UKRAINIAN
INSTITUTE OF STRATEGIES OF GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT AND ADAPTATION

EAST UKRAINIAN CONFLICT IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS

COLLECTION OF RESEARCH PAPERS

Vinnitsa
2015

S-67 **East Ukrainian conflict in the context of global transformations/** Ukrainian institute of strategies of global development and adaptation, Nilan-LLC. – Vinnitsa, 2015. – 196 p.

The collection contains articles on the most acute problems of modern Europe – the armed conflict in the East of Ukraine. The articles discuss the preconditions of its origin, development, characteristics and consequences.

The collection contains the entire spectrum of views on the essence and the genesis of the conflict.

The main principle of the material selection was its compliance with the scientific criteria of objectivity and justification.

Based on the fact that there is no final scientific assessment of the conflict today, this collection of articles should be considered the first attempt of the problem statement as a matter of future research..

The authors are responsible for the content of the materials.

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GEOPOLITICAL PRECONDITIONS OF ORIGIN THE CONFLICT SITUATION IN EASTERN UKRAINE

UDC 09.00.11

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POLITICS AND POLITICAL: GEMEINSCHAFT UND GESELLSCHAFT (COMMUNITY AND SOCIETY)

My paper is connected with the issue of the clashes and interrelation between Gemeinschaft (community) and Gesellschaft (society). I actualize the controversy between two notions and their complementarity. In this context the focus of Gemeinschaft is not so much connected with social entity but rather with the notion of Dasein. I focus on the phenomenon of policy as the foundation of the paradigmatic changes in Gemeinschaft (community). It is evident that semantic and semiotic constellation of social being or ethos, society as well as the communities are deeply rooted within ontological archetype of collective unconsciousness. This archetype represents the phenomenon of objectivity as the cosmic order and the manifestation of policy. Namely the phenomenon of policy is the imperative and the foundation for any communities and societies. The changes within archetypes are not correlated with the will of people, monarchs, political actors or society as a whole. At the same time the determination of political life within society does not depend on politics and policy. It is evident that between policy and politics exist the separation and indirect links. We can observe the attributes of politics as the embodiment of two segments: geographical space and the area of notions Topos and Nomos. It appears as the quintessence of transcendental imperatives.

Keywords: *politics, political, Gemeinschaft, Gesellschaft, Dasein, collective unconscious..*

Ab ovo usque ad mala. The power of this magic formula was known only to ancient Romans. It was obvious only to them, the advocates of strict logics and founders of European law, that any feast shall start with an egg

and to end with an apple. Ancient Greeks, unlike Romans, applied strict order of consumption only to drinks, and in the hierarchy of dishes they kept to the principles of tolerance, democracy, even anarchy. That is why Greeks formulated this problem in form of metaphysical enquiry: "what comes first – an egg or the chicken?".

Exactly on the basis of this ontological question in understanding the formula of public relations there exist two approaches. The first lies in assertion of the primacy of relations over public individuals, in acknowledging of self-sufficiency of relations per se, completely determining activity of people. This approach found its logical conclusion in theoretical conception of structuralism of Claude Levy-Strauss, Jacques Lacan, Michel Foucault and in the doctrine of "theoretical anti-humanism" of the French Marxist Louis Althusser. In somewhat mitigated form, free from absolutization, this point of view is characteristic for doctrinal methodology of Marxism as well.

The second approach is based on the idea of primacy of individuals themselves. Person is interpreted here as the subject and driving force of relations, in form of measure of all things and relations themselves. This position is realized in multiple theoretical variations of liberalism and humanism, up to Marxist's humanism of Roger Garaudy. It is striking that in both variation the same problem is raised – the problem of methodological grounds for choosing bench mark of the research when analyzing the essence and structure of social reality. Does the real way of understanding specific character of social reality shall be from the society to the individual or from individual to the society? What can we say about it?

Firstly, we are to state the fact, that this problem hasn't appeared neither today, nor even forty or fifty years ago. It is eternal methodological antinomy of social philosophy and philosophy of history not only Modernism or Postmodernism. The difference between the first and the second epochs lies only in the fact that Modernism persistently searched for ways of solving the problem by thoroughly selecting arguments, while Postmodernism was forced to recognize the both positions relatively true.

There is much reason, as to our opinion. The movement of cognition of social reality both from the society to individual, and from individual to the society does not give any warranties of cognizing the absolute truth of the being of historical process, but it opens various faces of its essence and reality. The whole history of development of European philosophy opens various variants of solving this problem to us: socialization of the society by Middle Ages and idolizing human being by the Renaissance, profane adven-

tures of a castaway of the Enlightment and glorification of Volksgeist by German Romanticists, categorically imperative aim-man of Kant and society-substance of Hegel, holism and additivism, holism and verism, liberalism and communitarism, finally, action theory by Talcott Parsons and the theory of communication by Niklas Luuhman. As we can see, there are no winners in this fundamental methodological competition, but under the signature of tolerance there are still only suspension points...

It is symptomatic that new vision of this problem appears before European philosophy in no way due to the growth of philosophic thesaurus due to ascription of newly constructed meanings to Latin concepts, what is characteristic of English-speaking philosophism type, and to those in Roman languages, but by means of German language practice of using words from everyday vocabulary in high theoretical and categorical meaning. Thus in 1887 Ferdinand Toennies in his famous work "Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft" drew attention to the presence in simple German folk language practice of some kind of synonyms, which in everyday practice differ from each other rather distinctly only due to cultural traditions and the presence of language feeling. In theoretical consciousness and scientific terminology these quasi-synonyms, unfortunately "are confused and understood as people see it without understanding differences in their meanings".

In the above work the necessity of strict differentiation of notions "Gemeinschaft" and "Gesellschaft" is pointed out, which are translated as community and society, respectively. "A group, - F. Toennies states, - formed by positive relations, is understood as a creature or a thing with single external and internal influence and is called a union [Verbindung]. These relations themselves, and thus these unions, are understood as either real and organic live – this is the essence of the community [Gemeinschaft], – or like ideal and mechanical formation, which is the notion of society [Gesellschaft]" [6, 17].

Without touching upon details of the proposed definitions of the above categories of community and society, we shall point out that the most important is that German natural language and, subsequently, German professor acknowledge simultaneous, parallel existence and functioning of historical process in two relatively independent and contradictory forms: the community and the society. In the light of such vision it becomes obvious that monistic principle *Ab ovo*, applied to solving the question is not universally specific, because imperative *Ad mala* is as well true, though not in disjunction, but in conjunction. As with *Ab ovo*. One more methodological issue about the chicken and the egg remains unsolved, but the answer to it is

to be searched deeper, in the sphere of mythological and symbolical reality, lying beyond the topic of this article. That is why we touch upon the issue of differentiation of *Gemeinschaft* or *Gesellschaft* from the other point of view…

Eighty years ago high Prussian official and famous theorist of law, with a rather oddly transcribed name, Carl Schmitt, wrote philosophic piece with an unusual for that time, and as for today name – "Der Begriff des Politischen" (The Concept of the Political) [1]. This rather small work made its author truly famous, and at the same time brought him rather ambiguous, even bad fame.

A true European intellectual has had no use for philosophic totalitarian discourse of German wild 1930s, especially as described by politically committed Carl Schmitt, with his "big fuss" over imperative of a priori distinction of "the friend and foe". According to the famous researcher of Schmitt's creative work, the professor of University of Munich, Heinrich Meyer, this publication "has sowed animosity and reaped animosity" [5, 10].

But there are other reasons of mainly critical attitude to this remarkable work. One of them is traditionally German way of philosophism, typical for its author. The innermost meanings and emphases of his intellectual construction are securely hidden behind the pictures of metaphors, allusions, tropes and are coded therein. Consciously or unconsciously he avoids the possibility of definite interpretation of his own concept. Finally, for some reason or other, or despite them any explication or satisfactory interpretation of the basic notion of Schmitt's political paradigm – the notion of "political" has not yet been achieved. Most analytics, studying his text, to my mind, do not point sufficient attention to the necessity of strict divergence of traditional notion of the politics (die Politik) and substantivized adjective "political" (das Politische), raised by Carl Schmitt to the high rank of theoretical notion from the category of philosophy and politics, constantly getting tangled in the net of identification discourse.

Let us start with politics. "Politics is the protection of one's own, repulse to the enemy". Politics is no other than "pure and simple battle" with the enemy for one's own. [1,29]. Such though abstract but strict definitions are proposed by Schmitt. If you don't get scared of loud metaphors, it is quite obvious that his definition of the politics in this aspect completely coincides with the classic European tradition and excludes any grounds for any discussions.

Controversies are opened during further conceptual broadening of this notion. Everything that in European culture traditionally bore designation of politics Schmitt diverges into two forms – political and agonal, thus enriching socio-philosophical and philosophical and political thesaurus with the notion *agon*. Decoding of this opaque notion "agon" is to be the first step to the hermeneutics of the notion of political. "Two fundamentally different "approaches" to the struggle: "agonal" and "political", Schmitt states. It should be pointed out that Schmitt rather fairly opposes to groundless and unlimited interpretation of politics as any form of "struggle" and "war". Overwhelming majority of springboards for public races, where vehement, sometimes bloody struggles start, are in no way connected with the sphere of politics, but the belong to the sphere of the commonplace agone, i.e. the sphere of every-day rivalry between public individuals, social communities and states. The key to differentiation of political and agonal controversies is the notion of antagonism. "An enemy is not an antagonist in bloody rivalry of "agon"".

Just like that in sociopolitical life, in the end, all the processes – technological, economical, juridical, moral or simple, production, consumption or communication processes, processes of satisfying individual and social needs or interests – always unfold in the form of agonal contradictions, or if turning to the lexis of Schmitt, in form of permanent agonal wars with indispensable victories and defeats, with indispensable divergence of all to foes and friends. Differencia specifica of agonal relations is the fact, that in its nature they do not bear any antagonism. They can be bloody, they can be cruel (and rather often they have been like that in history), but they never include antagonism and do not require obligatory destruction of the "enemy". Thus, we can draw the conclusion, that the basis of controversies between agon and the politics is formed by the boarder between non-antagonistic and antagonistic controversies.

Differentiation of agonal and political is to be accepted as fruitful and functional, as it allows avoiding unlimited fuzziness of the notion of politics and to make further step to acknowledgement of its horizons. Presently it is to lie in determination of methodological foundations of differentiation of the antagonistic and non-antagonistic. This process in not rather clear and requires strict reconstruction.

We don't know, if Carl Schmitt was aware of works of Ferdinand Toennies, but a certain accord of their conceptual and categorical formations is striking. What is Gemeinschaft? It is nothing but social reality, studied from the point of view of union of people [Verbindung], in which it is

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union, which precedes individuals and dominates over them. The power, integrating Gemeinschaft in the comprehensible whole, is the emerging symbolic code and sacral mythological paradigm. The underlying essence of the community is politics, or to be more precise, its political genome.

"Political unity is always, as fairly pointed out by Schmitt – … is the basic unity, total and sovereign… Politics is the fate" [1, 36]. The basis of the true politics is always formed by metaphysical and antagonistic oppositions. Unlike Hobbes with his *bellum omnium conra omnes* as the formula of *status naturalis – status belli* as the war of atomic, non-consolidated individuals, for Schmitt *status naturalis* is as well *status belli*, but this is not the war of individuals, but of the communities. It is within the framework of this war, where "personal identity is established an formed, by receiving visible gestalt" [1, 27].

Thus we are provided with specification that the politics is the sphere of specific struggle between communities for preservation and strengthening of their metaphysical code, their personal identity and gestalt. An important characteristics of the community is the fact, that rational component is practically always absent in its basis, but archetypes of the collective unconscious completely predominate. Exactly in such gestalts peoples become subjects of politics, forming "multiversum" of political world.

It is exactly at this point, where we receive the possibility to somehow rationally determine the most important notion of philosophical doctrine of C. Schmitt. It concerns the phenomenon of "political", which interpreting causes some controversies. Thus, Leo Strauss, one of the opponents of Schmitt of that time, pointed out that "Schmitt unequivocally refuses to give comprehensive definition of the political" [5, 114]. He is assented by the main representative of modern Russian traditionalism, A. Dugin, who ascertains, that the essence of the political each time escapes final determination, that the "political" cannot be identified straightly and unequivocally" [4, 12-13].

Finally he inclines to the paradigm of the elementary political determinism by stating that "politics in its essence precedes all these (social – auth.) components, exists before them and does not depends of them. But it shows itself through the group of certain phenomena, which are forms of realization of politics, products of its concretization" [4, 12]. Thus again we receive no divergence of the concept of the politics and the notion of the political.

On the one hand, the problem of analysis of socio-philosophical discourse of politics lies in search of metaphysical section, combining phe-

nomenal world of the politics with noumenal concept of the political. The political is substantial basis of the politics, basis of all its changes, which is manifested through the range of modi and accidents. It precedes all the components of the society, appears before them and does not depend on them. The fact that constellation of things and processes in society is predetermined exactly by this formula, is apparently proven by empirical dimension of socio-cultural of being itself. We, probably, may state that apriority of the political is a reliable empirical fact.

On the other hand, complexity and depth of the problem is opened beyond the empirical, with the first step to the abyss of the metaphysical. The essence, code, semantic and semiotic constellation of social being of one or another ethos, people, society lies in first ontological archetype of collective unconscious. This archetype is the objective given, like cosmic order and planet defilement. The name of this most important archetype is the political. It is the political, which is cardiac aorta and vital nerve of each people. The change or archetypes is independent of the will of people, monarchs, political figures or peoples. But political life of a society is not directly determined by the political. There appears intermediate link between the political and the politics. This link is formed by the attributes of the political. There are two of them – geographical space and the space of a word, or in other words, Topos and Logos. It is the political which appears as quintessence of transcendental imperatives of spatial being of unions (Verbindung) of people.

Transcendental structure of the ontological sacral principles of organization of public relations of social individuals is the system of a priori categorical imperatives for mass consciousness of the society, in accordance with the requirements of which the political activity of the society takes place and its political structure and organization develops; this system of social and organizational ontological imperatives is the substance of the politics, political life and political processes, it is generalized in social philosophy and political philosophy by the category of the political.

Political space is the sphere of language communication, structure of specially developed language of political communication, which meaning and sense like in conversion of sacral meanings in syntactic models of a language. In syntactical definition of political space the specific of rules is stressed with which obeying political imperative discourse, and finally political discourse develops. The notion discourse itself is the most exact for characterizing the process of verbalization of the political, as discourse "is not just a complex of utterances or statement, they consist of utterances,

which have meaning, power and influence in social context… discourse statements are the statements, having the same institutional force, and thus can be compared with a certain form of authority – those utterances, which can be classified as truthful".

In its own way political discourse, formed within the framework of the communicative system of the political space, meant to adequately reflect the sacral paradigm as universal substance of political processes in the system of judgments, from which any other imperative judgment can be inferred. Just kike that, a certain political discourse becomes paradigm of political identification for those, who share, chooses it, supports it and completely agrees to develop political practice according to imperative utterances of this discourse. And vice versa, the one, who doesn't share values of this paradigm, is beyond this political space and this political discourse, that is why it form the very beginning is doomed to be deprived of public life, being limited to personal space, or to be opposed to another's discourse its own sacral paradigm, own political space by way of political dissidence and struggle or to become ideological and cultural hostage of the ruling discourse.

The whole history of political struggle appears as the struggle of various political discourses, behind which inconsistency of cryptological structures of the sacral ontological myth is hidden. Struggle for discourse is the struggle for one's own archetype peculiarity in the whole range of its modi: culture, language, political space, political power, and finally, for material basis and the medium of all the forms of the social chronotope – the people and geographical and cultural landscape of its being. That is why each community always stands for preservation of its personal discourse, and the oppositional and the hostile thereto – for its substitution with the style of other paradigm model. The rebels agree to limit themselves with renewal of political vocabulary and syntactic structures of the language. This situation of the political conflict is much like Ukrainian realias, where behind the counter-paradigmal slogans of the power and opposition elementary surface language dissonance is hidden.

The peculiarity of political conflict is the fact that it always emerges and develops as spatial geopolitical conflict, which finally, reaches stages of outright antagonism and diversifies society to "friends" and "foes", i.e. To positively and negatively complimentary societies. A single individual can live in conditions of internal emigration rather long without destroying its paradigm portrait. But the community in conditions of such kind of geopolitical occupation almost never survives. That is why this is exactly in this

moment that the act of entrance to the foreground of the same mystical and irrational "political" occurs. It alarmingly breaks all the modus and pattern external shells of the society and puffs naked in order to present itself in form of direct archetype or outside phenomenal ethnic noumenon.

This political, which breaks to the surface from the depths of the unconscious, uncovered by the garment of the culture, civilization and elementary politeness, excludes the problem of independent choice by the individuals of cardinal decisions almost completely. The choice as an attribute of liberty, is obligatorily inherent in society, is completely impossible and prohibited in the society, that is why here the overall power (Gewalt) of the political reigns, "which captures individual existentially and completely dominates over his life and death. Consequently, his life belongs only to the imperatives of the political, what like the most important and the most accurate indicator signalizes about the level of danger of the Dasein (being) of a society.

A new logical links arises therefrom. The one, who belongs to the society with different imperatives, indifferent to the imperatives this community is for them only strange and only potential enemy. The one, belonging to the community with imperatives antagonistic to the imperatives of this community, is not only strange, but the actual enemy. "For its essential characteristic it is enough that it would be especially in intensive sense existentially something other and hostile, thus in case of conflict it would mean the denial of its own way of existence, and that is why it is necessary to repulse it and to defeat it in order to save personal, existential (seinsmassig) way of life [1,4].

The basis of all the existential controversies and differences of ways of life is by all means formed by metaphysical oppositions, as fairly noted by C. Schmitt "they can be draped with moral and economics, but that does not abolish them. Nothing human can abolish them. Nobody can conquer them". Indeed, metaphysical element is the core of any policy. This mysterious component always shows itself as an archetype or as symbolic paradigm of the political, or as an assembly bell, giving the alarm when everyone was to be ready to sacrifice oneself to save life of the community.

It is this sacral assembly bell, which has awoken Kiev Euromaidan at the time, when the situation formed, at the edge of which metaphysical abyss of renunciation of one's own way of existence, one's own freedom laid, when only the death of Heaven Sotnia the death of Ukrainian community, death of his motherland can be avoided. But the triumphant chime of the Maidan bell made feel something other. It made feel that Maidan stood

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not only against its greedy and immoral government, i.e. against elementary junta, which was nicknamed as "gang". It made us feel that this government was in no way the government of its own community; it was the power of another, strange, hostile and by no means consonant to it community. This government was built at the metaphysical foundation of political paradigm, which in no way coincides with civilizational foundations of Ukrainian existence. After the Revolution of Dignity of Ukrainian community there appeared the moment for Political bell on the side of the opposite community. It gave birth to Donbass.

And it doesn't concern Russia, I mean, not only it. It concerns Ukraine. For description of the present state of affairs methodology and terminology of a famous Russian historiosoph Lew Gumilev shall be used in this fragment. It is known, that at first relations between Russian and Ukrainian communities have been the relation of elementary Xenia, i.e. the form of neutral coexistence of communities with preservation of peculiarities of each of them. Social and psychological basis for interaction of these communities was relatively low negative complementarity, which constantly raised its tone under the influence of the policy of Russian tsarism. The name of this policy is assimilation, it has always been aimed only at russification of the Ukrainian people. The latter was implemented by all possible means: introducing Russian type of civilization, dictatorship of Russian language and Russian administration. The Ukrainian community has desperately resisted for centuries. Instead, it appeared to be almost helpless against tectonic shifts of Russian industrialization modus.

Constant injections of substantial masses of Russian population into the topos of Ukrainian society without minimal adaptation in its sociocultural landscape lead to paradoxical consequences. Russian vaccine was by no means dissolved in Ukrainian substratum and practically didn't dissolve this substratum in itself. Though the interaction of substratum and vaccine gave birth to a new formation or some kind of cancer tumor, some kind of quasi-community, which according to the terminology of L. Gumilev bears the name of Chimera, inside Ukrainian society.

This society has no longer bore systemic features of cultural paradigm of neither Ukrainian, nor Russian communities with their unique traditions and mentality. Unsystematic composition of incompatible moral, ethical and outlook guidelines predominates in its portrait. Instead of monistic mentality inherent to normal communities, here reigns absolute chaos and eclecticism of cultural tastes, religious beliefs and everyday ideas. Irrational psychological and ideological pandemia, which sometimes take form of

general social insanity, rage in strange communities. Primitive samples of the novel pseudo-religions, conservative utopias, based upon ignorance, incompatible with formal logic and elementary science, this is indigestible trough, from which spiritually feeble adepts of chimerical universals of chimerical way of being gulp spiritual raw vodka.

One more important characteristic of chimeras, which radically distinguished them from real communities: all normal communities reproduce themselves in a certain geographical space, adapting for centuries to their land, climate, becoming aware of sacral meanings of symbolic codes and imperative rituals. Chimeras are unlike that. They do not live in real space, like other communities. The field of their existence is unreal-surreal reality. The real landscape and chimera are parallel worlds. Their intersection is always accompanied by explosion, in which chimera annihilated, by dissolving in this or that unity. As an example we shall remember how thorny was the path of Ryasan and Orel collective farmers, who were forced to resettle to the lands of Kenningsberg Prussiia or Vyborg Ingermanland, where they had not had even potato yields. They calmed down themselves in traditional Russian way with patience and alcohol. And finally, who didn't escape from this strange land, found here their own identity in time. A totally different situation can be seen in Ukraine. For international community chimera in Ukraine appears to be almost respectable ethnic group or nation.

Its majority is formed from Russians, then come Ukrainians and natives of other ethnic groups. Its communicative integrity is based upon language, which its representatives themselves call Russian. It seems that this is significant exaggeration. The language of communication of this community cannot be called Russian. It is rather specifically local distorted form of language hybrid of Lingua franca, koine and creolized pidgin. Using such a hybrid it is pointless to try to create something like "Crime and Punishment" or "The Master and Margarita". Moreover, on the level of such kind of language the perception of poetic and esthetic masterpieces of Russian culture becomes rather problematic. Lingua franca allows, at best to understand the plot, but in order to realize the secret edge of poetics and metaphysics of the esthetic the linguistics optics of such hybrid appears insufficient and helpless at all. Even some phonetic likeness of Russian language and its Ukraine-sounding ersatz, which can be seen lately under the influence of Russian television can in no way solve the main problem of identification of vocabularies of this languages, that is why television vocabulary in no way goes far beyond lingua primitiva. Having such language at dispo-

sition, it is difficult to hope for literature masterpieces. Probably because of that reason Ukraine has never gave birth to the genies of titans of high sounding Russian words.

Besides, it is obvious that pseudo-Russian-speaking community in Ukraine, unlike community of Russian people, has either no taste to Russian language, or simple sense of the laws of turning its verbal forms, laws of linguistic form building, which are so much necessary for overcoming discrepancies between the original and its inferior copy.

