державної політики замирення. Доводиться, що процес замирення є життєво необхідним для соціального та духовного здоров'я нації, без нього можливі рецидиви конфлікту.*

**Ключові слова:** Україна, Донбас, конфлікт, замирення, Придністров'я, Чечня, стратегія.

*The article is devoted to the understanding of the existing world experience out of the intra-civilization conflict and the search for the best option for Ukraine. Depending on whether the country's territorial integrity is saved or not saved the possible scenarios of conflict resolution are summarized in two models, tentatively called "trans-dniester" and "Chechen" options. Although at the moment "trans-dniester trends" dominate in Ukraine fraught with the separation of the DNR/ the LNR, the "Chechen model" is the more desirable, the essence of which is to preserve the territorial integrity through a well thought-out and implemented by the state policy of pacification. It is proved that the process of pacification is vital for the social and spiritual health of the nation; recurrences of the conflict are possible without it.*

**Keywords:** *Ukraine, Donbas, conflict, pacification, Transdnestrria, Chechnya, strategy.*

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