Due to this fact we should remind the question, which is constantly raided by famous political powers about granting Russian language the status of the second state language. Of course, formally it is possible to give the status of state language in Ukraine to English, but this is evident nonsense for everyone. But less obvious nonsense is the aspiration to legitimate Russian at the state level. Affinity of Russian Ukrainian languages in no way makes it easier. Parallel use of such languages often leads to funny semantic and semiotic curious incidents. In addition, we shouldn't forget that true Russian language has never been used in Ukraine. Instead oral language ersatz – Lingua Russian vulgate – is at disposition of our average citizens. This is no literature lingua, it has no linguistic codification, norms of syntax and orthography, with its help one can't formulate texts of political, legal and diplomatic documents adequately. In such a state it cannot claim for the status of the state language. There are not so much variations for resolving the deadlock. It is necessary to ether improve the state of development of Lingua to the level of codified literature language, or to improve educational level of the population to the level of adequate mastering Russian language. The former and the latter require intellectual efforts and time, which cannot be determined in advance. All this can be implemented only at cost of displacement, exsanguination and returning Ukrainian to oblivion. Tat is why, if we give imperative slogan on provision to Russian of the status of the second state language more transparent form, it shall acquire more outspokent form of the demand to phohibit Ukrainian language. Commentaries are odd here.

Though we should draw attention to the fact that differencia specifica of socio-ethnical chimera in Ukraine lies not only in linguistic dimension. Lingua Russia is spread not only within chimera, but also within certain Ukrainian and other micro-communities. The present secret of specific character of our chimera, as we believe, is hidden in the sphere of its genesis.

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UDK 2:27.772(477)

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CHALLENGE TO RELIGIOUS FREEDOUM AND RELIGIOUS AND CONCESSIONARY VARIETY IN UKRAINE: IDEOLOGY AND TERROR OF "RUSSIAN WORLD"[1]

The article is dedicated to analysis of religious motives behind of separatism at Eastern Ukraine. As authors theses have shown, Orthodox fundamentalism is no less aggressive than "Islamic fundamentalism", and the "Russian spring" is no less bloody than its "Arab" counterpart. Because this species of Orthodoxy has government support and aspires to a role in politics, it can be called "political Orthodoxy." Morever, recently "political Orthodoxy" has manifested itself in the form of "Orthodox terrorism" on Ukrainian territory occupied by pro-Russian separatists. There is no doubt that the persecution of individuals and groups based on religion that we are witnessing is part of a coherent policy aimed at creating a "Russian world".

Keywords: *religion, East of Ukraine, separatism, Orthodoxy, «Russian world».*

Geopolitical preconditions of origin the conflict situation in Eastern Ukraine

In events around Ukraine one should see unity of political and religious motifs. Long before annexation of Crimea and undeclared war in Donbass the religious front was opened. Analytics, specialist on religious studies and Ukrainian theologians (it should be pointed out that the texts of Iurii Chornomorets and archimandrite Kyryl (Govorun) have many a time drawn attention to the fact, but, most distressingly, no one from leading Ukrainian and foreign politicians didn't foresee and take into account the growing role of aggressive Moscow orthodoxy in regional and global politics. As the events in Ukraine showed, orthodox fundamentalism is less aggressive than Islamic one and "Russian Spring" is not less bloody than the Arab one. As this kind of orthodoxy has state support and has a claim to political role, it can be called "political orthodoxy". Moreover, since recently "political orthodoxy" showed itself in the form of "orthodox terrorism" on Ukrainian territories, occupied by pro-Russian secessionists.

While monitoring groups, working in Ukraine, gather and present information about breaches of religious freedom, earlier unseen in this region, the need of more conceptual analysis of what is going on becomes more and more obvious and glaring – why it is happening and what does it mean for global society. It is no doubt that observed religious persecutions of people and groups are a part of consecutive policy of "Russian World" and that is why they pose a threat to regional safety, and even more, to the global order, as they contest the possibility of "global" itself, in particular the possibility of universal freedoms, universal values, international law in force.

Events in Ukraine made worried not only neighboring countries and involved politicians, but also the global Christian society. To wide extent the discussions speak not only about the conflict of Ukraine and Russia, but also about the conflict of Eurasia and Europe, of Russia and the West, orthodox "Russian World" and "secularized Protestant and Catholic civilization", universal human rights and "orthodox" values, freedom and "traditional" "order".

Ukrainian pro-European choice and "revolution of dignity" at the Square (November 2013 – February 2014) was followed by aggressive answer of "Russian World" – annexation of Crimea (March 2014), occupation of a part of Eastern Ukraine and creation of local quasi-public "people's republics" (April 2014). All the confessions, with the exception of the Church of Moscow Patriarch, turned out to be outside the law and suffered kidnappings, tortures, murders, seizures of religious buildings at the seized territories.

Obviously, it is important for international community to analyze and estimate the consequences of Ukrainian events for collaboration in the region of Eurasia and protection of religious freedom, as well as to take all possible measures to support and held victims of religious discrimination.

The facts tell for themselves: Greek Catholics and Kiev patriarchy in annexed Crimea turned out to be outside the law; pro-Russian "orthodox armies" operate in Donbass; dozens of Protestant churches are seized, kidnappings, tortures and murders of pastors are not rare; priests of Moscow patriarchy don't hide and give their blessing to the terrorists and refuse to perform requiem services over the fallen Ukrainian military men; Patriarch Kirill predicts the fall of Ukraine as "a kingdom, which split inside".

"Hybrid" war of Russia against Ukraine united and thus strengthened a series of interstate and interconfessional conflicts. The boundaries of Ukrainian state, the unity of Ukrainian political nation, confessional unique identity were violated. Whereas the religious component may prove to be the first one, as it is Moscow orthodoxy, which became the main tie of "Russian World", and, subsequently, the main actor of bloody "Russian Spring".

Annexation of Crimea was justified by the sacral meaning of the ancient Chersonese, and the war against Ukraine by protection of orthodoxy. As the President Putin declared in his message to the Federal Meeting of the RF, "the Crimea for Russia is ancient Korsun, Chersonese, Sevasotpol have a great civilizing and sacral meaning, like Temple Mount in Jerusalem for those, who profess Judaism. This event has a unique meaning for our country, for our people, as our people live in Crimea and the territory itself as strategically important, because it is here where spiritual source of forming of many-face, but yet monolithic Russian nation and centralized Russian state. It is at this religious ground our predecessors have realized that they are single people once and forever." [1].

In fact, the old European principle "whose power, those the faith" (cuius regio, eius religio) was contested. In return the principle "whose faith, those the country" is imposed. It is spoken of aggressive distribution of "Russian World" through orthodoxy of Moscow pattern. "Russian Spring" starts with words about brotherhood of the three nations and unity of orthodox faith, but then it is continued by annexation and the war against former brothers and brothers in faith, who dared to live apart and to believe in another way.

A well-known from the 19th century totalitarian conjunction "to be Russian means to be orthodox" becomes the main motive for consolidation of "Russians" and protection of the "orthodox". "Declaration of Russian

Identity" (the document adopted on November 11, 2014 on balance of the 18th Meeting of World Russian National Council, devoted to the theme "Unity of History, Unity of People, Unity of Russia") proclaims: "The most important criteria of nationality in Russian tradition was thought to be national language (the word "language" itself is an ancient synonym of word "nationality"). Proficiency in Russian language is obligatory of any Russian. The assertion that any Russian is to acknowledge orthodox Christianity as the basis of his national culture is justified and fair. Denial of the fact, and moreover the search of different religious basis of national culture witness of weakening of Russian identity, right up to its complete loss" [2].

As events in Ukraine showed, where there are Russian-speaking and "orthodox", there can emerge "polite people" with automatic machines in hands for their "protection" and for their integration in the single space of "Russian orthodox world."

"We cannot look through the fact that the conflict in Ukraine has a dubious religious basis", Moscow Patriarch Kirill wrote to the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew in the letter, which was posted on official site of the Department of External Church Relations of Moscow Patriarchate on August 14, and already on August 15 it disappeared. "Members of the Uniate Church and dissidents, who joined them, try to prevail over canonical Orthodoxy in Ukraine… I ask your Holiness to use all possibilities to raise Your voice in protection of orthodox Christians in Eastern Ukraine, who, in conditions of deteriorating violence on the part of Greek and Catholics, as well as dissidents daily live in fear for themselves and for their nearest and dearest, fearing that if oppressors gain the power, the orthodox shall be forced to refuse their faith or shall be subjected to hard discrimination", the Primate of the Russian Orthodox Church claimed.

The fact of manipulation with "canonicity" makes itself suspicious. For Russian Orthodox Church there are no other orthodox churches in Ukraine, all of them are impostors and dissidents. At the same time, Patriarch keeps silent about the fact that even for those, who operates with medieval term of "canonical theory", Ukraine remains disputable "canonical territory" and belongs rather to the jurisdiction of Ecumenical Patriarch, than of Moscow.

This fact should be thought over by those, who are in sympathy with the West, who say "orthodoxy" and mean Russian Orthodox Church. While sign of equality between world orthodoxy and Moscow orthodoxy cannot be placed in respect of the volume and quality.

Identification of the faith and Moscow orthodoxy becomes a power-ful propagandistic mean. As "orthodox militant", counsel of the Minister of Defense of DPR, Ihor Druz stresses: "There are no orthodox from Ukrainian part, because not a single churched orthodox person won't go with war against Novorossia, because they know that the Unity of Holy Russia is wished by God. All the holy, who spoke on this issue, are unanimous in the fact, that Holy Russia is to be single. But these are Ukrainian Fascists who are secessionists and want to split Novorossia from Holy Russia and to add it to rotting militant West. That is why there are no committant people on Ukrainian side. Punitive squads are formed mostly of Uniates, dissidents, Neo-pagans and sectarians." [3].

On July 31, 2014 locum tenens of the Kiev cathedra (Ukrainian Or-thodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate), Metropolitan Onufrii, turned to the president Poroshenko with personal message, in which he was forced to state violation of rights and freedoms of the faithful and intervention in the activity of parishes of Donetsk eparchy of Ukrainian Orthodox Church on the part of military contingent, which is in the East of Ukraine". He didn't mention of the problems of other confessions and abuses on the part of oc-cupation forces and terrorist. Thereby the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) corroborated not only religious, but also political dependence on Moscow. In conflict between orthodox supranational empire and national state, between imperial ideology and civil society "Ukrainian" Orthodox Church turned out to be not at all Ukrainian. It is obvious that such a position of "Ukrainian" confession poses a threat to national security and creates a dangerous precedent for other countries of the region.

In a certain sense, no longer Russia itself as a state, but Russian or-thodoxy as supranational trend becomes geopolitical factor. It is protection of "true", traditional, canonical orthodoxy, which justify actions of "ortho-dox armies" of Donbass.

In his article "Where the Threat to Orthodoxy in Ukraine comes from", published on the site of separatists "Russian Spring", Ihor Druz, who has already been mentioned (who this time signed as "Chair of the National Council of Ukraine"), declares "Kiev terrorists... are badly in need of "ideo-logical substantiation" of their supremacy over the slaves of Euromaidan. They need not only support of parties and trends, but also of religious con-fessions. Western curators are involved in subjecting of various confessions for a long time, there have been created a special departments for work with them in the State Department. In fact, it means destruction of strucutres of Moscow Patriarchate in Ukraine and creation of a huge religious and politi-

cal sect on the ground of remnants of various confessions, which would become an ideological basis for the regime of Poroshenko. Such processes take place all around the world, where under the guidance of western oligarchy a single world religion is swiftly created, which the orthodox fairly believe to be the religion of the Antichrist." [4].

Thus, by efforts of ideologists of "Russian Spring", the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, between Moscow orthodoxy and Ukrainian "Uniates, dissidents and sectarians" is taken to the global level and presented as the conflict of "Russian World" and "Rotting West", "traditional values" and "gay-rope", saving spirituality and perverting secularity. Moreover, remaining the main uniting force, Russian Orthodox Church tries to create alliance of those Protestants, Jews, Muslims, who agree with the orthodox view of history of Russia and accept their diminutive and inferior position unreservedly. As the head of the Department of Internal Affairs of one of Russian church councils (during round-table conference "Christian Values in Modern Russia, Moscow, May 25, 2006) declared to me, "We, Protestants, understand that places at the state table are reserved, but were are not against to eat scraps from the table" (Allusion to the Fragment from the Chapter 15 the Gospel according to St. Matthew "He said in reply, "It is not right to take the food of the children and to throw it to the dogs", She said, "Please, Lord, for even the gods eat the scraps that fall from the table of their masters."). It is clear that such allies for "truly orthodox" are temporary and soon they become the next victim (what is happening right now – while leaders of Protestants take part in meetings in various state councils and get president's decorations, their churches are persecuted mercilessly).

Most distressigngly, that not only Russian Orthodox Church, but also Russian Protestants see Ukraine as its "canonical territory" and have already started dividing Ukrainian churches, which are on occupied territories. In particular Russian Joint Union of the Christians of Evangelical Faith (RJUCFE) took a decision on creation of a separate eparchy administration in the Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol. The new structure shall be headed by the bishop Konstantin Bendas, a faithful advocate of strong government authority line of his supervisory bishop Sergey Ryakhovsky, the member of the President Council and the Civic Chamber of the President of RF.

Russian baptists are also believe that Crimea is theirs. As of the spring already they persistently invite Crimean churches to transfer from Ukrainian Union (UUECB) to the Russian Union (RUECB). Behind this expansion stands not only the issue of territories, but also the conflict of ideological

positions. In the resolution of the 34th Congress of the RUECB (May 30, 2014) Russian baptists condemned the change of government in Ukraine and called it revolt, "We declare our adherence to the Biblical Doctrine, which accepts no violent overthrow of legitimate government, nationalism and settlement of social and political controversies other than by way of political negotiation. "Do not copulate with rebels (Parables 24:21)" [5]. The delegates of the congress hastened to dissociate from "their brother in faith", at the time acting President of Ukraine, Oleksandr Turchynov, and at the same time to send to President Putin a loyal letter, in which they assured him of support and prayers "So the God would give Your strength and courage to stay faithful in the struggle with manifestations of xenophobia and preservation of interconfessional peace." It is only fair to say that many pro-Russian leaders of Eastern Ukrainian churches came further by demanding excommunication of the "bloody pastor". According to the testimonies of pastors from Donbass, when DPR secessionists ask them "Is Turchinov yours?" they bravely answer "not, not ours."

It is noteworthy that at the same 34th Congress of the RUECB together with resolution of Ukraine and servile letter to Putin the Social Concept of RUECB was adopted, in which it was written black in white as follows, "Neither of the nations or countries are to dictate its will to others on the basis of its own religious, economic, political or military superiority. Each nation is to direct its strength at corroboration of its own faulty exclusiveness and to achievement of genuine spiritual and moral progress." [6].

In order not to suspect pious champions of "Russian World" of dualism, we are to assume the only remaining variant: they really believe in the "holy Rus" and its "universal mission". Probably only by protection of "pure faith for orthodox and by "achievement of genuine spiritual and moral progress" the horrors of "Russian Spring" in Ukraine can be justified for the Protestants. Only by protection of mythic "traditional values" imperial ambitions of salutary Moscow orthodoxy in its epic opposition to the rotting Catholic and Protestant West can be covered. Only fanatic faith in oneself and one's unique character can close eyes to the unseen crimes against humanity and humaneness, against Ukraine and the world, against the God and one's neighbor, done by orthodox crusaders.

Sooner or later the world community shall be forced to acknowledge the fact of "political orthodoxy, and "orthodox terrorism", connected therewith, supported by Russia and having destabilizing impact at the whole region of Eurasia, and the sooner it happens, the better it is for regional and

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global security, for protection of religious freedom and civil rights, for self-determination of people and nations. One of the first steps in this direction can be recognition of "orthodox" people's republics (Luhansk and Donetsk) as terrorist organizations in the East of Ukraine. Such fair recognition shall to make things clear, determines the parties to the conflict, the aggressor and the victim, as well as shall allow to non-political and non-aggressive orthodoxy to dissociate itself form political and aggressive simulacrums..

In form of conclusions I shall propose eight key theses about religious dimensions of Ukrainian crisis, their global significance and possible position of the international community.

Firstly, the "hybrid" war, which was unleashed by Russia in Ukraine, is not so much anti-Ukrainian, as anti-West, and so much obviously religious motivated, that it can quite be called «holy war», in which "orthodox army" fights against "Uniates, dissidents and sectarians". In the conscience of ideologists of the "Russian Spring" Russian intervention is posed as a "crusade" against the West, winning back, gathering, reunion of the lands of "Russian World".

Secondly, everyone, who is connected with the West by origin ("strangers") or by deliberate choice ("traitors"), are automatically entered into the list of the enemies of "Russian World": Greek Catholics as betrayers of the enemies of orthodox faith, Uniates, "banderivtsi", orthodox of Kiev Patriarchate as schismatic dissenters, renegades, "nationalists"; protestants as sectarians, westernists, American spies; Crimean tatars as pro-Ukrainian and non-orthodox. There is obvious religious discrimination of all confessions with the exception of Moscow Patriarchate.

Thirdly, by intertwining with the state, using its monopolistic access to its resources and using ideological influence at its policy, Russian orthodoxy becomes more and more "political orthodoxy". In this case it is difficult to detach religion from the policy. It is this complicated connection the hybrid character of the war in Ukraine is explained. The state received religious justification and the holy sanction of the Russian Orthodox Church for merciless war, thus economic logic and political reasonability of turned out to be in subordination to religious motif – to return to Moscow Patriarchate its "canonical territory" and to build upon it an orthodox empire of "Russian World".

Fourthly, successive isolation from international contacts and violent incorporation of religious unions from Crimea and Donbass into close by religious doctrine Russian structures (this is claimed by Pentecostals and Baptists). Taking into account orthodox and aggressive ideology of occupa-

tional government, religious confessions are deprived of any possibility to conduct services in religious buildings and missionary activity in the society, to get international support and organize charity. Often the condition of returning confiscated buildings or extension of premises lease agreements is re-registration and concomitant procedure of "orthodox expertise". Confessions are left not only without rights and means of subsistence, but also in isolation from Ukraine and international support.

Fifthly, spreading of orthodox ideology of "Russian World" and religious pursuits of other confessions have already lead to significant change in religious card of the region. Most of religious organizations seized their activity and their congregation were forced to move to other regions. At the same time the majority of displaced people doesn't have necessary living conditions for their families, and perspectives for job placement under conditions of economic crisis in the country. The whole communities turned out to be in dissemination and the priests, who stayed on the occupied territories, are in constant danger. It can be spoken of destroyed religious unions in the three regions of Ukraine – Crimea, Luhansk, Donetsk Regions, thus it is necessary to speak of many thousands of refugees, aggrieved, killed and injured. Believers of various confessions can be considered victims of religious purges.

Sixthly, while interconfessional community of Ukraine was consolidated around anti-corruption "revolution of dignity", national dignity and opposition to aggression of "Russian World"; Russian confession were united in support of anti-West course of its president. The title of the book of the former President of Ukraine, Leonid Kuchma, "Ukraine is no Russia" conveys strict delimitation between the countries well and presents Ukraine to the world as an independent phenomenon - "no Russia". It is hard to grasp it within the framework of habitual ideas of the Western world, calling "Russia" everything that was involved by the former USSR. As of today it becomes clear: Ukraine together with its rich confessional variety, eastern and western synthetic religious culture is to be accepted as an independent and perspective subject of relations. Moreover, Ukraine is to be accepted as the victim of external aggression, whereas the reason for aggression became pro-Western orientation of the society and consensus of the majority of confessions, supporting European aspirations of the country.

Seventhly, behind the opposition in Ukraine one should see the conflict of universal human rights and freedoms and of the so-called "traditional values". Behind the deceptive rhetoric of "traditional values" neither universal, nor even all-Christian values are hidden, but the traditional for

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"political orthodoxy" values of "orthodoxy-autocracy-nationality", i.e. the values of "orthodox empire". On the contrary, by standing up for fundamental values of freedom, as applied to the person and the nation, Ukrainian "revolution of dignity" protects the possibility of religious freedom and confessional variety. In this collision of the forming civil society and monolithic "orthodox empire" in Ukraine the support of international legal institutes and solidarity of many-faced and free Christian world is needed.

Eighthly, as expansion of orthodox "Russian World" poses a threat to religious unique character of Ukraine, the protection of its unique character requires international help – professional monitoring, expert analysis, advocacy of religious freedom, expansion of international connections, integration into the global space. An answer to the intervention on the part of Russia can be subsequent and soon integration into the European space, but in no way "Finnlandization". In its turn, the world community has the only way to withstand absorption of Ukraine by Russia – to come closer to Ukraine, to tie it with strong religious, cultural, political, economic ties; to open all the doors for free travel of Ukrainian believers, who are in need of help; to use all diplomatic means recognize secessionist "people's republics" as terrorist organizations, their "policy" in relation to religious organizations as discrimination policy, their victims to be the victims of religion-motivated terrorism.

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CONSEQUENCES OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF "THE RUSSIAN WORLD" IN UKRAINE

The article analyzes the changes in the socio-political, religious situation and the consequences of attempts to implement the doctrine of "Russian world" in Ukraine. Theoretical and historical origins and main ideological foundations of the doctrine "Russian world" are presented; methods for export of cultural and religious values are described as leverages in conducting foreign policy. The ground of the impact of the doctrine "Russian world" in Ukraine is found.

Keywords: "Russian world", Orthodoxy, geopolitical doctrine, conflict in Ukraine.

Quite recently, Ukraine was associated with a post-Soviet state, especially famous in the world thanks to the success of Andrey Shevchenko and Klitschko brothers in sport, as well as violations of freedom of speech, a weak economy, and a corrupt government. Everything changed at the end of 2013, when protests in Kiev and some areas led to the escape of the authorities from the country that was a real boom in the information world, which increased over time. Further development of events in Crimea, and then in Donetsk and Lugansk regions have led to a real information war, the events in Ukraine do not descent from the pages of newspapers and TV screens, Ukrainian theme has kept primacy in social media over a year. Summits of the first politicians in the world are devoted to the events in Ukraine and ways to solve them. And often you can hear the opinion that the destiny of the world is decided in Donbass, and the possibility of World War III has never been closer. More recently a powerful industrial center of the country has become the scene of a struggle between two "life-worlds", the ideological systems, methods of the world perception – the Western European model of development and "Russian world". Perhaps the Ukrainian national identity is going now, as well as the choice of model of the state structure that will adequately meet the Ukrainian reality, however, that will

outweigh the scales on the final: a human life and the number of deaths, destroyed cities and the opportunity to get a "new state", which is quite dangerously balancing with the possibility of losing independence?

The collapse of the Soviet Union implanted in the minds of the population, as well as the ex-Soviet politicians and nomenclatura the idea of the lost homeland, as well as the search for themselves in a multicultural world, which opened with the fall of the "Iron Curtain". By that time, Russia had lost its superpower status, which the Soviet Union had, but in any way was trying to retain influence over the former Soviet republics, which entered upon the slope of self-identity and independence. This resulted in a series of military conflicts in the early 1990s, in Nagorno-Karabakh, Transdniestria, South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Chechnya, but these conflicts were not sufficiently ideologically elaborated, which led to the loss of the already not significant international image of the state. On this occasion the former chairman of the State Duma Committee on Foreign Affairs K. Kosachev quite clearly expressed: "Often, we cannot really explain the very meaning of our presence in the former Soviet Union, believing it is something axiomatic. The West does this under the guise of democratization, and we do this only for the sake of ourselves. But the slogans of democracy (even with the obvious geopolitical overtones) are addressed by the peoples, and our activity too openly pursues the Russian interests. This is patriotic, but not competitive. Meanwhile, we should offer something for the sake of THESE countries, something understandable and accessible: "growth, modernization and independence"; some unifying projects instead of pro-Russian" [8]. Since 2004, the Russian ideologists began to actively seek for those who needed to be "protected". Taking into account the concentration of ethnic Russian in the former Soviet republics, they did not have to search long. "The Russian diaspora offers social and humanitarian foundation for the implementation of the interests of the Russian Federation in the post-Soviet space", "as the Geopolitical concept, "Russian world" is useful in Eastern Europe countries, which Russia intends to hold in its own orbit and where it is ready to intervene, if they choose a different foreign policy" – the former deputy head of the Department of compatriots abroad A. Chepurin said [1]. Protection of the interests of the Russian-speaking, orthodox population fitted for that perfectly. So there appeared a need to rethink the "Russian world" into a geopolitical doctrine and a political technology.

The discussion about "Russian world", which was carried in Russia in the 1990s - early 2000s, can be reduced to the search for and attempts to preserve the cultural identity of the Russian people, even finding new, to

replace the lost Soviet. In this regard, the names of Peter Shchedrovitskiy and Efim Ostrovskiy are often recalled. According to the "Russian Journal", they are in the list of high-paid political strategists and specialists in the world to regulate political crises. Before that they managed to work in Ukraine, since 1993 they worked with L. Kuchma, V. Pinchuk, from 1998 with V. Khoroshkovskiy, as well as some commercial banks, with the "Komanda ozimogo pokoleniya" (which also included V. Khoroshkovskiy) since 2001, and entered the headquarters of Natalia Korolevskaya in 2012. The project of "Ozimoe pokolenie" can be called a failure, but the top five of the list has done a remarkable political career in Ukraine. Taking into account all this, the participation of P. Shchedrovitskiy in the project "Other. Reading-book of the new Russian identity" in 1995, where A. Kuraev, S. Chernyshev, V. Kaganskiy, S. Kurginyan and many others have taken part is interesting as well. This is a four-volume edition that can be only bought in the "Russian Institute". The essence of the thesis can be summarized as a thesis of one of the authors: "Other is a philosophical steamer that returns to its homeland". It is based on the understanding of those fundamental challenges that Russia has received after the fall of the Soviet Union, as well as the desire to draw attention of a group of authors to the works of each other, comprehending different ideas. Project organizers set a goal to organize a particular process, combine similar but disparate ideas and bring them to specialists in various fields of science. "Let's assume that some country was struck by a spiritual hunger. Sow grains of transcendental truth, good and beauty are not sown, harvest is not reaped, not grinded, not taken to the elevator and a variety of bins, flour is not made, bread is not baked and not distributed in some way through the trading network or a system of field kitchens. As you know, the more spiritual degeneration is, the merciless is the fire of material enmity that cannot be put out by material means. In this situation, the maximum objective is to revive the culture of thought making, cultivation of the spiritual soil. But the first step should be the awareness of the fact of a transcendent hunger, understanding that the function of the spiritual power of society, goal-setting function is destroyed, and requires speedy recovery and institutionalization", – S. Chernyshev writes in the foreword [2]. The Shchedrovitskiy's work in this collection, as well as the further cooperation with Ostrovskiy, should be considered the basis of the ideas of "Russian world", in the form in which we have to deal with it now. So, it is the Russian language that becomes the lever of expanding the influence of "Russian world" abroad, "Russian world" is a community of people who speak Russian, no matter

where they are physically, if they are spiritually in Russia. In fact, Russia has been taken out beyond the physical and has become rather a cultural phenomenon, so where they speak Russian, there is Russia. According to P. Shchedrovitskiy, it would open access for Russia, primarily, to the economic component of the countries, where the Russian diaspora lives. However, at that time such ideas were considered purely theoretical and even utopian.

Everything changed in the mid-2000s, gradually "Russian world" moved from intellectual circles into the rooms of the Kremlin and the Russian Orthodox Church, having become one of the main vectors of Russian foreign policy. This is primarily due to the high attraction and a great mobilization potential of the concept, because it does not pose a political or socio-economic bias, but the cultural and ethical senses, does not restrict Russia only by its borders, but rather opens up the possibilities of political influence on the countries, where there is a Russian-speaking diaspora; it is not important who you are ethnically, what political views and social status you have. This approach allowed doing what seemed impossible, for example, orthodox communists appeared with such slogans as: "The task number one for the Russian world is orthodoxy and Soviet project must work together". In late 2006, the President of the RF V. Putin said at the meeting with the artistic intelligentsia: "Russian world can and must unite all those who cherish Russian words and Russian culture, wherever they live, in Russia or abroad. I use this phrase more often – "Russian world" [3]. A little later, in 2007, the foundation "Russian world" was created by the presidential decree, which set the goal to popularize the Russian language and culture in Russia and the world. "Now, under the auspices of the Russian Fund 100 centers in 45 countries and 145 offices of the Russian world in 56 countries operate – from Argentina to Armenia". "The world does not consist of the Baltic states, Ukraine and some Eastern European countries, where there are some attacks on the fund "Russian world". So we continue our mission with our head high and we will continue it regardless of the fact whether there are people who like it or not". "Over the last year the Russian world has changed, it has been changed by Ukraine. Seven years ago we talked about the Russian world as a cultural phenomenon; we talked about the world of Russian language and culture. Now the Russian world is increasingly politicized and it becomes a category not so much cultural as political", – the executive director of the fund Vladimir Kochin said [4]. "And in November 2010, the Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia, Kirill said: "The core of the Russian world is Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia. The basis of the

Russian world is the Russian language, Russian culture and orthodoxy. Kiev is the cradle of the Russian civilization" [5].

However, focus on the diaspora reflected within Russia itself. Based on the polls of "The all-Russian public opinion studies centre" in November 2014 – 71% of Russians have never heard of "Russian world" concept, 52% of those who understand this concept do not include the central and western Ukraine in it, but include Donbass (72 %) [6]. Commenting on the poll, the archpriest V. Chaplin said: "I am delighted that more than a quarter of our citizens have already known about the concept of "Russian world". It is in fact new. It appeared only a few years ago, and now there is a fairly broad discussion concerning the question who can be attributed to "Russian world", and who himself refers to it. We have won many invasions from the East and the West, and we will defeat those who are trying to impose on us a life of someone else's rules. We will defeat America as well – not necessarily on the battlefield, but on the field of ideas and meanings. We say things that are more obvious to people all over the world, we ask such questions which cannot be answered people who build a world power. Since truth is for us" [7].

In 2010, the same center made a series of polls to determine the degree of religiosity of Russians. The study found that only 2% of Russians adhere to Lent, and 71% do not consider it necessary to do so, as only 2% make confessions once a month, or more often, as a rule the same people who are fasting. It was also revealed that 33% of Russians do not know any commandments, and about 15% believe the commandments are other phrases that do not belong to them. According to the same data only 41% of Russians refer themselves to the Russian Orthodox Church, another 25% simply believe "in God", and 21% are trying to believe "more than now". [9]

Similar statistics leads us to think about the ideological basis of "Russian world". The concept of "Moscow as the Third Rome" and "Holy Russia" immediately comes to mind, but these ideas are more suited to academia, from which "Russian world" has come. As S. Gradirovskiy noted in 2010 at the roundtable "Ukrainian and Russian world. Antropoaspekt" "the discussion subsided, because brute force began to dominate in Russia. And later the phrase "Russian world" was picked up by Nikonov, who created a foundation, started doing projects, all this other money and other political heft. This idea was picked up by the new patriarch. But, admittedly, RW now looks like the geopolitical, and even more as a business-diaspora project" [10].

Geopolitical preconditions of origin the conflict situation
in Eastern Ukraine

When "Russian world" was taken to the "arms" of the Russian authorities, for promotion and greater access, if we may say so, the creation of a specific interest of the population, it was simplified ideologically. Therefore, the ideas of "Bulwark of Orthodoxy", "Grandfathers fought" can be attributed to the ideological basis and as derived from the previous ones, "Crimea is ours".

The first statement – the Russian Orthodox Church is the foundation of the Universal Orthodoxy and is the only church, which has retained the authentic faith. This idea goes back to the Council of Florence in the middle of the XV century, where the Christians of the Eastern rite were presented by bishops of Constantinople and Kiev. After the adoption of the Florentine union the Metropolitan of Kiev received resistance in Moscow, where his residence was and went to Rome, and the Church Moscow detached from the Kiev Church, but not in the canonical way. In fact, the cathedral, which was intended to reduce the controversy, deepened the rift between the Western and Eastern branches of Christianity. After the fall of Constantinople, the union lost its political significance, and it seemed it never had the religious. So, the Universal Orthodoxy is based on the idea of "Pentarchy", i.e. 5 ancient and key churches for the Christians of the Eastern rite, they include: Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch, Jerusalem and Cyprus canonical local churches. Also there is a very interesting phrase from tomos of the Ecumenical Patriarch Gregory VII on November 13, 1924: "The first branch of Our Table of the Kiev archdiocese and its dependent Orthodox archdioceses of Lithuania and Poland, as well as their bringing to the Holy Moscow Church came not with the requirements of the canonical rules, and not with respect for everything that has been established with respect to the full autonomy of the Kiev Metropolitan, who bore the title of Exarch of the Ecumenical Throne" [11].

The second statement – Russia alone won the Great Patriotic War, having freed Europe from fascism. The origins of this idea originate largely from the Soviet propaganda, but it was given a new dimension by the performance of V. Putin in December 2010: "Now, concerning our relations with Ukraine... I respectfully disagree with you when you have told now that if we would be separated, we would not have won the war. We would still have won because we are a country of winners". "The war is won I do not want to offend anyone, due to the industrial resources of the Russian Federation. It is a historical fact; this is all in the documents" [12]. It should be started with the fact that the Second World War is a global process, where 63 states have taken part, on three continents, and in the waters of the

four oceans. It is the largest armed conflict in history, the total number of killed is about 65 million people. USSR is actually one of the countries winners, but this is an alliance, which was composed of 15 republics and Russia is only one of them; for example, the loss of the Ukrainian SSR is about 45% of the total losses of the USSR in the war. The name the "Great Patriotic War" was used in the Soviet Union, now in Russia and some former republics; the world did not name individual wars of several countries during the Second World War as opposition, a similar name is not mentioned in western sources, and is considered only as a period of Soviet participation in the conflict. The Soviet propaganda tried to bring the war to a confrontation between the USSR and Germany, and in some sense it did it, but is it true? The special role of the 9th of May, "Victory Day", which is the day of mourning for the dead for other participating countries, the day of grief, and a reminder of the tragedy that almost led to the destruction of humanity. In the Soviet Union and now in Russia and some former republics, this day symbolizes one of the biggest holidays that emphasizes military power of the state.

The combination of the two previous ideological foundations represented the third – "Crimea is ours". The first thing that comes to mind is Putin's conversation with George Bush in 2008, at the NATO summit in Bucharest. "You understand George that Ukraine is not even a state! What is Ukraine? Part of its territory is Eastern Europe, and part, and a large one, is presented by us!" – the President of the Russian Federation said [13]. It was, perhaps, the first open and aggressive speech of V. Putin, in which the national identity of Ukraine was placed in question.

"For Russia the Crimean Peninsula, ancient Korsun, Chersonese, Sevastopol have a great civilization and sacred value as well as the Temple Mount in Jerusalem for those who profess Islam and Judaism. And that is how we will feel about it from this moment and forever, because it is here, in the Crimea, in the ancient Chersonese, or as it was called Korsun by Russian chronicles, Prince Vladimir was baptized and then crossed the whole Russia", – the President of the RF V. Putin said in his address to the Federal Assembly in December 2014 [14]. We can endlessly talk about that fact that Putin in his speech contradicts himself, Vladimir was the prince of Kiev, Moscow did not exist, the Russians all the more, that it was still far off before the introduction of Christianity into Russia, and the first printed Bible appeared in the area only at the end of XVI century and so on. In fact, in this situation we need to be as honest with ourselves as possible, it does not matter whether elections in the Crimea were legitimate, there was a Russian

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army, and whether Crimea wanted to return to Russia so much. The important thing is that now it is the territory of another state, and it is lost perhaps for Ukraine. The Crimea is possessed by one whose fleet is based there. Ukrainian fleet is not there. In late February 2014 the new leadership of Ukraine was not able to keep part of its territory, and it seemed nothing was done for this, appeals to the principle of inviolability of borders and calls for the countries of Western Europe and the United States cannot be considered adequate measures. It looked as if you were cut off a leg, and you talked about the principles of humanism and human life as the highest value. The main question, "Crimea – it is Ukraine or Russia?" is possibly remains, although the indigenous population – the Crimean Tatars – probably have their own opinion about this.

Constant appeals of the ruling authorities of the Russian state to Orthodoxy, its key role in the construction of the state and the Russian consciousness, are pushing us to comprehend the work of the Russian Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate in Ukraine. First of all, we should refer to statistics, to better understand the scope and capabilities of this organization. According to the data of "The Razumkov Centre" [15] as of 2014 76% of Ukrainian population consider themselves to be "believers", regardless of whether they attend church or not. 70.2% identify themselves as Orthodox Christians, including 24.8% belong to the Moscow Patriarchate, 31.9% belong to the Kiev Patriarchate, and 39.8% of respondents answer "just Orthodox". For example, in Donetsk, with the support of the UOC MP, there is CRT television, and three Orthodox magazines and 2 newspapers are published. And this is despite the fact that in the east 62% of people identifies themselves as believers, but, for example, in the West it is 93%. Representatives of the Kiev Patriarchate do not lead such activities, and the proportion of Greek Catholics is extremely small. Such activity is not limited to newspapers and television; if we analyze the policy documents of "People's Republics", for example the constitution of DNR, you can see the following: "WE, THE SUPREME COUNCIL OF THE DONETSK PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC, feeling like an integral part of the Russian world as a Russian civilization, community of Russian and other people, thinking the inseparability of the fate of the Russian World and wanting to continue to be partakers of it, remaining committed to the ideals and values of Russian world and honoring the memory of ancestors who shed blood for these ideals and values and conveyed to us love and respect for the common Fatherland, confessing the Orthodox faith (Faith Christian Orthodox Catholic of Eastern Confession) of the Russian

Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) and recognizing it as a keystone of Russian world, and being conscious of the historic responsibility and expressing the will of the multinational people of the Donetsk People's Republic, as expressed in the referendum decision of May 11, 2014, following the generally recognized principles of equality and self-determination of peoples and proclaiming the inviolability of the democratic principles of the formation and exercise of power, reaffirm the sovereignty of the Donetsk People's Republic on the whole of its territory and the establishment of a sovereign independent state, intended on the restoration of a unified cultural and civilizational space of Russian world, based on its traditional religious, social, cultural and moral values, with the prospect of joining the Great Russia as the halo of the Russian World, and adopt the present Constitution of the Donetsk People's Republic" [16]. The former advisor of the Minister of Defense of DNR on Information Policy in August 2014, in his interview, said: "The Ukrainian side does not have orthodox at all, because any Orthodox church-going person will not go to war against the Novorossiya, because he knows that the unity of Holy Russia is acceptable before God. All the saints, who spoke on the subject, unanimously agreed that the Holy Russia should be united. And the Ukrainian Nazis are just the separatists and they want to break Novorossiya away from the Holy Russia, and attach it to the militant decaying West. Therefore, there are no church people from the Ukrainian side at all. There are mostly Uniates, schismatics, neo-pagans and sectarians in the punitive battalions. There are many formally baptized people in the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate among the soldiers of the army, but they do not know even the basics of the Orthodox Faith, Belief" [17]. The so-called "armed forces" of DNR and LNR comprise units positioning themselves as religious. For example, "Russian Orthodox army" is perhaps the most famous of these units, there is also the Orthodox battalion of "Voskhod", the Legion of St. Ishtvan, and the battalion of the Holy Mother of the August "August". Such actions religious motives here made to the overall picture of the conflict, followed by attempts to bring them to the fore, supposedly that true orthodox soldiers defend the faith of their ancestors, something like that is formalized in the constitution of the DNR. Of course, the official position of the Russian Orthodox Church and the UOC MP is sufficiently clear, for example, the archpriest G. Kovalenko, the head of the Synodal Information and Education Department of the UOC MP in June 2014, said: "The Russian Orthodox Church does not bless the "Russian Orthodox army" to fight for "Russian world" [18]. Such reaction the church hierarchs is not surprising; the ROC

cannot afford the official support of the "Republics" and the loss of the rest of Ukraine, but officially there is no war in Ukraine, no Russian soldiers as well.

Based on the foregoing, there are questions of whether or not there are such strong positions of "Russian world" in the Donbass? Perhaps there is a different vision of Ukrainian national identity, played by the "external forces"? And how it happened that in the administrative territory where during independence there have been no protests or strikes, and population is the least religious in the country, "religious armies" actually have occurred to defend "their way of life and ancestral faith"? The questions are quite complex and can hardly have unequivocal answers acceptable to all parties to the conflict. In fact, Russia has never seen Ukraine as an independent state, for example, in the collection of the Institute of Europe, "Ukrainian crisis: expert assessment" [19], which was released in late 2014, the following trends can be traced: the collapse of Ukraine is a natural process, the continuation of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Ukraine is an artificial country, a forcible collection of different peoples with different identities. It is noted as well that the Russian science has never engaged in a comprehensive study of Ukraine, considering it a part of itself. Therefore, it is not surprising that the "volunteers" from Russia protect "their" land, the Orthodox faith and traditions on the territory of Ukraine. This combination of elements of Orthodox Christianity, ideology, geopolitical concepts with an unstable government situation, unsuccessful steps of the authorities in running the country, the difficult economic situation gave rise to the of East-Ukrainian conflict. This situation has not arisen simultaneously with the end of "Euromaidan" and was the result of a prolonged lack of interest of the state in addressing primarily ideological issues and careless information policy, a lack of promotion of the Ukrainian language and culture, and the lack of ideas of Ukrainians that does not contradict to local cultural characteristics of a specific territory, but rather complements it. Did it have solutions? Perhaps, there was a certain sequence of the most successful political and economic as well as security steps that could lead to the improvement. Were the parties of the conflict interested in the solution? Obviously, each of us has his own answer.

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UDC 130.2

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UKRAINE: THE BIRTH OR AWAKENING
OF THE SUBJECT OF HISTORY

This paper is an attempt to see the modern conflict in Eastern Ukraine not as a confrontation between the West and Russia or an internal civil conflict, but on the basis of Ukraine itself, on the specifics and the patterns of development of Ukrainian history, its internal determinants and its place in the history of European (Christian) civilization, through the attempt to trace the historical unity of action, a single historical subjectivity of Ukrainian (rus, ruthenian) culture from Kievan Rus to Kiev Maidans of the XXI century.

Keywords: a subject of history, Ukrainian nation, Catholic Rus, Rus, conflict in Eastern Ukraine..

"New Orientalism. The Colonial Influence in the Western Views of Ukraine" [1] accuses the Western intellectuals of quite a colonial vision of Ukraine. The author draws such conclusion by comparing Edward Said's thesis from the work "Orientalism", having become a textbook for any postcolonial studies already, which was published in 1978, with the latest opuses of the Western experts on the Ukrainian conflict. The West actually denies the right of both Asian societies and Ukraine to be the subject of history, and not just the object of it. Not that we are basically deprived of this right, most the Western vision of Ukrainian history and contemporaneity makes the Western intellectuals think us definitely in terms of the object.

Is it really so? Does that vision of Ukraine correspond to reality or is it simply inadequate or not fully accurate the West's vision of Ukraine?

Let's try to find out whether Ukraine is only now becoming the subject of history or there is some tradition in *longue dur?e* of Ukrainian history in its subjectivity.

First of all, we shall define the terms. Without going deep into theory, under the subject of history we shall understand the community, which is able to influence by itself and influences the course of its own, and as a result - not only its own history. A prime example of it, of course, will be the nation-locomotives (the English, the French, the Germans, the Russians), that is, those nations that are permanent vanguard of European history and produce trends, followed by others. The objects of history are the nations over which history is made.

What does make the object of history be the subject of history?

First of all, it is worth noting that the subject is an ?ctor, i.e. the current phenomenon. And any action precedes the definition of objectives, because to act means to act for a particular purpose. So at the moment when the certain community sets its specific objectives, it, firstly, becomes the subject of history, because it begins to move toward the defined objective, realizing the way to the objective as its own mission, and that gives meaning to the existence of community. Returning to the national existence, we have to admit that exactly at this moment a nation becomes a nation. It is the realization of its own objective, the mission of its existence that begins the way that the nation will pave for itself. The trailhead of this way becomes a moment of the birth of the nation, which can be produced from either cultural (the Jews, the Germans, the Poles), or political communities (the Americans, the Swiss, the Austrians[1]).). The beginning of this historical way to a particular mission is becoming a subject of history, because it is the beginning of the action - the implementation of its objective. So, actually being the subject of history constitutes a nation.

It is obvious that such goal-setting at the level of large public entities can not be the matter of unanimous approval at the popular assembly (veche), counsel, general meeting of "shareholders" or referendum. Then, how is the goal which gives meaning to the existence of the whole nation, formed and revealed? Such not an easy and fateful mission lies on the shoulders of intellectuals. A striking example of this is the Central European Risorgimento[2], the engine of which was romantic poets and, in some places,

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[1] Actually, the latter ones are an excellent example of how a nation arises from the dynastic state.

[2] National revivals.

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as it were, for example, in Slovenia - the priests. It is the "high culture" surrounding (in Gellner's understanding of it) where the reflection on the whole national life of the whole community occurs. The base, the material for such reflection is "the low culture" in all its diversity. In the end, the purpose of existence of a nation does not arise *ex nihilo*, it is implicit in the history of the people, and it is a constituent that ensures the continuity and the consciousness of its selfishness on the ways of history. In fact, this is the first, academic stage of the national revival, according to M. Hroch [2]. The next stage is the popularization of the developed intellectual ideas. In the classic Hroch's version it occurs, mainly, through a university department. But, in our view, for the belated Central European nations, who often do not have their own department, such popularization may quite occur through creative writing, through the "phenomenon" of prophet poets, that is not completely the same as the more famous adherents-populists. These poets are called to renew the connection of the past with the present and future in the collective consciousness, that was lulled by the time of enslavement, thereby contributing to the revival of the nation as a subject of history, which is a manifestation of the purpose of national existence. And that means appearing of the mission of the nation's existence, actually the mission that the people is entrusted with, and that is a cross, which the people is destined to carry in their *via dolorosa* history. The conceptualization of such mission takes place everywhere in the framework of the Christian religion, although it may have extra- or pre-Christian content.

The figure of a poet-prophet or a prophet-awakener was brought forth by romanticism. A national genius, who was considered worthy of articulating the national archetypes, able to sound different tones, caressing or tearing the soul of one or another representative of the nation, in a nutshell, everyone. Creativity of such writer goes far beyond literature or philosophy, it's the articulation of the very *Volksgeist*, which until now has been hidden under a shroud of secrecy for its carriers.

And there can be no question that Taras Shevchenko as well as his "fellow prophets" A. Mickiewicz, S. Petofi, J.W. Goethe, W. Chavcha-vadze, H. Ibsen, etc. fulfilled their mission consciously, and therein their genius lies (the very same inspiration from above, whether from God or from the national spirit), in order to, intuitively, easy, spontaneously, perhaps even without noticing, turn the development of world history to a qualitatively new stage, having brought new formations - the nations, - to the forestage of history. M. Heidegger wrote in his work "On the Essence of

Truth": "History begins only when beings themselves are expressly drawn up into their unconcealment and conserved in it, only when this conservation is conceived on the basis of questioning regarding beings as such" [3, 18]. Precisely, the urgent objective of romanticists was the discovery of history as a foundation of national existence, the intuitive discovery of unconcealment of secrets and archetypes - the essence of national existence, which is traditionally opened as history, furthermore a national history.

According to M. Hroch, the political stage becomes a final one when the nation, having become aware of its mission, and thus become the subject of history, begins to struggle for its own state and the political realization.

However, the factor, that initiates the process of nation formation, is awareness of its own religious mission among the equal before God, but different populations. A crystallization center of this national messianism is the particularities of the religiously colored awareness of its own community, that reach pre-Christian times, but were re-interpreted and specifically realized exactly in the framework Christianity. Crossing over, two religious paradigms do not create a nation, but make it possible.

If the pre-Christian images formed the primary ground for distinguishing the community, the necessary negative stage of identity "we are not ...", then for a positive one "we are ..." something different was required. It was European Christianity that made possible the existence of a nation; it has given to a nation the main weapon - the concept of history, a linear time concept. Only within a framework of time, conceptualized by Christianity as a linear sequential process, the awareness of lingering, continuity of life in general and life of its components in particular has become possible. A nation is, first of all, a memory, historical consciousness that is conscious of itself as the bearer of a clearly defined mission. As a result of the fact that the genesis of a nation is a process that belongs to the European intellect, the mission is defined in a historically acceptable, understandable, usual Christian form. The mission, realized in such way, is invariant - to lead the universal movement towards salvation. In fact, the empirical variety of a nation creates the varied understanding of the ways and paths leading to salvation: from the popularization of the gains of the supremacy of democratic values (obviously based on the intentions of the Bible), like the French have it, to the idea of achieving the kingdom of heaven by the persecuted and the oppressed, who will initiate the universal brotherhood and equality (the ideas that the Slavic national revivals of the XIX century emerged on). The metaphysical foundations of neither Antiquity or the Middle Ages allowed the nation to be born, that's why a

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nation is an object of modern reality only, that has replaced its predecessor - a dynastic state, - in the public space.

Now come back to Ukraine. At first glance it may seem that the events of the last decade in Ukraine constitute the birth of the subject of history under the name of Ukraine. Here, as one can see, everything fits together - the formation of a civil society, which supposedly only now is emerging in Ukraine. This is particularly evident on the example of events of 2014 (and the trend continues to live) when the self-organization of society crippled Ukrainian Leviathan and has become the expressive action that induced the Ukrainians to decide their own destiny by themselves, i.e. to act for the benefit of their own objective. Concurrently we note that the Ukrainian philosophers Igor and Jaroslav Pasko [4] connect, and well-grounded enough, the birth of European nations just with the formation of a civil society when a society itself begins, through the representative institutions of different levels, to bear responsibility for itself, that has been delegated previously to monarchs. That is so, in this inextricable bundle the responsibility is primary, freedom comes only after the responsibility and just as its necessary continuation. The Ukrainians trodden the road to freedom just by taking the responsibility for themselves in the winter of 2014. It was a unique situation, when, in fact, the society within a limited area of Maidan proved capable of reconstituting a full state with a medical system, army and police. Moreover, the witnesses of this process often says that this system was functioning at least no worse than the official state with all the bureaucracy and resources.

Was not the Zaporizhian Sich organized itself in the same spontaneous way? Isn't this social formation a prototype of a civil society in our territories? Interestingly, that, according to many researchers, the emergence of the university was one of the prerequisites of birth of the modern Western society. On Kiev Maidan there were public lectures at the Barbican too. All of these are interesting historical parallels that still need studying.

To make a long story short, it seems that the recent events have given rise to a new subject of history - the Ukrainian nation. But is that Ukrainian subject really so fresh and new?

What strikes the eye of Western intellectual (as well as Russian one), who is insufficiently conversant with the history of Ukraine? Ukraine, its territory and population are constantly found themselves at the epicenter of events and in the sphere of influence of more powerful neighbors: Muscovy (the Russian Empire), the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Ottoman

Empire and the Habsburg Empire, etc. In other words, these incomparably more powerful forces govern Ukraine throughout its history, that certainly, at first glance, does not allow to speak about the historical subjectivity of Ukrainian heritage. But ... According to the rules of genre, in such circumstances the Ukrainians should have disappeared among the surrounding subjects having adopted their culture and taken the mission as their own, so that means to assimilate.

At the same time it is obvious that it is not so. None of the major political formations that governed at the territory of Ukraine, succeeded to assimilate the Ukrainians, but certainly all the external conditions promote to do that. So there was something that held the Ukrainians together, something that prevented them from losing their own identity, something that, according to our assumption, was realized as their own mission.

As we have already noted, realization of mission, which constitutes the national existence, usually took place in the categories of Christianity. Accordingly, the Ukrainian (Ruthenian, Rus[1])) objective should be looked for in this direction. And there we should raise a few questions that should be answered.

Nature of Kievan Rus' Christianity and its heritage. Contrary to the traditional version of taking the patterns of Christianity from Byzantium, there are more and more voices saying about the uniqueness of Christian traditions of Kievan Rus. Anyway, Rus as the eastern outpost of the Christian world, should be aware of its unique mission of defense of Christianity, first geographically from the hordes coming from the east, and then ...

... and then institutionally. Indeed, after the fall of Kiev in 1240, a significant part of Rus was under the authority of the Horde. And, while the dawning of the Cossacks, the phenomenon of chivalry, began to appear on the southern lands in order to continue the struggle for Rus (if not in political, then, first of all, in the religious sense), North-Eastern Rus is looking for ways, and not without success, of cooperation and adaptation against the background of submission to the Horde (thus being forced to adopt the mental and political traditions of the nomads). It's interesting, that when the idea of Moscow as the Third Rome appearing, Moscow charged Constantinople with losing the independence and submission of the latter to

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[1] In the present article names Ruthenian, Rusyn, Rus are used as synonyms related to community of people who lived in the territory of Ancient Rus, identified themselves with the old Kievan Rus tradition as opposed to identities of Polish, Lithuanian or Moscow traditions.

**Geopolitical preconditions of origin the conflict situation
in Eastern Ukraine**

Muslims of the Ottoman Empire, at the same time as if not noticing their dependence on the Horde that was not orthodox too. It is difficult to talk about saving the cultural traditions of Kievan Rus, when the Finno-Ugric, which were under the Tatar-Mongol, the Horde suzerain's governance, ascended to Moscow princely throne.

At the same time the southern Rus also lost its independence and came under the reign of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. However, the relationships between the conquerors and the conquered developed in a completely different way, following the strategy of resigning to the Germanic tribes of Rome. When the conqueror, denoting its political and military domination, not only does not try to influence the local cultural traditions, but also adopts them. In fact, in contrast to North-Eastern Rus, South Rus retained its cultural, religious and even civilizational selfishness in the new political environment of "Lithuanian tented roof" according to the apt statement of S. Plokhiy [5].

Actually, it was the preservation of Rus identity in territory of Ukraine-Rus that provided a national revival of Ukraine, which since the XVII century having become to be a headache for more powerful neighbors. It is Kiev as a center of Rus that stands in the center of the Ukrainian movement from the time of Khmelnytskyi until the time of the UNR, the Directory and P. Skoropadskyi. Even when Muscovy under Peter I was renamed in Russia with an obvious claim to monopolize the rights for Ancient Rus heritage, Kiev continued to be *axis mundi* of Ukrainian (Ruthenian) national existence, to be the umbilical cord that mentally connects Ukraine with Rus. Obviously, Russian culture and politics feel the same, realizing that the Russian project is incomplete without Ukraine (which can often be called otherwise in Russian thought). This understanding can be traced in almost everything from the medieval claims to the throne of Kiev to Vladimir Putin's speech about "the Temple Mount" in Chersonese, that, certainly, according to the speaker, can be appropriately extrapolated on the slopes of the Dnieper.

Time of Ukraine's forming part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. In traditional Russian and Soviet historiography it is widely accepted to report on rigorous sticking the Catholic faith and polonization of population of Rus, a byproduct of which, obviously, become the Ukrainians, which in the mass consciousness are often perceived as "*the Russians spoiled by the Poles*", "*confused in their history*", as recently said Kirill, Patriarch of Moscow. So what actually happened?

EAST UKRAINIAN CONFLICT IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS

In the reporting period, the late XVI - the early XVII century, in the territory of Rus there was a significant segment of the population that was the bearer of as if the two types of identity: political – the one of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and ethnic – the one of Rus. This is reflected in the famous Latin expression *genti Ruthenis, nationi Poloniae*. The vast majority of the active members of society belonged to the Catholic faith, that, however, did not prevent them from clearly pronouncing their own Rus identity. The most famous and vivid example of this may be S. Orikhovskyi-Roxolan whose words *Ruthenum me esse et glorior et libenter profetior*[1] could be a slogan of the entire Catholic Rus in the middle – the end of the XVI century. Such population of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth has left for history two important cultural artifacts known as Dobromil circle (headed by J. Szczesny-Herburt) and Kiev circle that was gathered around the figure of J. Vereschinskyi, Kiev Catholic bishop. Originality of this phenomenon (its referring to the lack of binding Rusyn-Orthodox) is due to the involvement in European cultural circles and studying at the universities of Western Europe. This fact caused the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth identity of the representatives of Catholic Rus, and certain political attachment to the legal norms and the power of the king. However, a clearly defined Rus identity fully denies the thesis, about the destructive role of Catholicism in education of Rus gentry in the late XVI century, that established in the national historiography. It is noteworthy that almost all the written sources, that the representatives of Catholic Rus left behind them, were written in Latin, but it is an argument for the backwardness of their own culture and language, which could not meet the cultural needs of the educated population when using outside the church, rather than an evidence of de-Rusification and polonization of the authors. Anyway, using Latin to express their own creative best practices, the Ruthenians-Catholics no doubt their Rus identity. As a matter of fact, the analysis of names which the representatives of Catholic Rus gave to their own works, doesn't provide the grounds for talking about their polonization[2]. Turning the passing attention to onomastics, we can come to the conclusion that Rus identity of these people was put to the most front of their activities. It is clear that in connection with the crisis of Orthodoxy as

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[1] "I am Ruthenian, and I am proud of it and openly declare it".

[2] Stanislav Orikhovskyi-Roxolan (Orichovius-Roxolanus, Orichovius-Ruthenus), Turobinskyi-Rutenets (Turobinius-Ruthenis), Paul of Krosno (Paulus Ruthenus Cros-(rus)nensis), Georgii Tychynskyi (Tyczyniensis-Ruthenus), Grygorii Chui-Samborskyi (Cregorius Vigilantius Samboritanus Ruthenus) etc.

a common cultural matrix of the Ruthenians, these Rusyns with the Catholic Credo managed to raise the flag of the local cultural tradition, without throwing back its development, and even tried to write the Rus culture into the European context. This "writing" was possible due to bringing the ideals of humanism and other values of the Renaissance, which the works of representatives of the Catholic Rus are so filled with.

Catholic religion is rather a reaction to the decline of Orthodoxy not only as a purely ecclesiastical phenomenon, but also as a cultural dominant. Obviously, when people felt the need not only to have the reading and writing skills and to know the Bible, but also to join the leading intellectual currents of their time and here we are talking, in particular, about humanism, the Renaissance and the Reformation, they were forced to join the educational communities in more organized and advanced Catholic institutions (the Jesuits appeared in the territory of Ukraine only in 1568). In 1605 in the well-known polemic work "The Warning"[1] the unknown author vividly described the similar situation: "Reading the Polish chronicles you find enough references the Poles settling together with the Rysuns and making friendships with them [i.e. the Rusyns], and giving their daughters in marriages with the Rusyns, thus passing through them their traditions and science. Thus, as a result of polonization, the Rusyns were jealous of the Polish traditions, languages and science, and not having their own science, they begun to send their children to study in Catholic schools. And when getting education and studying sciences, their children adopted the faith. So, through science and education, all Rus gentry gradually accepted the Catholic faith. Therefore, the descendants of the Rus dukes came from the Orthodox faith to Catholicism and changed their names in order it was impossible to trace their family ties with the ancestors. As a consequence, the Greek Orthodox Church began to decline, because the wealthy people who dissociated themselves from the Orthodox Church, stopped coming to church [6, 89].

The wide passage cited above clearly illustrates the crisis of Orthodox education, perceived through the prism of the Orthodox functionary. All attempts of the Orthodox leadership to create an educational alternative to the Latin system in the form of Greco-Latin schools, have managed with the tasks imposed on them. In our opinion, the main reason is that the education system focuses on the past rather than on

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[1] The full name is "The Warning, that'll be Very Necessary in the Future Time for the Orthodox Christians, the Sons of the Holy Catholic Eastern Church"

the major modern developments. According to V. Shevchenko: "the serious attention that was paid to the Greek language, was not due to the Renaissance desire to return to Antiquity, but to the need to find sources of their own traditions and to oppose the Greek language to the Latin one" [6, 104]. Thus, the attachment to the Byzantine traditions, which were rather bony (at least at this time), prevented the development of Rus education, and, as a consequence, culture in general. After all, "the Greek language has ceased to be the language of advanced scientific thought and the Old Church Slavonic language never was. They were taught only because the Orthodox Church texts were written in them"[6, 124]. The leading developments of intellectual life of the Old World have focused in the area of the Western tradition, and therefore the Greek and Old Church Slavonic languages did not provide access to them to the extent that the Latin and Polish languages did. And T. Zenkovskyi [7, 234] consider this fact to be the problems of national development in the XIX century, because when it came to establishing the national scientific literature, the Old Church Slavonic language was maladaptive, and the local intelligentsia was forced to use Polish, Latin, Russian and thus often incorporated into the respective cultures and national traditions.

So, proselytizing in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth certainly was dictated not by the vile machinations of the Jesuits and the Catholic Poles, but rather a purely pragmatic choice of the progressive and promising youth. Catholic world gave a lot more opportunities for career and human development in the late XVI - early XVII century, and Catholicism itself had not been demonized jet, Catholics were still brothers in Christ, rather than enemies. Poland became a window to Europe for the Rusyns. The Rusyns made a career at leading universities through the Polish and Latin cultures: Paul Rusyn from Krosno in Krakow, Yurii Drogobych – in Bologna, Gregory Grygorii Kyrnytskyi − in Padua, etc., but this belonging to the official Western culture did not prevent them to clearly identify them-selves with the Rus public conglomerate. Thus, we see, that at least at the turn of the XVI-XVII centuries the Orthodox-Rusyn identification had not worked jet, and it became actual later when the confessional difference was to attach value to political ambitions of the Cossacks.

The well-known fact that later, covered with a halo of glory, the defenders of Ukraine and the Orthodox Church B.Z. Khmelnytskyi and J.S. Mazepa also studied in Catholic schools. Swinging of the pillar of Orthodox Rus, Ostrozhskyi family, can be an evidence of the progressiveness of Catholic education system. The singers of Ostrozhskyi dukes seldom

mentioned that Vasyl (Constantine) Ostrozhskyi himself had a tendency to the reformatory ideas, and his successors did become Roman Catholics. The systemic crisis of Orthodox spawned the cultural and spiritual vacuum that the Rus elite had to fill from Catholic sources, but its ethnicity remained expressively Ruthenian[1]. And the achievements of Western education was actually used for the reformation of its own Orthodox education.

At the long last the *Hadiach Union[2]* is an evidence of living not only cultural but also state Rus traditions in the consciousness of Rus gentry. Thus, we see that due to the objective reasons the position of the Orthodox culture forced the leading representatives of Rus to incorporate into the Catholic world, but remain faithful to the Rusyns. So, as a result of these processes, the theories of the Y. Vereshchynskyi type about Catholic Kiev or the ideas of the Rus principality as the third (together with Poland and Lithuania) part of the Commonwealth appear. Actually the belonging to two worlds: the Eastern (Orthodox) by ethnicity, and the Western (Catholic) through religion and political affiliation, spawned an attempt to reconcile these two worlds in territory of Ukraine, to create a symbiosis of identities. It subsequently evolved into the idea of the Union of Brest. The representatives of Catholic Rus made an attempt to secede both on the religious background of the Roman Catholic of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and on the political grounds, according to N. Yakovenko, "by virtue of being more educated [Ukrainian (Rus) gentry] abandoned the historical memory of the reign greatness of the princely Rus "[8, 270], and who dreamt of its revival" [9, 305]. Here, actually, there is a need to dwell on the fundamental conceptual issue: the Ukrainian (Rus) society was between the two leaders with two different vectors of development.

Firstly, the Cossacks were gaining strength as the anti-Western element. But the last statement should be treated with extreme caution, because the Cossacks' anti-Westernness certainly did not speak for its

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[1] The famous Ukrainian historian N.N. Yakovenko, the leading specialist in Ukrainian gentry of the early modern period, emphasizes that the genealogical legends of Rus families tend to the time of Kievan Rus, thereby carrying the relevant historical memory of the Ukrainian lands in the period of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

[2] An attempt to reform the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth from a two-part (Polish-Lithuanian) in a three-part (Polish-Lithuanian-Cossack) republic. The corresponding document was signed September 6, 1658 in Hadiach by the representatives of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth on the one side and Hetman Ivan Vygovsky - on the other side. In fact, Hetmanshchyna (the Cossack Hetmanate) was the part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth on the same terms on which the Crown lands and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania were united by the Union of Lublin in 1569.

Eastern vector. History gives us many examples when the Cossacks'
campaigns against Byzantium did not leave us a chance to think about their
warm relations, and also there was no reasons to speak about the special
friendship between the Zaporozhian Army and Muscovy. The Cossacks or
the new Rus nation became a carrier of not an abstract generalized, but
rather a specific autochthonous Eastern Christian identity, and the historical
basis of its right to exist just binds with the Kiev Orthodox throne not
associated with Constantinople.

Secondly, this old Rus elite, princely families and nobility, who saw
the future of its people within European culture[1], and a vivid example of
this can be the phenomenon of "Catholic Rus". Tapping into the
achievements of the Renaissance and the humanist values, the
representatives of Catholic Rus gave a "civilized" form to the history of
their own people, largely legitimized the existence of the Rusyns for the rest
of Europe (meaning that they wrote it according to the standard samples,
that made it a part of history of the peoples of Europe). Thus, according to
Ukrainian researchers V. Litvinov and R. Mnozhynska "the ethnic
consciousness in the Renaissance had such characteristic features of its
"we" as a territory, language, religion and law. It is appropriate to add the
joint origin and name "Rus" as the collective ethnic concept of the
Ukrainians, as opposed to "them" (the Poles, the Muscovites, the Jews, the
Tatars, etc.). In the works of many Ukrainian Catholic thinkers (for
example, S. Orikhovskyi, Sh. Pekalid, S. Klenovich and J. Dombrowskyi)
Kievan Rus in increasingly frequency is called a state formation of the
Ukrainian people, thus, making active attempts to restore the historical
memory of the people in order that they felt themselves complete and self-
sufficient ethnic group with deep historical traditions and culture [9, 317].

S. Orikhovskyi calls Catholic Rus a pride of Ukraine (*robore
Roxolaniae*) and, listing the Ukrainian Catholic gentry, emphasizes their
roxolan patriotism (XVI century). [9, 317].

A conclusion of Litvinov and Mnozhynska is very representative: "If
we try to view the problem of "Catholic Rus" from the point of view of the
national ideology, in the aspect of the political, territorial and state concept
of "Ukrainian nation", then the terms "the Ukrainians" refers to all the
inhabitants of Ukrainian (Rus) lands, but not just to one cultural and
religious confession part which was formed in the late XVII century. From

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[1] Речь идет об определенном общеевропейском поле, которое основывалось скорее
на западноевропейской традиции.

the point of view of such national ideology, "Catholic Rus" contribute to Ukrainian culture not less than the Greek-Catholics or Orthodox, and provided no less cultural forces for both material culture and spiritual culture [9, 317]

Usage of possessive pronouns such as *nostrum* in relation to the lands or people is another reliable source of determining the identity of Catholic Rus. Every culture has "its specific attitude to other cultures, a peculiar geography "the world of culture" with its characteristic placement of a center and a periphery: near and far, important and unimportant cultures" [10, 6]. Thus, in particular, J. Dombrowskyi creates his famous poem "The Dnieper's Stone" on a clear opposition "we" - "they", where "we" mean the Rusyns-Ukrainians, "the people who has saved the ancient throne of Kiev right up to this day"; Ostrozhskyi and Zaslavsky princes and the descendants of Danilo Galician. "They", i.e. foreigners, are the Poles, the Tatars, the Lithuanians, the Moskhs, which the permanent wars took place with"[9, 305]. It is remarkable how the Rusyns are contraposed to both the Poles and the Moskhs; to the first ones − in spite of the author's being a Catholic, and to the second ones − taking into account the existing Sovient historiography and the overwhelming majority of Soviet historiography post-Pereyaslav historiography.

The Union is one of the most controversial moments of the Ukrainian history of this period and in Russian historiography it has traditionally been viewed as a surrender of the interests of pure Orthodoxy. But it is worth noting that the efforts to unite and reconcile the tore Christianity constitute the main goal of the world Christianity. As the article progresses, we shall note that only the Moscow church blocked the previous Florentine Union, disrupting the process of unification of the Church. In Brest the representatives of Kiev rather resumed the charitable deed, actually, not yielding in the matters of faith.

In the end, after the union/conquest of Rus, it took the state apparatus of the Russian Empire a lot of time and effort to overcome the cultural and mental differences between the two parts of the once united Rus.

Even after the administrative and political conquest of South Rus it remained a cultural contributor to the Russian Empire and its culture. In fact, the cultural space, burned by the Horde, required the external intervention to generate its own culture. Thus, the greatest progress of Rus culture we see just in the period of active both technological and cultural borrowing from Europe during the reign of Peter I. It is noteworthy, that at a certain stage of its history, Russia had eliminated the teaching of philosophy on the grounds of

being obviously harmful, and when it was decided to renew the teaching, it
turned out that in the whole Empire there was only one specialist − a
professor of the Kiev Theological Academy - Pamfil Yurkevych, who was
called to arrive in Moscow to revive philosophy. It was he who became a
teacher of the father of Russian philosophy Vladimir Solovyov. In fact,
Ukraine became a cultural donor constantly supplying Russia with the
impulses necessary for cultural life; the same N.V. Gogol, whose mental fate
was wonderfully described by the Russian writer A. Shiropaev [11].

Conclusions. So, we have to admit that today's process of Ukrainian
history constitutes not appearing of a new subject but just another revival of
it. Throughout its history from Kievan Rus to modern Ukraine, the
Ukrainian (Ruthenian) project is a constant struggle to save opened to
dialogue, non-isolated Eastern Christian Culture, rooted in the European
tradition of permanent cultural exchange. The post-communist revival of
this open space is a continuation of the historical actions of the Ukrainians
and constitutes the constitutive moment that forms the historical identity
from the Kiev popular assemblies (town's meetings), through the Cossack
Rada and the democratic traditions of gentry to Ukrainian Maidans of the
XXI century.

In this light the war in the east of Ukraine looks not like a civil
conflict, and even not like a clash of the Russian (Eurasian) and Western
civilizations, but rather like a conflict between two models of the Orthodox
civilization. They both originate in the traditions of Kievan Rus, but the
vectors of their development are different: Ukrainian (Rus) version of the
Orthodox world throughout its history has been an active participant in the
process of cultural exchange within the Christian civilization, it is really open
to dialogue; and Moscow (Russian) version is constantly distancing itself,
often is in opposition to the European civilization, in such way apodictically
focusing on ideological, including political, borrowings from non-European
civilization forms. Thus, the current conflict is deeper than just a geopolitical
conflict; it's a cultural, ideological, metaphysical conflict between the two
Rus versions of the Orthodox civilization.

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THE MODERN WORLD'S HOTBEDS: SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES IN THE SITUATIONS AROUND THE "ISLAMIC STATE" AND SELF-PROCLAIMED REPUBLICS OF DONBASS

The article compares the situations around the self-proclaimed state entities of IS and DPR-LPR, namely the actions of the respective formations' representatives, response of the official authorities and international community to such formations. The reasons demonstrated for the conflict escalation: territorial claims from the self-proclaimed state formations, religious self-identification, and doctrine of revenge on both sides of the confrontation. It is proved that a tougher position by the Iraqi official government leads to more victims, as well as to more systematic condemnation

of the separatist forces by the world community, including the military assistance.

Keywords: state, DPR-LPR, IS, conflict, government, revanchism, Ukraine.

The world at the beginning of the XXI century is not homogeneous despite the globalization mechanisms designed to unify the information field. If due to the advanced mass media and communication means the message of the event can really spread all over the world in a few minutes, two factors still remain contributing to unequal perception of that message by different addressees. Firs of all, every newsbreak during its media broadcast receives the interpretation from the one who reports it. Even abstracting from the fact that the media assets often represent the business interests of their respective owners the mass media is always focused on the general social order during news feeds generation. So, the news by "Al Jazeera", "Xinhua" and "Guardian" will be different in content and placement (prioritization and emphasis), as well as by the comments, since the strategic vectors of these three resources audience interest do not match a priory. Moreover, a similar situation exists, for example, in the event of Russian and English versions of the news feeds by the same "Xinhua" Agency, which devotes nearly all Russian-language news feeds to the Sino-Russian relations. It is worth to mention that small-scaled mass media that have to rely on the materials of the major news agencies such as "Reuters" depend both on the emphasis, arranged by this agency, and thus not quite falling under this definition, and not always broadcasting the stories relevant to the audience as well, as it was in some Ukrainian mass media in the 90s. Secondly, the audience does not necessarily agree with the interpretation of a particular channel, but can produce its own version of the events comparing information from several sources, or trying to rethink the information from one based on own experience. The interpretation heterogeneity becomes deeper in the today's world due to the unlimited number of information channels and lack of absolute authority in the field of interpretation for a large audience.

Before the new information will be built into the human mind it passes, as indicated above, through a number of filters that place it by importance and accompany with interpretation. In particular, it concerns the information about the conflicts constantly taking place in the world. A person takes notice, first of all, of the conflicts that directly affect him or relatives, neighbours, coreligionists, etc. Thus, the problem of the "Islamic

Geopolitical preconditions of origin the conflict situation
in Eastern Ukraine

State" (former ISIS) is existential for the Middle Eastern Christians, Iraqi Kurds, and Syrian Alawi, while the issue of "New Russia" (Novorossiya) is unlikely excites them as much. Even an expert analyst, if he lives in Brazil, is engaged in other matters compared to the expert from Belarus and Kuwait, since the expert also focuses on public demand. The reaction of the average Ukrainian to the importance of such a precedent as the war in Europe has changed dramatically during the period of 2008 - 2015. To obtain more than objective vision of the situation and options for its participants' further actions, you must ignore the emotional perception of the situation as an existential saturated and try to consider it in terms of the processes taking place in the world as a whole. However, it is a signal to those who believe a certain situation being existentially important (for example, residents of the region, where the armed conflict is in place), to understand that others can consider it differently, hence, there is a need to attract their attention, otherwise the world can simply overpass the problem without any respond to it.

For the actions efficiency about the situation around the Eastern Ukraine conflict and self-proclaimed republics the Ukrainian public officials abstract from the events emotional evaluation and rationalize their own strategies. Meanwhile, it is difficult to make, if a person is directly engaged in the situation, and therefore – to start own strategy arrangement it is necessary: first, to consider the conflicts occurred or occurring in the world under similar conditions, namely the actions of the participants and consequences thereof; secondly, to get acquainted with the experts opinions, who have no existential relation to the target conflict and able therefore to analyze it from the perspective of rationality. In this event the direct participant of the conflict situation gets an advantage since the rationalized conclusions of the first two items can be added with his own observations as a witness of the events, whereas the unbiased experts seek for the actual material in the secondary sources (including mass media), which fail to give an objective picture of a whole. Combination of analytics and own observations allow the conflict situation participants to get clear conflict landmarks for building further conduct strategy instead of focusing on the transient and often illusory goals that seem important from an emotional point of view. It must be emphasized once again that such a combination should take place by adding own experience to the rational strategies instead of rational explanation of the situation in order to please own emotions.

This article's objective is to identify similar and different characteristics of the Eastern Ukraine's and one of the most relevant conflicts,

namely – related to the activities of the "Islamic State". The study results
can be used further for Ukrainian party's strategies elaboration in the East-
ern Ukrainian conflict. In particular, in addition to the actions on the part of
the "Islamic State" and DPR-LPR the response will be analyzed to the cor-
responding activities of the Governments of Ukraine and Iraq, as well as the
international community. The situation in the Middle East, developed
around the IS, is one of the most relevant conflicts in the world today, com-
parable according to various indicators with the Eastern Ukrainian one.
Firstly, the IS movement received a passionate momentum due to the "Arab
Spring" ideas radicalization. Secondly, the IS claims the official status,
although not recognized by any of the states that exist both in the Western
and Islamic world. Third, the IS makes profit from use of the mineral re-
sources in the controlled areas, financing this way its activities. Fourth, the
IS has a clear religious-focused identity, which is not characteristic of the
modern states and indicates the movement's countersecular nature standing
against both dissent and the (Western) modernity. Fifth, the two situations
have overlapped the political mood of revenge, when the representatives of
the previous regime have to support in an open or secret manner the forces
standing against the current government, which also came up to the gov-
ernment of a state with the ideal of revanchism.

ISIS appeared in 2006 on the basis of the ""Al-Qaeda" Iraqi branch
and some small radical groups, but for almost a decade had no much suc-
cess and support. The burst of grouping's activity occurred during 2014,
when it separated from the "Al Qaeda", moved outside the Iraq, and dra-
matically increased in numbers. This burst became possible, to a wide ex-
tent, due to the moderate forces failure trying to overthrow the authoritarian
regimes in the course of the "Arab Spring". Due to the inability of the mod-
erate Islamists to impose its own discourse, reluctance of the authoritarian
regimes to go into the dialogue with the rebels, as well as the military coup
in Egypt, the radical groups entered the arena setting forth completely dif-
ferent goals and using different means. The radicals and adventurers from
other regions began massively joint these groups, including from the Arab-
Muslim world, Caucasus, Central Asia (the flow from here increased after
the expulsion of illegal Muslim migrants from Russia, as a result of which
the latter started returning home on a massive scale and created an aggres-
sive competitive environment there [1]). Since IS controls considerable
financial flows, including, - from the sale of oil obtained within the occu-
pied territories, a certain number of adventurers gets there selling the mili-
tary experience and not necessarily sharing the ideas of the grouping. Other

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direct parties to the conflict in the Middle East are both other radical groups (Sunni, Shiite, Kurdish, Melkite, etc.) and the official armed forces of Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and other countries as well. The conflict around the "Islamic State" is also forced to speak out the main geopolitical players, most of whom condemned the actions of the IS and recognized the very formation as a terrorist one (United States, for example, even provided military equipment to Iraq to fight IS).

The problem of the political and social movements' radicalization in the countries with no experience of Western liberal democracy is attributed to the fact that the parties to the process do not consider it necessary to engage into dialogue with the enemy, if it seems to be safe. That is, the rulers of such states neglect the peaceful popular movements and do not fulfil the public requests, if such requests are made amicably. On the other hand, the public is not always aware of the legitimate rules of making the requests, effective mechanisms for political decisions implementation, as a result of which such requests continue remaining the mere appeals in the social networks. Finally, when the opposition gets the authority, it begins to neglect the requests of its opponents, who lost the political power (as it happened in Egypt during the reign of Mohammed Mursi), which contributes to the further radicalization and escalation of the conflict. At the same time, the Western society mechanisms enable the establishment even through the illusory dialogue with society and moderate opposition movement to keep political control of the country. In particular, there is a speculation that a military coup in Egypt was supported by a greater part of the population since the "Muslim Brotherhood" failed to maintain active public dialogue with opponents continuing the authoritarian practice in adopting the political and personnel decisions remained by the President Hosni Mubarak. Addressing the Ukrainian situation, we can recall the so-called "Tax Maidan" (2010), when the President Viktor Yanukovych and Prime Minister Nikolay Azarov came out to the rally participants, communicate with them and promised to solve the problem, which relieved the distress; during the events of "Euromaidan" these same officials ignored the beginning of the protests, and the neglect of mild protest movements led to the radicalization of the latter and putting all new requests (at first - the resignation of the Cabinet, and later – of the President). Similarly, some of the authoritarian steps of Ukrainian government institutions at the current stage, including termination of social payments to the citizens residing in the occupied territories, increasing complexity of the movement mechanism out of ATO area, etc., lead to the public mood radicalization of Donbass population and po-

tential interest in DPR-LPR activities. However, it should be noted that the President P. Poroshenko and other officials are more responsible with respect to the social dialogue compared to the President Viktor Yanukovych during his last months of stay in power.

IS claims the status of the state (Arab. "Davlia") and on June 29, 2014 declared the Caliphate restoration and the head of the organization Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi received the caliph status. Thus, we are talking about formation, which considers itself not an organization, but the state, and the Islamic doctrine – the main source of legislation acknowledging only one religion as a true one. Hence the cruel treatment of the Shiites, Christians, Yazidis and unbelievers, and it forces the representatives of the relevant sectors (mainly Shiite) to engage into the swinging of the military conflict, or at least try to put pressure on the IS through the diplomatic channels (such as Yezidis [2]). The mass media repeatedly reported the use of unlawful violence by Iraqi Shiites against Sunnis, who were suspected of sympathizing the IS [3] and the Iraqi Sunni Mufti Rafi 'al-Rifai Taha al-Ani in his interviews constantly emphasizes the fact that the actions of the Shia militia is one of the reasons that compel the Sunnis in Iraq to support the IS [4]. A similar situation is in Syria, where the IS and other Sunni groups are fighting with the Shiite troops, which support the regime of B. Assad. IS is not recognized as the state even by those countries that can be traced for a hypothetical connection to this formation (Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Russia). Especially the claim is questionable as to the caliphate status on the part of IS because it does not meet any degree of recognition neither from the formation itself, nor its leader in the Muslim world.

Claiming the real stateness within the certain territory the IS is different from the other radical Muslim organizations, for example, "Hizb-ut-Tahrir" and "Al-Qaeda" operating worldwide in the form of networks and approaching the "Taliban". Stating claims for the stateness the "Islamic State" claims the territory of at least two countries (Iraq and Syria) wishing to unite all Muslim countries over the long term. It is exactly the focus on the state status and seizure of the territory considered a key characteristic of the "Islamic State"; for example, Ukrainian orientalist, Aleksandr Bogomolov distinguishes the IS from the classic terrorist organizations like IRA, aimed at upholding the independence of the Irish people. [5] It is interesting that Bogomolov considers that the motivation to create such state formations as IS involves the confrontation against the western secular society through the conservative forces self-determination. In contrast to the IS, the DPR-LPR claims to the territory of one country only, Ukraine, but over the

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long term this project is linked to the concept of "Russian World" and therefore is also considered to be expansionist, of which the nearest neighbours of Russia (Belarus, Lithuania, Poland, Kazakhstan) are well aware having their recent official policy of integration with Russia replaced with the proclamation of own path for development. However, same as the Governments of Iraq and Syria, which are unable to conduct a coordinated fight against new formation within their territories, Ukraine also failed to take effective efforts in becoming a regional organizer of opposition to Russian expansion, except for the visit of the Presidents of Belarus and Kazakhstan, activity of People's Deputy Igor Mosiychuk and his assistant Amina Okuyeva, other non-system movements.

Focusing on a specific territory facilitates using of the territory's resources, including - minerals. IS gained the control over important oil fields, and smuggling (at dumping prices, two – three-fold less than the official oil price) to Europe and Asia has brought this formation many millions of dollars [6], used to finance further activity of the grouping. It should be noted that at the official level both the Government of Iraq and Syria with the support of the US Air Force and United Nations institute are trying to prevent oil sales by the representatives of the IS, but the process is still going on at the smuggling level. In turn, the DPR-LPR gained the control over large part of the Donbass coal industry enabling the representatives of these formations to engage in coal smuggling (DPR's scope of activities in the field of coal is much less profitable than the scope of IS activities, but also the overall budgets of these formations are not comparable). Meanwhile, the Ukrainian government took considerable time and much public attention to abandon the official purchase of coal from the official representatives of the DPR-LPR and after some time only the Minister of Energy and Coal Industry of Ukraine, V. Demchishin, came under tough criticism being accused by the Prime Minister A. Yatsenyuk in inadequate policy regarding energy contracts with Russia. It can be assumed that such criticism was caused, in part, by a public attention regarding the activities of the relevant ministry and destruction of the part of coal by pro-Ukrainian paramilitary groups [7], and partly – by the requests from the Western partners with respect to imposing by Ukraine of actual sanctions against Russia and DPR-LPR. At that, the ability to supply coal from the territories under DPR-LPR control still stands on the informal agenda, as stated, for example, by the LPR representatives on February 6, 2015 [8].

Religious identity is critical for the IS since it is an attempt to recreate the conditions for sharia implementation, which is the main message

proclaimed by the supporters of al-Baghdadi. In this sense, it should be noted that the title of caliph, claimed by the latter, is not a political only, but the religious as well. On the other hand, the Caliphate status requires a much greater level of legitimization and claims of the Caliph title must be supported by a substantial reputation among Muslim scholars and religious leaders. The usurpation of this status by IS representatives has led to the fact that they are not recognized by the majority of Muslim scholars and none country of the Islamic world, but the uncritically minded radical groups around the world tend to them constantly joining the ranks of the fighters. DPR-LPR, in turn, position themselves as Orthodox state formations and guided by religiously embellished ideology of "Russian World". Such claims are not recognized, but not refuted officially by the representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church, which creates additional obstacles to the resolution of the conflict, as well as stimulates the representatives of the "New Russia" (Novorossiya) continue own fight and other Orthodox radicals constantly maintain it and join the ranks of the "Russian Orthodox Army" and other paramilitary formations. A more clear position of the religious leaders and churches, as well as an explanation to the society and parties to the conflict of the Christian vision of the problem would likely neutralize the ideological component. In this sense, we should ascertain the insufficiently active articulating of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church position – although this church is not sufficiently credible to many supporters of the "Russian World", it is this church, to which the Orthodox diocese in the Crimea and Donbass abide being targeted by the supporters of the DPR-LPR. Although a similar situation exists in Iraq, where the Sunni Grand Mufti does not criticize directly the IS, but at least takes part in the discourse regarding this formation calling honestly to admit the illegal actions on both sides as the unlawful without blaming for all the ills of Sunni radicals and their supporters. It can be argued that the lack of communication with traditional religious institutions leads to the fact that the bottom line is that both IS and DPR-LPR involves rather anti-Western and coutersecular oriented ideology than religious identity, when the activity in the fight against the West replaces the need for religious formation [9].

Another factor that allows comparing the "Islamic State" with the DPR-LPR is a certain revanchism in the actions of the opposing sides. In Iraq the confrontation revolves around the Shiite-Sunni issue, since the Shiites after the fall of the regime of Saddam Hussein began to put pressure both on the officials of this regime from the "Baas" Party and Sunnis, which formerly dominated in the domestic politics of Iraq. As a result, the former

ruling party representatives merged with the force that can oppose itself to the new official government, which leads to a constant escalation of the Shiite-Sunni issue, including – in the mass media, when both parties accuse each other of crimes against the civilian population. A similar confrontation in the Eastern Ukraine's conflict takes place not directly against the religious background, but rather against the ethno-lingual one, when pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian forces are constantly blaming each other of the same crimes committed on the grounds of the national antagonism. Historical background, however, reminds of Iraq, when the representatives of the former political elite facilitated the development of the DPR-LPR groupings and tried to attach their own political demands to these military power formations, while the representatives of the new elite were trying, though not as severely as in Iraq, to push away their political opponents from the political decision-making (a lot of representatives of the former Ukrainian government obtained the appointments under current conditions, and therefore are not forced to rely on the direct support of the DPR-LPR). Finally, we can't speak about the complete lack of the national issue on the agenda with respect to the situation in IS, because the process there involves the Arabs, Persians, Kurds, Assyrians, Armenians, Turks and other peoples of the region.

Thus, in the activities of the IS and DPR-LPR you can identify some similarities, but in turn, the reciprocal moves of the official state authorities of Ukraine and, for example, Iraq, are not always identical. It can be stated that the actions of the Ukrainian government are aimed not at the undermining of the DPR-LPR economic and ideological base, but the political pressure on Russia, quite sluggish and not always adequate, without lack of real effort to become a regional leader in the opposition to the Russian expansion. Iraq, by contrast, is constantly trying to prevent the enrichment of the IS at the account of oil, sometimes believing it is better to destroy the party using the US Air Force, than to allow smugglers selling the oil. More moderate pressure, which the current Ukrainian government exerts on the representatives of the former political elite, reduces the support by the latter of DPR-LPR, but not always the deliberate steps of relatively common population of the territories of ATO lead to an escalation of the conflict generation. Inconsistent policy of the Ukrainian government in the information-ideological sphere has led to the fact that the population of Donbass increasingly comes under the influence of pro-Russian ideology tracking the events through Russian mass media and self-proclaimed republics, while the Ukrainian institutions are unable to effectively oppose this ideological

activity, as evidenced by the discussion regarding too untimely created Ministry of Information Policy of Ukraine and the inability to attain the official response from Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which doesn't criticize the self-proclaimed formations or call for a dialogue.

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EAST UKRAINIAN CONFLICT:
TYPES, FEATURES AND WAYS DE-ESCALATION

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PAVING A ROADMAP TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND TRANSFORMATION IN UKRAINE

The article explains the approach to the transformation of Eastern Ukrainian conflict, in which the current crisis is recognized as a manifestation of deep-seated tensions. Features a two-pronged approach to achieving peace in the region: a) through the implementation of multilateral diplomacy, focused on changing aspects of the behaviour and attitudes of the parties to the conflict; b) by creating a body of restorative justice on the type of the South African Committee of truth and reconciliation. Suggested by the author strategic steps towards a peaceful end of the conflict, are: a) carrying out the decentralization reforms of Ukraine; b) the issue of Crimea by a national referendum; C) the designation of economic security as a priority the way to achieve political security; and (d) the gradual establishment of strategic alliances that will provide for Ukraine's membership in the EU but not NATO in the coming years. In his proposals author uses a large experience in this kind of problems on the conflicts on Middle East, Africa and Southern America areas.

Keywords: *Ukraine; Crimea; conflict; roadmap; strategy.*

Violence recently re-erupted in Donetsk, bringing an end to the fragile September 5th Minsk Protocol ceasefire. It marked a reignition of what has become the most serious impasse between the West and Russia since

the cold war[1] and the bloodiest conflict in Europe since the Balkan wars, with over 5,000 killed,[2] 10,000 injured and one million displaced.[3]

The conflict is multifaceted and inextricability linked and must be addressed on multiple levels. On one hand lies a Ukrainian civil strife between Western Ukraine supporters of the post-revolutionary Ukrainian government and eastern Ukrainians of whom many support Russia and the separatists.[4] On the other hand, internal tensions have been exploited and exacerbated to fuel a proxy war between the West and Russia, with a quintessential expression in the annexation of Crimea that has served as a symbol and continuation of historic East-West divides.

Military solutions are unrealistic and can be counterproductive. Supplying arms to President Poroshenko to directly challenge Russian forces or adding permanent NATO deployments to the Baltic states will likely result in an escalation of military crisis and a dramatic increase in casualties.[5] Similarly, pressuring President Putin by imposing more severe sanctions is unproductive as he continues to enjoy overwhelming support at home.

A political solution is hence the only pragmatic way forth. This paper proposes a two-pronged approach to attaining peace in the region. It first outlines a conflict transformation approach that recognizes the current crisis as a manifestation of deep-seated tensions and seeks to address the behavioral and attitudinal aspects of the conflict through a) implementation of multi-track diplomacy focused on a Track II approach; and b) establishment of a restorative justice body such as a South African model truth and reconciliation committee.

It will then propose conflict resolution methods focused on facilitating a peaceful ending to the current conflict by taking strategic steps. These include a) undertaking reforms towards Ukrainian decentralization; b) resolving the issue of Crimea through a national referendum; c) prioritizing economic security as a path for political security; and d) forging strategic

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[1] http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2b0b440c-2ac8-11e4-811d-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz3PYc4pwa5

[2] http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/24/world/europe /ukraine-violence.html?hp&action=
click&pgtype=Homepage&module=first-column-region&region=top-
news&WT.nav=top-news

[3] http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30929344

[4] http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/09/opinion/driving-ukrainians-into-putins-
arms.html?_r=0

[5] http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/crafting-a-win-win-win-for-russia-ukraine-
and-the-West/2014/12/05/727d6c92-7be1-11e4-9a27-6fdbc612bff8_story.html

alliances that will consider Ukraine's membership to the EU but not to NATO in the coming years.

Opposing Narratives

Ukraine is a country with a complex history and multilingual pluralistic population. Having gained independence only in 1991 after over 500 years of external rule, it has had little time to forge a strong national identity and narrative.

The country is often described as divided into two conflicting regions, with attempts by any group to dominate the other bringing the country to the brink of civil war.[1]. On one hand lies Western Ukraine, which was brought into the Soviet Union in 1939 and comprises mainly Catholics with pro-Western tendencies. On the other is Eastern (and Southern) Ukraine, home to a largely Orthodox predominantly Russian-speaking population with pro-Russian sentiments (with Crimea, on its end, only becoming part of Ukraine in 1954). In reality, while the regions' historical backgrounds contribute to their distinctive character, divisions are not so clear cut, with any effort to break eastern Ukraine from Ukraine proper likely to be met with resistance not only from Western Ukraine, but from wide swaths of Ukrainians living in the east[2] including Russian-speakers who have expressed loyalty to Ukraine.

Deep opposing foundational narratives have long created tensions between the sides with pro-West supporters seeing Moscow as a historical usurper of Ukrainian independence and pro-Easterners perceiving Kiev supporters as traitors who collaborated with Hitler and pose a challenge to the two nations' collective Russian origins.[3]

In recent years, the conflict has been fraught with information wars over how the Ukraine crisis started. For one, the Russian narrative presumes that mass protests against and expulsion of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich, in the guise of NATO expansion or European Union overtures, were not only supported but orchestrated by the West to install pro-Western regimes and consolidate zones of influence in the Russian neighborhood.[4]

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[1] http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/henry-kissinger-to-settle-the-ukraine-crisis-start-at-the-end/2014/03/05/46dad868-a496-11e3-8466-d34c451760b9_story.html
[2] http://www.rferl.org/content/ukraine-east-West-divide/25279292.html
[3] http://qz.com/213318/at-the-heart-of-the-ukraine-conflict-is-a-conflict-about-what-actually-happened/
[4] http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2014C17_fhs.pdf

The Western narrative believes mass demonstrations against President Viktor Yanukovych in 2004-5 and his ousting in 2014 were justified reactions to his pseudo-democratic regime ruled by cronyism and corruption[1] and his decision to enter into a formal pact with Putin's Eurasian Economic Union rather than the European Union[2] against the will of the Ukrainian people.

Secondly, regarding the February 21 agreement in which Yanukovich agreed to a power-sharing deal brokered by the EU and then fled to Russia, Moscow supporters believe the opposition staged an unconstitutional coup and military seizure of power. On this basis, they deny the current Ukrainian government legitimacy and refuse to recognize it as a negotiating partner.

The West emphasizes Yanukovych's refusal to keep his end of the bargain by fleeing and leaving behind evidence of wide-scale corruption[3] thus losing all internal support.[4] It regards the Russian move on Crimea as an attempt to create and maintain influence on political processes in Ukraine given that the Kremlin lacks relations with the new political actors in Kiev, thus using military force to assert hegemony in the region.[5]

Thirdly, Moscow sees Kiev as dominated by Ukrainian nationalists and extremists who threaten the safety of the Russian minority, a theory provoked by the new government's attempt to annul a language law passed by Yanukovich in 2012 to strengthen the status of the Russian language. Under the 2010 military doctrine, Russian armed forces may be deployed if the security of Russian citizens outside its borders is threatened. To justify annexation of Crimea, the Kremlin cited an assistance request from Yanukovich, who they consider the legitimate Ukrainian president, considering it an attempt to stabilize the situation in Ukraine.[6] Similarly, Putin claims to protect other vulnerable minorities, declaring mass attacks on churches and synagogues in southern and eastern Ukraine.

The West asserts that there are no credible reports of ethnic Russians under threat and that acting President Turchynov refused to sign legislation

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[1] http://www.Kievpost.com/opinion/op-ed/brian-fox-the-pseudo-east-West-divide-340641.html

[2] http://qz.com/213318/at-the-heart-of-the-ukraine-conflict-is-a-conflict-about-what-actually-happened/

[3] http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/03/222988.htm

[4] http://qz.com/213318/at-the-heart-of-the-ukraine-conflict-is-a-conflict-about-what-actually-happened/

[5] http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2014C17_fhs.pdf

[6] http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments /2014C1 7fhs.pdf

limiting Russian language use at the regional level.[1] They stress there have been no attacks on churches and that Jewish groups in southern and eastern Ukraine claim they have not seen an increase in anti-Semitic incidents.[2] The West believes Putin will use any pretext to try to recreate the Soviet Union. They also regard his actions as having a political function to subdue opposition within Russia and regain legitimacy in the name of protecting the Russian sphere of influence.[3]

I. Steps Towards Conflict Transformation

This section outlines measures that can transform the conflictual relationships that underlie and support continuation of the current conflict in Ukraine at the interest, discourse, inter-group and social-structural levels.[4]

a. Multi-track Diplomacy with Emphasis on a Track II Approach

It is imperative to address conflicting accounts in Ukraine in matters such as historical narrative, personal and collective security, values, economic gains, language, etc. before the conflict becomes intractable, a permanent part of daily life and a dominant force in shaping opposing identities. So long all sides (Ukraine, Russia, and western countries) keep equating winning with controlling the public narrative,[5] belligerence will continue to grow among both international leaders and Ukrainians.

In order to move towards de-escalation and stabilization, a few steps must be taken. For one, institutions such as the OSCE must continue to play the role of on-site neutral observers to ensure that facts, not rumors, are the basis for political decisions.[6]

Secondly, high-level talks should be convened under the auspices of international peace organizations with participation of all parties, including Ukrainians factions, the EU, the U.S. and Russia. Third parties such as the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine[7] could facilitate agreements and the Council of Europe could serve as a forum for dialogue between the sides.[8] All negotiating parties should include men, women and minorities.

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[1] http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/03/222988.htm
[2] http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/03/222988.htm
[3] http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2014C17_fhs.pdf
[4] http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/transformation
[5] http://shorensteincenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/d88-dougherty.pdf
[6] http://www.dw.de/osce-in-ukraine-facts-as-basis-for-politics/a-17551906
[7] http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm
[8] http://worldbeyondwar.org/ukraine-dialogue-east-West-cooperation-key/

Simultaneously, track-two diplomacy comprising intense sustained informal dialogue for rival parties should be pursued as an important step not only for d?tente but as a fundamental means of constructive change. The goal of such talks is for sides to take a critical attitude towards their own narratives[1] and bear responsibility for the deep-rooted tragedy that is unfolding[2] without fear of losing face. Successful dialogue requires that the following actions and principles be incorporated:

• Each party should outline their fundamental goals and requests. Often groups have a general idea of the objectives they seek to realize, but once they are at the negotiating table, it becomes clear that they have yet to sort out many details and fallback options.

• Every side should present the other groups' claims according to their understanding. This can clear misinterpretations and define expectations.

• Parties should embrace a discourse that focuses on needs over rights. For example, rather than insist on agricultural fields due to historical claims, a request for modern housing may be more pragmatic; rather than a claim rights to a body of water, factions can determine amounts of water needed, etc.

• Avoid pressuring parties into promises they are unlikely to keep. Often in negotiations, the stronger party pressures the weaker side to make unrealistic promises. Broken promises often become a basis to break off negotiations at later stages.

• Rather than dividing resources that are important to both sides, create forums to deal with them mutually.

• Include women as well as vulnerable minorities that have distinct stakes in negotiations to ensure their perspectives are heard. Beyond Russian-speaking Ukrainians, groups may include members of Jewish or LGBT communities who feel threatened by ultranationalist paramilitary groups such as the Azov battalion that uses Nazi salutes and insignia[3] as well as Crimean Tatars who have encountered racism and Islamophobia from Russia.[4]

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[1] http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments / 2014C 17_ fhs . pdf

[2] http://worldbeyondwar.org/ukraine-dialogue-east-West-cooperation-key/

[3] http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/09/opinion/driving-ukrainians-into-putins-arms.html?_r=0

[4] http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/06/opinion/ukraine-not-ready-for-divorce.html

• Include extremist groups who may otherwise act as peace spoilers such as pro-Russian separatists and members of ultra-nationalist groups like Right Sector.

b. Implementing Restorative Justice through a Truth and Reconciliation Committee (TRC)

Beyond track-two diplomacy, implementation of a multilingual Truth and Reconciliation Committee (modeled after the South African TRC) should be considered. One aim of such an effort would be to set up a Committee on Human Rights Violations whose purpose would be to conduct public hearings where conflict victims can speak about their experiences and perpetrators can come forward in exchange for some form of amnesty (whose exact parameters would have to be determined). Forming a climate of openness that enables a critical examination of the history of the groups' (Eastern and Western Ukrainians, minorities like Tatars, Jews, etc.) relations can serve as an essential foundation for rehabilitation, restoration of human and civil dignity and reconciliation. Such a platform could balance and lend nuance to polarized narratives often based on misinformation. A similar committee can be considered for voicing grievances against corruption.

A Ukrainian TRC could further serve to create a basis for a new, collective national identity, which was never fully formed given the nation's relatively nascent independence and complex history. Bringing together people with distinct social identities, beliefs and truths to share perspectives, while affirming that each individual experiences is important rather than focusing on the misdeeds of the other group, can allow for formation of a collective truth. Moreover, such a forum would reduce stereotypical images and perceived behaviors of groups such as conflating language with regional loyalty. By symbolizing citizens' rightful passage into equal consideration and respect, individuals may feel included as part of the state. Furthermore, the character of reconciliation itself can provide an exemplar for, and thus grant trust in, the political processes of democratization and justice.

II. Steps Towards Conflict Resolution

This section focuses on steps that should be taken to strategically manage and contain the current conflict and move rival parties towards positive outcomes.

a. Decentralization Reform

The debate over whether or not Ukraine should become decentralized has been longstanding, peaking both in the early 1990s when Crimea wanted to secede and during the Orange Revolution when the eastern and southern regions threatened to form their own republic.[1]

In order to resolve the current crisis and establish foundations for long-term peace and development in Ukraine, the country must undergo constitutional reform towards decentralization. Currently, the government has weak incentive to create bureaucratic institutions and little obligation to respond to demands of citizens as Ukraine's constitution grants the president the ability to appoint and dismiss local governors, a power that is extremely unusual among parliamentary democracies. Centralized control of local government has exacerbated regional tensions and hindered trust in democratic leadership[2] as non-embedded political structures—where local government is nominally accountable to its people but really answers to exogenous centralized powers—have led to feelings of marginalization.

Granting greater authority to regional government would solidify Ukraine's democratic character and represent the interests of minorities whose lack of ability to voice grievances through democratic processes serve as incentive to turn to violence to change the status quo, a risk Ukraine cannot afford.[3] Steps should include giving locally elected councils in each province the power to choose their own governors. This would help ensure that local government develop the trust and meet the needs of its specific population rather serve the president and represent the national majority. Moreover, this structure could serve as a critical stepping-stone for local politicians to showcase their leadership abilities and become competitive candidates for higher office.[4]

President Poroshenko is heading in the right direction having stated that authorities are ready to begin the decentralization process. However, the importance of such a move must be emphasized beyond the ruling party, as implementation depends on the wider parliament overwhelmingly voting to change the constitution.[5]

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[1] http://www.dw.de/would-a-federal-ukraine-be-viable/a-17404541

[2] http://www.huffingtonpost.com/roger-myerson/a-call-for-political-dece_b_4903795.html

[3] http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2b0b440c-2ac8-11e4-811d-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3PYc4pwa5

[4] http://www.huffingtonpost.com/roger-myerson/a-call-for-political-dece_b_4903795.html

[5] http://www.dw.de/would-a-federal-ukraine-be-viable/a-17404541

b. Resolving the Crimean Crisis

Even as attention is directed towards curbing violence in East Ukraine, the Crimean situation must under no circumstance be ignored. Western actors cannot accept the unilateral referendum to secede from Ukraine, whose validity critics question[1], or Russia's annexation of the region, as they violate international law as well as both the Crimean and Ukrainian Constitutions.

With the Russian Ruble and Russian laws already put into place, the West should think strategically about how to deal with the peninsula. Prolonging an ineffective sanction war or imposing further military intervention would only exacerbate the situation. Instead, as part of a settlement, Ukraine and Russia can set a timetable for a national referendum in which all Ukrainians would be granted a vote regarding Crimea's future status with provisions such as the Crimean population's vote holding greater weight. This would annul the unilateral and dubious freedom-of-elections nature of the previous referendum, and be a democratic inclusive process in line with international and national laws. If voted back into Ukraine, Crimea could continue to enjoy or renegotiate the autonomy it has hitherto received, with its Constitution deferring to the Ukrainian Constitution on jurisdictional matters.[2] If it joins Russia, Ukrainian and other minorities such as the Tatars who fear harassment [3]should be given the choice to stay with full rights or to leave peacefully.[4]

c. Endorsing Economic Security as a Path for Political Security

Economic factors that stand alongside political grievances as primarily motivators of the conflict must not be overlooked. Average Ukrainians are 20% poorer than they were prior to the fall of the Former Soviet Union.[5] The combination of bleak income alternatives and the low cost of conflict-specific capital such as military weapons and organizational skills provided by Russia to separatists have allowed tensions to manifest themselves through violence. To combat this, Kiev should consider providing positive incentives for separatists to stop fighting such as assessing possibilities for

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[1] http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/07/world/europe/ukraine.html
[2] http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/07/world/europe/ukraine.html
[3] http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/16/vladimir-putin-crimea-tatars-russian-ukraine
[4] http://www.ipsnews.net/2014/04/ukraine-crimea-solution-federation-high-autonomy/
[5] http://www.themarker.com/wallstreet/1.2497610

weapon buy-back programs (in the form of cash or other goods and services) both in the short and long term.

In addition, the West has largely ignored the negative effects of Kiev's withholding of $2.6 billion in pension and public sector payments (e.g., for schools and hospitals) on local populations from separatist-controlled areas.[1] Kiev should consider reversing punitive measures that worsen already-dire conditions of locals, serve as proof that the West neglects the population and further marginalize locals, pushing them towards pro-Russian forces.[2]

In addition, instead of encouraging growth in Ukraine, the West has mandated severe austerity measures. Given the gravity of events in Ukraine and their potential international ramifications, it is worth reassessing the efficacy of such policy and considering ways of granting financial and technical aid to Ukraine to bring stability in the short and long term.

d. Forging the Right Alliances: Yes to the EU, No to NATO

During these fragile times, it is critical that Ukraine and the international community be strategic about the types of partnerships that will enable the country to achieve sustainable peace. In this regard, Ukraine should be allowed to join the European Union but not NATO, where its status should only be reevaluated in several decades to ensure stability in the region.

Ukraine's integration with the EU enjoys unprecedented public support, as was made clear during the 2013 protests on Kiev's central 'Maidan[3] and subsequent signing of the Association Agreement.[4] To this end, the European Commission has committed to a series of economic and financial measures to support reforms necessary to stabilize the country and enable integration.[5]

Steps towards EU membership should continue given integration will bring opportunities for sustainable economic development and prosperity to the region. However, it must be made clear to Russia and its neighbors that having stronger ties with Europe will not mean pivoting towards a par-

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[1] http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/06/world/europe/ukraine-to-freeze-payments-in-separatist-areas.html
[2] http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/09/opinion/driving-ukrainians-into-putins-arms.html?_r=0
[3] http://www.eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2014/140514_02_en.pdf
[4] http://www.eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2014/140514_02_en.pdf
[5] http://www.eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2014/1 40 514_02_en.pdf

ticular sphere of influence and does not contradict or come at the expense of sustaining close relations and trade with Eurasia.

Conversely, Ukraine should not be allowed to join NATO, though this option may be re-evaluated in some 20 years. Any thing short of this would pose a serious threat to security in the region.

Although officials acknowledge their country is far from satisfying NATO requirements, the Ukrainian December bill dropping the country's non-aligned status and moving towards meeting membership criteria indicates that Ukraine would apply if it believed approval was likely.

The bill has angered Moscow, which sees NATO as one of its most important rivals for influence in the region.[1] Unsurprisingly, Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev warned that a formal application "would turn Ukraine into a potential military adversary for Russia."[2] Thus, to pragmatically support nonviolent resolutions to the crisis, NATO must reject such a possibility.

Additionally, Western military involvement is likely to further position the conflict as international warfare rather than as a Ukrainian civil war, the latter of which is more likely to bring Russia to an agreement. The main priority at the moment must be to end the violence and bringing Kiev into the NATO would only result in exacerbating the conflict.[3]

Conclusion

Immediate adoption of the outlined conflict resolution steps and a longer-term embrace of conflict transformation methods can allow Ukraine to rise as a prosperous and peaceful nation. Yet throughout these processes, Ukraine cannot allow itself to be a pawn in an East-West proxy war. Rather it should take a pro-active approach, at once recognizing the strategic positioning that grants it its potential but also the fact that it can afford to compromise now on issues such as Crimea and NATO given the need for regional cooperation on global challenges and given power relations are likely to go undergo vast changes in coming years.

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[1] http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2014C17_fhs.pdf
[2] http://www.forbes.com/sites/dougbandow/2014/12/26/ukraine-wants-to-join-nato-and-fight-russia-u-s-must-say-no-and-make-alliance-an-issue-of-security-not-charity/
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VIRTUAL ASPECTS OF THE WAR STRATEGY
OF XXI CENTURY

This article examines the current contexts of the problem of war. In the paper, the author focuses on a virtual component in the current conflicts. Particular attention is paid to the socio-constructivist mechanisms of formation of the military operation in the twenty-first century. The paper considers the possibility of virtual constructs as the main elements of the war strategy.

Keywords: *war, virtuality, social construction, hybrid warfare, reality.*

The problem of war and peace in the social and philosophical thought in the past two thousand years has gained more and more noted sound and was updated by the majority of Eastern European and Russian thinkers. Nowadays the question of the essence of the phenomenon of war and its connection with the phenomenon of virtuality is important. Active attention to this relationship is explained by the fact that nowadays the category of "war" is increasingly associated with the moral and value approach. To extend such a narrow vision we should refer to other philosophical approaches, opening new dimensions and aspects of the war. This article **aims** to philosophically understand the comprehensiveness of a modern war, reveal the essence and methods of its virtualization in a globalizing world.

Modern interpretations of the war are preceded by a number of historical and philosophical reflections. The main essence can be summarized in the following definition: a war is an armed struggle between states or nations, between classes within the state. In fact, every philosopher paid attention to the issue of war and peace by building this perspective into the scope of his philosophical interests.

The cradle of the military history and the development of the military-philosophical thought is considered to be ancient Greece. The greatest contribution to the study of the phenomena of armed struggle was made by Thucydides, Xenophon, and Polybius. Being progressive thinkers, they

realized the importance of military subjects for survival strategies for the Greek city from the onslaught of the barbarians. The contribution of these philosophers to the development of military art is the study of the causes of war, dependence of their success from the role of military leaders, the material factor, geography and anthropology. Heraclitus said that "war is the truth of the world, the father and king of all things" [1, 361]. Plato wrote about the war as a necessity, which makes even the "ideal" of the state to fight, as there is no war, where there is no change (to maintain ideality) [1, 373].

In the XVIII century there was the establishment and arrangement of military science as a body of knowledge about the war, military affairs and military art. The great military writers of this era were Folar, Guibert and Maurice of Saxony, and subsequently – Frederick II, D. Lloyd and B. Bulow. The experience of preceding wars was summed up in their works and some general principles of war were identified. In XIX century Archduke Charles, Napoleon, Jomini and Clausewitz had significant influence on the development of the military theory.

The boundaries of the XX-XXI centuries are a line beyond which scientific progress and individual conditions of the mass consciousness, such as "black holes" of Jean Baudrillard, do the very essence, the idea of a totally different war – incomplete, illogical, that does not comply with the order of things in the XXI century. Therefore, the war has become a phenomenon, requiring new social practices. In addition, the experience of the First and Second World Wars generates complete rejection of a global war of the world scale. Wars became local, partisan, but they became even more dangerous, and have the different nature of their activity. The latter bold statement confirms the fact of transition of large-scale open wars (especially of the first half of the XX century), typical for the whole human history, to the state of "hybrid warfares" [2]. Hybrid warfares are a way of conducting armed hostilities in the undeclared format with a maximum use of the local population, small highly professional groups, enabling the development of high technologies and information manipulation. And the basis of this process of wars transition into a hybrid state is a phenomenon of virtuality, which will be discussed further.

Virtuality is the object or condition that does not really exist, but may appear under certain circumstances [3]. The word "virtus" was used by the Romans to denote the best qualities that were inherent in the ideal men – soldiers: agility, strength, endurance, morality. Virtuality can be considered as an "ancestor" of a war. It is virtual qualities in the modern sense that

have created a set of moral qualities contributing to the war in the Roman society – valor, courage, aggression – which was primarily in the Romans at inciting the many wars of the ancient world. The fact that the goddess of war in the Roman mythology was Virtuti that inspired the Romans for military exploits points out the direct connection of subjects of war and virtuality [4, 747-748]. It is because of the desire to join the more valiant, courageous, warlike, which was popular in the Roman society, the individual became a part of such virtual world in completely real armed hostilities. The distinction between the real and the virtual position was lost. Virtual was becoming the state in which the actors involved in the war, lost the distinction between the real world in which he could be crippled during war actions in difficult conditions of unsanitary of ancient wars, where losses among the wounded after the fight were significantly higher than those killed in battle and virtual, in which the goddess of valor Virtuti guaranteed him courage, bravado, promotion in society of Ancient Rome [4, 747].

Of course, the XX – XXI centuries do not correlate with a similar perception of the concept of virtuality in the Roman theological vision. Even Thomas Hobbes in the New Times argued that "... war is possible only by the fact that people do not know the causes of war and peace ..." [5, 56]. Breakaway from such statements relevant for the middle of the XX century, is found in the Kantian tradition of the question "How is the knowledge of war and peace possible?" typical for the age of Enlightenment, and the arguments of von Clausewitz that war is the continuation of politics by other means. Paraphrasing of this judgment by Michel Foucault, who called the policy of the war continuation as other means, made the subject of war historically permanent, like the Heraclitean "everything flows, everything changes".

To understand the relationship between war and the virtual processes the Heidegger question should be put: "Why is there war, but not vice versa, the eternal world?" From the point of view of philosophy, as well as political science, geopolitics, logistics wars can be brought to a vast number of reasons of existence. "It may be that human freedom can be maintained and immeasurably expand the experience of its existence only if the undecidability of voltage remains" [6, 352]. Thus, the philosopher indicates the course on the immanent inhesion of armed hostilities in the world inherent in the very nature of social development policy.

In the XXI century, the phenomenon of war begins more and more connotatively contact with the phenomenon of virtuality. Calm and measured in terms of military-conflict existence of society in Europe after World

War II accepts only the term "war", but not its very essence. Virtually in the minds of individuals of European culture, there is only the shell itself, similar to the idea of Plato, without essential content. The war, which was more and more in local conflicts, ceased to bring great fear to the masses, as well as ceased to be associated with the concepts of life and death as "being on the verge of being and non-being" [1, 354].

But the individual is vital of awareness of such phenomena for their own existence. Nowadays a simulacrum of a similar awareness is given by many popular products in the virtual world of cinema as action movies and computer games of the "shooter" genre [5]. This trend was confirmed by Karl Jaspers at the beginning of the era of the formation of the virtual era, opened by a technological progress and means of communication, who wrote: "The question remains unresolved whether there is something like dark and blind to the will of the war in a man – the desire for a different, for the way out of the everyday life, the stability of the circumstances, something similar to the will of destruction and sacrifice, misty enthusiasm, aiming to create a new world, or knightly fight thirst far from reality; the will to self-affirmation, tending to prove what it can do, and preferring to passively wait for death at the end of a meaningless existence the freely chosen death" [6, 345-346]. An analogy with the image of the goddess of war of ancient Romans Virtuti can be found in the statement of Karl Jaspers, and, most importantly, an indication by the German philosopher of "or distant from reality" thirst of the struggle directs the logic of addressing the problem to the definition of virtuality as "an object or condition that do not really exist, but may occur under certain conditions". Consequently, the virtual existence of the war is the primary prerequisite for the emergence of any real fighting. For the military conflict in the XXI century it is no longer enough to have a territory of a certain part of the world, the most heavily armed (North Korea, Syria, Palestine, Afghanistan). Somehow, everybody today is increasingly talking about the importance of the conduct of war actions in parallel with a media war that has a lot of concepts [7]. But few prove that the main phase of the war is before the conduct of war actions. It is after the realization of the fact that you can start a war only on a "virtually trained territory" that many believe to be the propaganda and ideology, the term "hybrid warfare" appeared, which is now essentially replaced the classical term of war. The military action is possible only after the creation/ destruction of the integral image of the war aim in the minds of individuals. Such transition was outlined in the 90s of the XX century. For example, in 1994 the experience of war in Kuwait was absorbed during the Yugoslav conflict:

"The new strategy aims to cause confusion among the commanders and undermine the discipline of the Yugoslav Army" [8, 112]. In fact, this was one of the first wars in which the rate of efficiency was not done solely on military strikes and active armed hostilities, and on the change of the interpretation of the public opinion for the formation of attitude of individuals. This war has shown that "virtual death" of the enemy is necessary in the form of strengthening of negative attitudes in the public opinion, the significance of which was appreciated by the same ancient Greek philosophers – sophists, Protagoras, Democritus. The public opinion is made up of ideas, mental constructs, logical and semantic relationships in our minds. The very fact of the influence on the state of this "virtual product" can be reduced to the basic theoretical knowledge about the relationship between reality and the information coming from the virtual world. It is in the factor of influencing the effect of virtuality that the effect of creating and conducting successful military campaigns of modern times lies. The ability "to implement – to present" the strongest threat of military real/ possible hostilities in the mind of the individual lies solely in the plane of language, which is in some way connected with the real objects, as was pointed out by J. Searle [9]. Ultimately, the bloodiest wars, with the exception of ethnic, are made precisely because of the need to create and manage objects in the real world and the existential being. A definitive understanding of the fact that it is possible to "drag" the population of a certain area on its side with the help of the language, has come only with virtual-information strategies. The ideological and propaganda influence is widely regarded as more effective than immediate armed hostilities.

The most efficient in terms of a virtual war are the "Operation Desert Storm" and the Yugoslav conflict that have shown that the real victory will be won only when people form their opinions not only on the basis of the propaganda, but on radical constructivism, the basis of which will be provided by the virtual world of the winner side – television, radio, absence of mobile connection with other territories of the country. The main thing is a total seizure of all social factors and phenomena that allowing a person to design his reality. This provision is aimed at causing the phenomenon of extreme solipsism, with which individuals on the interested militarily territory either support the enemy in the existing hostilities, or create the possibility for the appearance of the conflict in future. Thus, the virtual becomes a key factor in the conduct of hostilities in the XXI century [10, 61].

Establishment of an information-social sphere of the enemy placed from a philosophical point of view in a state where "the location of certain

realities cannot be reduced to the rules of spatial and temporal design" [11, 14], makes it possible to create a completely different reality for individuals. If the Admiral Ushakov began to destroy a flagship for the first time in military science, Hans Guderian first took tactics of tank wedges, separating rear arears and notifications of the enemy, the boundary of the XX-XXI centuries has shown the need of taking control of the areas, able to change the perception of reality.

The course of armed hostilities showed that virtuality as well as in the Middle Ages, becomes the essence of material objects, enclosed in potency that develops in the process of reality absorption. Thus, the virtual values, goals, ideals during the armed hostilities or before preparing for them, are the essence of the potential with respect to the real world and they carry out the very course of the armed hostilities, expressing the active support of one party or another. If in the Middle Ages, the word "virtual" was used to complement the leading theological model of reality, in the modern world in all wars the virtuality increasingly forms the basic reality of a man, cut off from the outside world by the war. The phenomenon of virtuality in the XXI century becomes not the characteristic of consciousness or perception of the individual, but forms the outline of reality. The event of propaganda is usually targeted at the last image [12]. But the latter is significantly different from the virtual influence during the war. Propaganda creates only short-term impact on attitudes and public opinion; it has mostly temporary and political influence, pursuing short-term goals. Bringing of the virtual phenomenon has a much more profound and philosophical meaning – to change the very basis of the construction of the reality of the population by building a logical system of cause-and-effects which should lead the reality of the individual to a specific action.

In the context of discussion the war it should be noted that the phenomenon of virtuality begins more and more to overcome the incompleteness. The example of that could be the emergence of unmanned and totally automated systems of air strikes (drones), high-precision radar, and guidance system for smart rockets. They are a product of automatic (essentially virtual) data collection systems. They are based on the experiments of Neumann, Eckert, and the latter, in turn, are required to the galaxy of outstanding philosophers and their achievements: Babbage and his analytical engine, Leibniz with his symbolic logic. The latter are rooted in passages of Aristotle's logic, indicating two thousand years ago the concept of entelechy as a virtually mortgaged potency. Thus, nowadays the phenomenon of war is based on the advanced virtual technologies, supported by all the same

"virtual roots" of the listed philosophers that laid the foundation for modeling reality nowadays by their discoveries. It is a virtual component of the war that has shifted the balance of power in the world, having created a system of tracking and alarm, and having made the armed hostilities of two world wars unwise and unsuccessful. As viewed from the perspective of Aristotle's "cold war", it cannot be called cold, but the virtual. And in ancient Greek it can be called as possible in its potency. Since its essence was to continuously improve the systems of precise, virtually-high technological guidance of weapons at the enemy and a pure potential of its destruction in the event of a threat.

Any probability of the war nowadays can also be predefined by virtual strategies due to the fact that structural and logical unit of forming a picture of reality is considering not the limiting facts of reality, but its construction, not the absolute essence (the outside world), but the limited structure, construct which is incomplete and can always be supplemented by logically justified, according to the same individual, phenomenon [13]. Virtuality in the Aristotelian definition of entelechy as a possibility, potency in the military science gives the option of inductive logic, where the war itself must acquire a sufficient basis for its "existence" outside of "entelechy-virtuality" at the initial stage. Only then it will go to the boundaries of political, geopolitical, anthropological and any other dimensions of reality.

Many people find it extraordinary that often the ways of further development of something new in this world was found by the authors of the philosophical and artistic works. So, one of the foundations of virtuality was founded by a well -known fiction writer R. Zelazny, who wrote that "few people can recognize that they is completely alien of the idea that the world they see around them, in fact, is the figment of their imagination". In fact, this quotation confirms that the world we imagine tomorrow is virtually pre-designed today. It can be said that there is a high proportion of solipsism; phenomenology faces with its variations as well, which carries out the reduction of the real material world to a pure consciousness (as a virtual category). If you transfer this logic of virtuality to the phenomenon of war in the XXI century, it can be stated that because of the synthetic analysis of two events – the war and the virtuality it has become possible, firstly, to show the essence of the further development of the war, and secondly, to predict the trouble spots of its occurrence.

So, Orwell pointed out in 1945, even before the threat of the nuclear war that its essence is the situation where the living space of the world is divided between several major players. This author was the first who used

such the terms as "cold war" and "hyper-power" which defined the essence of the further vector of military tension on the planet. A purely virtual and theoretical literary activity of the author allowed predicting the future of the world war, which since the 40s of the XX century is all the more strongly drawn into virtuality as the maximum strategy in terms of its expression for the development of a modern military sphere. If propaganda showed the effectiveness due to its focus on the suppression of the use of vulnerabilities of the human mind, because of clearly established strategies, the impact of the virtual on the nature of modern war makes it possible to create a complete picture in the mind of the individual, and shows that the propaganda can only create images [13, 134].

Secondly, to predict the appearance of a local explosion of a military conflict in the XXI century is much more efficiently not via satellite, which provides virtual-visual map of troop movements of the enemy, but through the sphere of social communication. This statement is not new. Such strategy has already been used during World War II and was aimed at identifying patterns in the information field [13, 140]. But virtuality in military conflicts of today aims at more than the creation of factors contributing to the war in the form of marker words, metaphors and meanings substitutions, false facts which, when viewed from a philosophical rather than journalistic, sociological point of view, are nothing like deliberate violation of the first law of Aristotelian logic. The aim of the phenomenon of virtuality in military applications is to create in the individual consciousness of the masses of individuals inhabiting a potentially interesting from a military point of view territory approximate the phenomenon close to radical constructivism, when the individual does not accept the rules and the truth of society and state, and builds a kind of infinite closed on himself world and not receiving signals from the outside world. To create a war, conflict, any armed and social conflict nowadays, the most effective method is the application of the paradigms of radical constructivism, mentioned by Lazarsfeld: construction of knowledge by the subject, the transfer of the function of cognition only to the experienced world, and not for further opening of the ontological reality [14]. Thus, you can create a virtual world in the mind of the individual, based on the principle of secrecy of the cognitive experience of the last [14, 113]. As the beginning of this virtual strategy in the practice of wars the operation of US secretive agencies on the formation of the image of the Afghan war years of 1979-1989 in the eyes of the people of Afghanistan as the war of the Soviet Union against all Islam can be called. The worldview of uneducated Mujahiddin who see Islam as the basis of their life, wishing

to return the time of "pure Islam and sharia" into their existential reality, created a situation described by Lazarsfeld when "the world that we know (live) on our own experience and that we ourselves construct, is an involuntary act, our constructional design is not a subject of special attention, i.e. we do not know how we do it" [14, 17] and gave the best possible ground for a purely virtual, unconscious constructional design of the world, which contributed to the escalation of the conflict, and its manageability.

As massively, as is the case with the Mujahiddin, and most efficiently all above strategies of virtuality are used in the conflict in the east of Ukraine. One of its causes is an updated military doctrine of the Russian Federation, which has determined the impact of information as defined in the war of the XXI century. The use of information (virtual) impact on the population of Donbass, mentally tied to the Soviet past, allowed carrying out acts contrary to the international law, regional stability. And there are minimal chances to prove the involvement of official government agencies to the conflict. Besides the creation of a hard-radical model of social construction of reality for the public makes it possible to "use the military potential of the population in conjunction with military force".

Building such a virtual construct nowadays is not an auxiliary, but the main strategy for the viability of any military campaign. And if we talk about the conflict in the Donbass, then all of the above is a skeleton, without which aggression would be bogged down in the early days. Therefore, it is possible to determine the start of certain preparations for possible armed hostilities by the slightest beginnings of change, substitution, correction of the basic criteria and factual material forming the perceived world, affecting the very selection of facts to form a reality and having the opportunity to bring these facts into line with the reality the individual wishes to construct [14, 52].

So nowadays there is a wide range of instruments previously used to simulate virtual reality from the media and the Internet to social networks, new religious movements, discursive practices, former video games that have become drones, becomes rather a means of forming reality. The military strategy of the future will increasingly move away from the use of standardized practices of only armed and outreach components, and more and more will complement the latter with improving practices of the influence on the formation of reality perception. The basis of the feasibility of this strategy lies in the delineation and further opposition of the truths inherent in the content of the terms submitted to individuals, and the truths, based on real facts, with the emphasis on the thoughtless use of the first at

the maximum visualization and realism and maximum distortion of values of the second [15, 21]. As an option, this practice now provides the possibility to apply fewer armed forces of their own and mobilize for war the population of a local region interest from a military point of view.

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UDC 303.01

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NETWORKS FRICTIONS AND MACHINES OF WAR: METHODOLOGICAL NOTES ABOUT THE UKRAINIAN CRISIS

Study of the current Ukrainian social and political crisis requires overcoming of a number of epistemological obstacles. This becomes possible through the use of methodological tools that are able to take into account the peculiarities of the object under study. The article is an attempt to substantiate the possibility of application of the network theory. The concept of "the machine of war" is an additional theoretical module of the network theory.

Keywords: *networks, actors, interaction, friction, the machine of war, Ukrainian crisis.*

Study of the current Ukrainian crisis which was caused by a number of reasons and in its turn led to multiple consequences (Euromaidan protests, escape of V. Yanukovych, the events in the Crimea and in the east of Ukraine), is conjugated with obstacles of epistemological and political nature. First of all, its incompleteness is a fundamental problem as it does not allow to represent the object under study in its entirety. Therefore, the conclusions concerning the nature, driving forces and trends of the process under study cannot be conclusive. Its further development can introduce significant corrective amendments in the research itself and its results. This incompleteness problematizes the subject of the research. For a number of reasons it cannot take an appropriate distance relatively to the object under study.

Besides its involvement in the studied process – whether it's evident participation in the events or just the situation of being affected by them – has lead to a confusion of the requirements as to the objectivity of the research and practical dispositions, indiscernibility of own aspirations and the logic of the events. An additional obstacle of empirical kind is inaccessibility of reliable information about the researched events and processes. In-

deed, the very nature of the latter (police and military operations), the peculiarities of the involved actors, information war involving mass media, etc., all these factors fundamentally hamper proper analysis, they demand constant rechecking and clarification of the statements, they doom us to inevitable incompleteness and unavoidable assumptions, which are at risk to remain unjustified.

On the other hand, the study of the Ukrainian crisis has been complicated by the spread (if not by the   prevalence) of theoretical constructions in social and human researches of post-Soviet countries the distinctive features of which are (1) a mixture of research and management paradigms, and (2) orientation on the study of, so to speak, sustainable objects and "standard" situations. In these research approaches it was assumed that the social world is a closed and complete system, which is well distinguished from the external world. It was possible to distinguish sharply defined areas and subsystems in it, to select elements, to define management structures and methods of influence which are commensurate with existing management practices. A similar correlation between research and management tasks accompanied the development of social sciences in the (post)Soviet space. On this basis, the research object itself is conceived as a relatively stable or developing according to a given logic, any deviations from it are seen as a violation of the norm that require a "therapeutic" intervention.

The present research situation is very different from that described above. The involvement of the researcher in the studied processes, incompleteness and questionable validity of a greater part of the information, the factors which have already been mentioned, and a number of other peculiarities encourage the search for such a research methodology, that would allow to overcome epistemological obstacles and provide theoretical tools adequate to the set objectives of the research. Variability of the studied social formations – whether they are the self-defense sotnias of Maidan or voluntary groups in the area of ATO – demands significant changes to of the research optics. The demanded methodology should be able to account for the variety of driving forces, conflict intensity and variability of the studied processes, their fundamental "openness" to external influences. The study of the Ukrainian crisis at all stages of its flow is inseparable from the study of the processes of mass mobilizations of the participants of the conflicting parties, constant constructions and re-constructions of social and technical networks in the process of confrontation, followed by political and economic pressure from different sides, etc.

In other words, the Ukrainian crisis is an unfinished process of formation and revision of connections and relationships, which involves a lot of individual and collective actors with varying degrees of autonomy, which often pursue their own interests. It is necessary to take into account a high degree of conflict intensity in this process, as well as the "the price of the issue" for many of its participants, so to speak, non-standard situations. This leads to many tensions, inconsistencies, mistakes and other "faults" in the functioning of by no means well-functioning social and technical networks.

* * *

The study of the above difficulties, fortunately, is not new for social disciplines. A sufficient number of theoretical approaches have been suggested to solve such research problems. Many of these approaches were developed in the framework of the network theory. However, the latter, to be precise, acted as a metatheory, that is such a conceptual frame, which can be paired with many other theories (groups and organizations, authority, communication, etc.), offering extremely abstract patterns and acquiring specification only with the further refinement of the researched processes. Specific theories appeared as a kind of modules contributing to this specification. The advantage of the network theory is the fact that it bases its formations on the idea of "openness" of the social world. It allows you to treat it not as a disadvantage, but as its inescapable property. Moreover, the network theory, as a way of understanding the social world, is up-to-date and commensurate theory with the particular mode of its existence — the world of decentralized social networks, "transparent" state borders and global communications.

The network theory develops quite simple forms of conceptualization of social processes, which allows it to respond to changes flexibly and to preserve, in the words of R. Haeussling, "ideological neutrality": "nodes and relationships are — abstractly speaking — the constituent parts of the network. Multiple nodes, entering into relationships, form a network. In the social sciences the nodes usually represent actors, i.e. people, groups, organizations and other social structures. Relationships can symbolically be represented in the form of channels through which different types of social activity (e.g., companionship, barter and/or government decisions) of participating actors (nodal point) can flow. In addition, the network can be divided into centers and periphery of social activity" [2, 36]. The network theory uses a topological idea of space that is constructed by placing the actors and the relationships between them taking into account identified

social distances. A topological space is a construct, not a reflection of the physical space, although it can be "superimposed" on the latter, thus producing a map of display of a social matter in a physical one.

Networks are dynamic formations. This property allows them to be used for the study of social changes. Of course, not all parts of the network are equally changeable. When necessary, it is possible to distinguish several levels of stability: from stable structures to chaotic fluctuations generated by unexpected events and processes. The structures are formed due to the regular reproduction, the routinization of interactions between the actors of the network. The number of actors, the intensity of the interaction, reciprocity, regularity, openness to the outside world, conflict / collaboration, verticality / horizontality, formality / informality, etc are the variables of the network. Though the degree of variability of the network can depend on many factors, it is determined as a part of the study empirically. However, it should be noted that positioning is typical for the network dynamics, i.e. actors in one way or another respond to the changes in the surroundings of their node because these modifications can threaten their interactions. At the same time each actor not only responds to changes, but he produces them, following his own or joint strategies and pursuing certain goals. The strategies of the actors can develop both in relation to the networks and inside them. Strategies inevitably include the element of reflexivity of the actor, causing different perspectives: "worm's-eye view" – from the network and "bird's-eye view" – from the perspective of the actor. The strategies identify the participants and the degree of involvement in the process, the direction of the activity, functions, procedures, goals and objectives, forms of interrelations inside the group and relation to the external world [3, 210].

Interaction of the actors is decisive for the formation of any network. Interaction structures relationships, stabilizes the structures and confirms or modifies established connections. Regular reproduction of interactions, their, so to speak, routinization forms the rules and behavioral patterns, which can further be reproduced automatically. At the same time, the network of relations and connections are, as a rule, very difficult to be viewed by one actor, which is able to observe only a part of the network, but form an overall view of everything what is happening on this basis. The picture, emerging in the mind, B. Latour suggested to call it *panorama*, allows the actor to observe everything and at the same time to see nothing, "creating in the viewer a strong impression of complete immersion in the real world without any artificial mediating or costly information flows coming from the external world or to him" [4, 263]. Panoramas, despite the fact

that they distort the perception of the world, create a sense of visibility and intelligibility, they allow the actors to be (self)determined and be prepared for the action, to place yourself in the center and to form a holistic image of the world as a space of interaction: despite its simplified nature, panoramas make interactions possible; because of their simplicity, they lead to unintentional consequences for the actor. Panoramas should be taken into account and reconstructed because they help to understand the intentions and the goals of the actors, the reasons of their mistakes, motives, etc.

Thus, the network theory (in its various versions) offers a comprehensive approach to the study of social processes. It sets the most basic metatheoretic frame of the research, allowing to combine various theoretical *modules* - special theories developed for the analysis of specific phenomena. Use of the machine of war concept in the function of such theoretical module of the study of the Ukrainian crisis appears to be a promising, productive theoretical tool to analyze both civil protests (Euromaidan) and the armed conflict in east of Ukraine.

* * *

The concept of the machine of war (or war machines) was proposed by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari [5, 587-716] and was further developed in the book by Manuel Delanda "War in the age of intelligent machines" [6]. In this work, the author researched the impact of technology on the military sphere, development of various techniques of battles conduct and organization of the war machine. The latter in this regard is understood as a complex social and technical formation which combines people, different apparatus and weapons: "We can present a military institute as a "machine" consisting of several different levels, each of which since the ancient times has been an integral component of the army: it is the level of armaments and military facilities; the level of tactics, where the people and weapons are integrated into the units; the level of strategy, where these compounds fight, receiving a common political objective; and, finally, the level of logistics, delivery chains and supply, where the conduct of the war is associated with agricultural and industrial resources that nourish it"[6, 11]. The successful functioning of the war machine is a well-functioning interaction and communication on every level and between different levels.

Of course, the war machine does not function in a social and political "vacuum" – it turns out to be the subject of interaction in a complex social and political network open to the external world. Nevertheless, communicative connectivity inside the war machine is relatively higher than that between the machine and the external world. The machine is a compound of

many elements in a single assembly, which acquires autonomous properties. Taking the nomad tribes as an example, Deleuze and Guattari told about a principle opposition of the war machines and the apparatus of a state, which tries to protect itself destroying or co-opting nomadic units into state structures [5, 588-589]. Indeed, even under the conditions of transformation of the war machine into one of the institutes of the state, which became the subject of research of Delanda, the relationship of the army and state agencies are often not simple. And it's not just the corporate spirit of the military men – machines of war, even under the conditions of the peacetime and the total subordination to the state express a principal alternative to the "civilian" world with their own patterns of life and thought, they are present as a possibility of a different mode of existence. In our case the fundamental problem is the necessity of neutralizing or "appropriation" of numerous (para)military formations by the state and co-opting them to one of the state defense and law enforcement agencies with the goal of submission to the chain of command and performance of clearly defined tasks by them, since the existence of armed groups being beyond the state control is a direct violation of the state monopoly on the legitimate use of violence to support the rule of law. Of course, the problems which Ukrainian state faced in relations with the force units formed during Euromaidan and with separatist groups in the east of Ukraine, are an evidence of existence of, let it be short, but extremely tempting opportunities of a different mode of existence for many participants of the protest actions. After all, the machines of war by themselves do not have war as the first target. On the contrary, war as a goal occurs only when there is a confrontation with the state apparatus seeking to neutralize the machine of war, or to subordinate it to their purposes. When the state successfully implements this plan, the machines of war change their nature and function, because now their goal is to fight with other machines of war or with another state. As the war machines are transformed into the institute of state, war becomes their immediate goal [5, 707]. A recent example of this transformation was the inclusion of the self-defense units and some activists of the "Right sector" ("Pravy Sector") in the National guard of Ukraine in March 2014, which presupposed their subordination to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine in accordance with the Law "About the National Guard of Ukraine" [7].

The principal problem of functioning of the war machine is well-functioning and coordinated interaction, because this determines its ability to solve set tasks, and its very existence. This problem is particularly acute for modern armies compelled to act under the conditions of increasing un-

certainty. As it is noted by Martin van Creveld, the current trend in the modern world is the spread of low-intensity conflicts, which have replaced traditional wars. That is, today an armed confrontation between states, as a rule, is below the level of intensity that used to be considered a war. Moreover, the trinitarian distinction between the government, the army and the population is broken in these conflicts, as the latter becomes increasingly involved in the conflict, it becomes its direct participant: "If battles are to take place, not only military but also political communities on whose behalf they act, will be closely intertwined. It is very likely that there and then, where and when this convergence happens, the armed forces, deployed by these communities, will no longer be the armies of traditional type. Under such circumstances the distinction between armed forces and civilians (as well as between the upper and lower parts of the respective hierarchies) is likely to be erased" [8, 290]. Armed groups, involved in such conflicts, like the nomadic war machines, are based more on charismatic than on the institutional principles. Their leadership is inseparable from the armed group, which, often relying on the support of the population, controls certain territory. However, the boundaries of this control are not clearly defined and they are impenetrable: "Military organization of any size will control a territorial base of   one or another character. However, it is unlikely that this base will be geometrically continuous, impermeable or have large sizes. Probably its borders – it is also a modern term – will not be clearly defined on the map. Instead of the borders, in some unexpected places there will be road checkpoints manned by thugs lining their own pockets and the pockets of their bosses" [8, 295].

The growing uncertainty significantly complicates the coordination of the war machine. To describe the complexities of this kind of M. Deland used the metaphor of "friction", which, however, has several meanings: "On the one hand, in transport and communication networks it means physical friction, responsible for delays, congestions and crashes of cars. But in a more general meaning it is used to refer to any (natural or artificial) phenomenon, which prevents the execution of a tactical or strategic plan. In this extended meaning the word "friction" can refer to everything from bad weather to an independent will of an opponent (both its active resistance to the advancing of the troops and sabotage). In the case of tactical command network friction is represented as "corrupt data". Not only information circulates in the contours of command networks, but also uncertainty produced by the uncertainty of the military situation" [6, 94].

The problem of uncertainty is usually solved by the centralization of the decision making. However, this created new tensions, caused by the fact that maximization of certainty on top of the command pyramid, thanks to the specification of the commands and checking of their performance, and also the increase of the information flow through the networks, created informational "overloads" and merely added to the uncertainty on the entire network. Another approach that emerged in the German army during the two world wars, by contrast, solved this problem through decentralization, when the commander outlined the objectives and gave the tactical units the right to use different means to achieve them: "Thanks to the lowering of the threshold of decision making (i.e. transfer of responsibility to the local level), each part of the war machine started to work with a small level of uncertainty, not allowing it to concentrate at the top. Creating an island of stability in the middle of war, we dissipate the uncertainty along the whole chain of command" [6, 95]. However, the solution to the problem of uncertainty by means of a distributed network is only possible if there is a high degree of coordination and cooperation of various subdivisions and military services. This sets additional demands to the military command. In addition to knowledge, skills and abilities required to perform the stipulated tasks, relationships in the decentralized chain of command must be built on trust. Lack of trust leads to increased uncertainty and friction in the network, causing conflicts and disruptions in the performance of the assigned tasks. At the same time coordination through distributed network became possible thanks to the development of communication means, that is, the problem of technical support of the command network operation became fundamental and, therefore, the role of skills and abilities to commission and use technical means increased significantly. Thus, the war machines turned into extremely complex social and technical networks where the material and technical component became critical.

An additional source of friction is the need to coordinate the interaction of the war machine with the logistics networks, which provide the supply of food, weapons, military equipment and ammunition. In fact, any more or less large military unit has to organize a system of supply of all necessary things. The functioning of the logistics system is always fraught with numerous difficulties — car breaks and lack of cars, traffic congestion, lack of transportation, delays of deliveries, etc. Moreover, failures in the functioning of the logistics system not only lead to the inability to perform the defined tasks, but also to the attempts of the participants to solve the

supply problems then and there independently. This situation only creates a new source of friction in the interaction with the local population.

* * *

The study of the Ukrainian crisis in the perspective of the network theory contributes to the redirection of the research in a more pragmatic course. Instead of searching for an answer to the question "What is it?" it focuses on the questions "What is its structure?", "How does it work?", "What does it consist of ?". This shift contributes to a significantly greater operationalization of the study, identification of "strong" and "weak" points in the object under study, and if necessary, to its decomposition and re-building.

The network theory and the concept of the war machine, developed on its basis, allow you to grasp a number of organizational challenges facing both the participants of the civil protests of Maidan and the parties to the armed conflict in the east of Ukraine. They create an opportunity to identify some key moments actuating and/or creating tension in the functioning of the protest and military forces in so volatile, "nomadic" nature. Both sotnias of Kiev Maidan, activists of Avtomaydan and many subunits, participating in the armed conflict in the east of Ukraine, are complex as to their composition and poorly or insufficiently centralized as to the manner of decision-making and coordination formations — in fact, conglomerates, consisting of many groups of a different degree of cohesion and readiness for active actions. Coordination of interaction of such groups is often linked with the need to restrain their non-planned activity, reactions to provocations, the need to restore control and an appropriate degree of discipline. Spontaneous protest activity of self-defense forces and numerous difficulties faced by the parties of the armed conflict in Donbass when it comes to the compliance with the agreements reached can serve as an example.

Interaction under the conditions of uncertainty is always a difficult task. Differences in the levels of competences, coherence of interaction, discipline, the objectives being pursued and the morale of these groups and their participants – all these factors cannot but influence the degree of trust to each other and the success of cooperation. Apparently, many errors, inconsistencies and mistakes, observed during joint actions of these collective entities, are the result of many frictions in the organizational networks designed to coordinate the actions of the groups. We should not forget about the numerous cases of dysfunctional logistics networks (primarily during the conduct of military operations in the east of Ukraine), which turned out

to be unable to provide food and weapons properly, and the influence of many political and economic factors on the conduct of protests and military actions. In other words, logistical and political networks operate in the "joint" with the machine of war. This approach offers a productive framework for the analysis and explanation of such problems, for the search of possible solutions and at the same time for finding new vulnerabilities of the opponent. The search of ways to minimize the devastating impact of the war machine on civilians, who appeared to be the hostage of the situation, is also critically important in this regard.

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REPUBLIC OF BELARUS AND UKRAINIAN CRISIS

The article is devoted to research of a position of government of the Republic of Belarus concerning situation in Ukraine, formation of the Belarusian policy for the new authorities of Ukraine. Use of the Ukrainian crisis on an internal political field of Belarus is discussed. The special attention is paid to gradual change of a geopolitical course of Belarus in a background of escalation of war in the east of Ukraine.

Keywords: *The Republic of Belarus, Ukraine, Lukashenko, the Eurasian economic Union.*

Ukrainian crisis, in which basis at the first stage internal economic and political controversies prevailed, was reformed into geopolitical "funnel" very quickly, in which both its nearest neighbors and global players, including Russia, European Union and the USA were involved.

If at the first stage of the crisis (maidan, November 2013 – February 2014) the countries of the western part of the former USSR – Belarus, Moldova, Georgia reacted to the crisis as a whole with restraint, trying to use it exclusively to strengthen their positions in the dialog with the European Union, which ended with Kishinev and Tbilisi entering into association agreement with the EU, on the second stage (February – March 2014) the crisis took Minsk by surprise.

Unexpectedly, Belarusian government found itself at some geopolitical crossroad. Armed clashes at Kiev Maidan, coup d'etat in Ukraine, overthrow of the legitimate president Yanukovych, relatively passive position of Russia as to the crisis frightened A. Lukashenko, who felt indirect threat to his power in Belarus at once. At the same time, crisis in Ukraine provided Minsk with a kind of green corridor.

In addition to overall political instability, coming from Ukraine, the government policy of the independent Republic of Belarus was influenced by prejudices of the ruling elite, inherited from the Soviet time, traditional jealousy in relations with the Soviet center.

It should be noted that relations between Ukraine and Belarus, at the beginning in the format of Soviet republics, and then as independent states, has never been neighborly or all the more brotherly. In the years of existence of the USSR the highest nomenclature of the two republics has actively rivaled each other for the attention of Moscow. There existed competition between Kiev and Minsk at the highest rank in the view of resources, allocated to the republics, including financial resources, inducements, positions, decorations. In spite of the fact that relations between first persons of republic party structures were kind-hearted outwardly, in fact even the highest Soviet party leaders fought desperately for influence at Kremlin.

In the years of independence, from 1991 relations between Minsk and Kiev have been critical at times. In particular, unsettled disputes concerning arrears of Ukrainian enterprises to Belarus partners allowed Belarus authorities to block demarcation of the border between Ukraine and Belarus for almost 15 years. In the years of A. Lukashenko presidency during the following aggravation of relations with Russia Belarusian authorities have many a time tried to use Ukraine against Kremlin. On the one hand, Minsk has periodically tried to create a kind of anti-Russian Union in form of transit block, able to impose on Moscow strict conditions of transit of Russian energy resources to European market with Kiev. On the other hand, Belarusian government, using traditionally difficult relations between Russia and Ukraine, tried to consolidate its image of the "only collaborator", which is to be supported with resources and credits, against the background of the "stubborn" Kiev.

In its turn, the government of Russia in effort of involving Ukraine into integration projects, initiated by Moscow on the territory of the former USSR, has actively used Belarus as an example of advantageousness of being in integration with Russia since mid-1990s. In 2012-2013, when Russian government collaborated actively with the president V. Yanukovych, offering him high level of financial and resource support for entering Customs Union, Minsk showed a certain concern. A. Lukashenko's concern was probably conditioned by understanding that if Ukraine had entered the Customs Union, it would have pushed Belarus aside the Russian resources by taking away main grants from Russia.

In 2013-2014 the crisis of the post-Soviet state system, combined with disintegration of the national economic models, created in 1990s, became obvious. Ukraine became the most striking example of this crisis, when it refused entering into Eurasian integration in 2013 and formed its participation in Association with EU in 2014.

EAST UKRAINIAN CONFLICT IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS

The triumph of the Maidan in the end of February 2014 was taken in Minsk with great level of concern. In the first place A. Lukashenko felt, that "Kirghiz" scenario of removal from the presidential position was repeated (overthrow of the president K. Bakyev in Kirghizia in 2010), when Moscow avoids direct involvement in political crisis on the side of the former government. Belarus government, fearing the possibility of their own maidan in 2015 (the year of presidential election in the Republic of Belarus), felt its defenselessness acutely.

The government of the Republic of Belarus found itself in a difficult position. Political independency of the Republic at the foreign arena is formally restricted by the participation of the Republic in the Allied state of Russia and Belarus, Eurasian Economic Union, Collective Security Treaty Organization and at the same time, in Eurasian program "Western Partnership". Existing economic dependency of Belarus on supplies of energy resources, credits and Russian market encouraged Minsk not to integrate in Moscow, but to dissociate from Russia, avoid fulfilling allied duty in order not to come to hand to the West. Ukrainian crisis proved to be a kind of test for adherence of Belarus government to the union with Russia. It turned out to be that Minsk failed the test once again.

We should remind you that Belarusian government hasn't recognized the entrance of Crimea into Russian Federation until present time, repeating the situation of 2008-2009 when A. Lukashenko at first promised to recognize independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and then went back on his words.

Minsk recognized interim government of A. Turchynov – A. Yatseniuk practically at once after the coup d'etat on February 22 and hastened to meet interim president of Ukraine in the South of Belarus (March 29, 2014). RF refused recognizing new post-Maidan government in Ukraine. Belarusian government remained indifferent to the liquidation of the law about languages; the only reaction of the official Minsk to the tragedy in Odessa Trade Unions House on May 02. 2014 was the telegram with condolence, addressed to A. Turchynov. The President of Belarus appeared among the guests from NATO-countries at inauguration of P. Poroshenko, where A. Lukashenko called upon getting even with citizen soldiers from Donbass. "Here there can be no variants. They all are to be liquidated. But this is to be done sensible, so that peaceful citizens won't get harmed [4], i.e. he supported Anti-terrorist operation (ATO) of Ukrainian army in fact. Later on, Minsk would start equipping Ukrainian units, involved in ATO, with fuel and wheeled machinery [10].

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Belarusian government experts and analyst justify position of their government, acting as political partner of Kiev by the availability of high trade turnover of the Republic of Belarus with Ukraine (as of 2013 – 6 billion USD). It has been claimed many a time on various levels that Minsk is afraid to lose Kiev as important trade partner. However, for example trade turnover of Belarus with Russia comprises about 40 billion USD. It is ironic, that at the same time Belarusian government was not afraid to endanger its trade turnover with RF. In its turn, trade turnover of Russia with Ukraine was over 50 billion USD, which by the end of 2014 was reduced by 8.5 billion USD [18].

In the end of July Minsk together with Astana didn't support attempts of Moscow to form a single position within the framework of Eurasian integration concerning the access of Ukrainian commodities to the market of Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Moreover, at the same time Ukrainian export of food commodities was redirected to Russian market through the territory of Belarus, where Ukrainian commodities received Belarusian documents and were repacked in Belarusian packages. Taking in to account that due to the efforts of Ukrainian government the contact between enterprises of Russian and Ukrainian military-industrial complex were broken, Minsk tried to act not only as intermediate in reselling of military products of Ukrainian enterprises, but also made efforts to transfer to the territory of the Republic of Belarus a number of perspective military manufactures. Specialists from Ukrainian military-industrial complex are offered new employments and housing on the territory of Republic of Belarus.

Application of Ukrainian Context in Relations between Russia and Belarus

From the very beginning of Ukrainian crisis official Minsk found itself at the crossroad. On the one hand, preserving allied speechcraft, A. Lukashenko supported Russia in the conflict with Ukraine, on the other hand, he acted on the part of Kiev. In particular, when evaluating the results of referendum in Crimea, A. Lukashenko claimed: "Back in 1994, when we agreed to withdraw nuclear weapon, the USA guaranteed the so-called "nuclear umbrella" for us and for Ukraine – that we shall preserve our independence and territorial boundaries. That is why it is inadmissible that these guarantees are to be broken and that some country should take away part of a territory from other state. It is wrong." [15]. But he corrected himself at once, that Russia is not at fault in the crisis [15].

In autumn of 2014, already at the height of the civil war in Ukraine, A. Lukashenko claimed that presently Russia is forced to support south-

eastern territory of Ukraine: "Their brothers live there, and Russia cannot live them under the hatches", he told during press-conference for Russian journalists. According to Belarusian leader "the only thing is obvious, that in no case the war is to be started there and Russia will never start a straight-line collision [7].

However, A. Lukashenko demanded from Moscow to recognize special role of Minsk in relations with Ukraine at once, what was reflected by the opinion, which prevailed in autumn 2014 in Belarusian government that Russia sustains a defeat in confrontation with the West. In particular: "A rhetoric question to you Russians, that you don't like my contacts with Ukrainians, tell me why, is it harmful to Belarus or Russia that I communicate with the politicians from Ukraine, support relations with them? The latest events in Ukraine showed that there is nothing bad in it. And during out talks with the President of Russia I always ask him "Maybe I should get involved in solving some questions? If it is inconvenient, I may talk to some politicians in Ukraine … That is why I talk to Ukrainian government, even with… how is his name? – Liashko, I think (seems a very active, from the point of view of Russia, reactionary politician and a terrible nationalist) … And I shall keep in touch with these people." [13]

A. Lukashenko further used peacemaking rhetoric to justify his position in relation to Ukrainian crisis, but with each month it became more and more difficult to disguise departure of Belarus from Russia in terms of Ukrainian issue.

In time Belarusian government was able to take geopolitical advantages from preserving allied relations with Russia and development of contacts with new Ukrainian state, which was headed by P. Poroshenko. By leaning against such a controversial foreign policy, the parties, which were involved in conflict one way or another, could start a number of advises in Minsk, which at the beginning of September ended with signing the protocol on truce in the South-East of Ukraine.

The first summit of EU, Ukraine and Russia on issues of settling the conflict in Ukraine was held on August 26 in Minsk. It should be noted that Belarusian party had only indirect relation to both Minsk advises and to the summit on August 26 by providing "ground" for negotiations, but it used these international events to break international isolation. In particular, at the beginning of October, A. Lukashenko had offered directing Belarus troops to the conflict area unexpectedly and without agreement with Moscow: "If necessary – and this is a very dangerous and awful thing for me – since there is distrust of Russia to the West and of West to Russia, of Amer-

ica to Russia and of Russia to America, and there is distrust of belligerent parties, I would be ready to use my armed forces in order to take conflicting parties apart." [8]. Nevertheless, this statement, having no prospective for implementation, drew attention of international community and political powers to Belarus and its leader.

The more Russia got stuck in Ukrainian crisis, the more possibilities were provided for Belarusian president. In October 2014 A. Lukashenko openly joined western critics of the President of Russia, V. Putin, devoting his next conference for Russian journalists to shattering critics of the President of Russia: "And frankly speaking: **there is only one reason – it lies in your disorder and lack of control"** [14]. Occasionally, pointing out good-for-nothing Russian government, Belarusian President addressed evaluations of the socioeconomic situation in Kaliningrad, Smolensk, Bryansk and Pskov, claiming that Kaliningrad Region is the "patch of Belarus". Believing that Moscow is not engaged in regions development, he reminded Kremlin, that part of these regions once formed a part of Belarus [14]. In fact A. Lukashenko tried to apply "Crimean" approach to Russia.

Influence of Ukrainian Crisis on Eurasian integration project

Though the greatest problems with Minsk occurred in the sphere of Eurasian integration, Ukrainian crisis, as well as return of Crimea to Russia, caused great damage to integration processes on post-Soviet area, what affected the preparation to signing Treaty on Eurasian Economic Union and on preparation to Eurasian Economic Union forming:

- Belarus and Kazakhstan demanded to restrict economic expansion of Russia to their markets within the framework of Eurasian Economic Space, what was reflected during Eurasian Economic Councils in October and December 2013;

- Kazakhstan opposed unfolding Monetary Union on the basis of EAEU. As it turned out to be, Minsk and Astana were not yet ready to widen political integration on the basis of Eurasian integration;

- In course of preparation of Treaty on EAEC Belarusian government demanded creation of a single market of Russian and Kazakh petrol without "exceptions". Practically Minsk demanded specific privileged conditions of access to Russian petrol and the right to free duty-free export of petro-chemical products from the territory of the Customs Union. This was to secure Belarus over 30 billion USD over in the nearest future. In addition, Belarusian government attained from Moscow term loan in the amount of 2 billion USD for stabilization of accelerated decrease of reserve assets of Belarus, what threatened the republic with devaluation of Belarusian Ruble.

[12]. Official Minsk proceeded from the fact, that against the background of escalation of civil war in progress in Ukraine Moscow cannot afford crisis in relations with partners in Eurasian integration project.

In autumn 2014, foreseeing reduction of financial grants from Russia due to "tax maneuver", implemented in Russian fuel and energy complex, Belarusian party resorted to pressure campaign at Russian government, and as a result, received approval from Moscow to retain export duty for Russian petrol export in Belarusian budget. Practically, against the background of worsening of relations between Moscow and Kiev, petrol off-shore was regenerated in Belarus, what reduced Belarusian ruling elite to euphoria. It turned out to be that civil war in Ukraine is much advantageous for A. Lukashenko government.

As a result, the partners in creation of EAEU, and first of all Belarus, used Ukrainian crisis for pressure on Kremlin, demanding from Russia increase of grant support.

Using sanctions against Russia by the Republic of Belarus

With introduction in the beginning of August 2014 of food anti-sanctions against EU member-states and the states of North America by Russia, relations between Minsk and Moscow acquired intolerant character. In the beginning of August, after 2-3 calls by V. Putin, who demanded from the President of Belarus not to torpedo food sanctions against the West, A. Lukashenko enounced "When talking with the President of Russia, we spoke about protection, as he said, of Russian market. That is we are to fulfill our obligations on protection of the union market in part of transit of cargoes from the West through Belarus to the territory of Russia. If Russia closed its market for certain goods, we are not expected to let these goods en route through Belarus to Russia." [9]. Basically, this obligation concerned also Ukrainian food commodities, supplied to Russian market through Belarus.

Though Minsk didn't fulfill the promise, given by the President of Belarus to Moscow. It should be admitted that agreements, which made the basis of the Customs Union and the Single Economic Space, proved to be inapplicable to the emergency situation, which formed in relation between the leader of the project, Russia, and the countries of the West against the background of Ukrainian crisis. As far back as the Customs Union was formed, Russia lost control over its customs borders factually. Actually, now competent Russian authorities have no reliable information about what is carried to the Russian market through Belarus, what affects Russian small and medium business and the capacity of RF budget.

Within the framework of implementation of food anti-sanctions Russian government came to agreement with Belarus that Minsk has a right to import food raw materials from EU states, process and supply finished products to Russian market. In this case Ukrainian food raw materials were neither mentioned nor implied. Having taken advantage of "window of possibilities" at the border of the Customs Union, Belarus increased its import of inferior food raw materials, including those from Ukraine, dramatically what became apparent to Russian Sanitary Services at once. In addition official Minsk unfolded great logistic net on sending goods to Russian market, which are not subject to reprocessing. There appeared Belarusian mandarins, oranges, kiwi, ebony etc. Ukrainian fruits have also been noted. Products are formally sent to Kazakhstan, but the trucks were unloaded on the territory of Russia. Under agreements within the framework of Eurasian integration project Russia has no right to control this transport means.

Russian border with Belarus is crossed by 100 to 150 trucks (expert evaluation) daily. By the end of 2014 income of Belarus from undermining Russian food anti-sanctions made about 400-500 millions USD [11]. This was this money, received from smuggling goods, covered by sanctions, which made the basis of election campaign fund of A. Lukashenko for organizing president campaign in 2015.

Thus, since the end of 2013 the policy of Belarusian government in relation to Russia underwent significant evolution, what reflected radical changes of moods in official Minsk in context of the crisis in Ukraine.

Change of geopolitical status of the Republic of Belarus

Kiev Maidan in winter of 2013-2014, overthrow of government of V. Yanukovych, Crimea entering into the composition of Russia, dramatic aggravation of relations between Russia and the West, mass pressure of the USA and the EU pressure with sanctions on Russia made a profound impression at the government of Belarus. For a while the government of the republic felt deprived of reliable political cover.

Geopolitical changes in the region, which took place in 2014 due to Ukrainian crisis, in fact had no direct threat to sovereignty of Belarus, they could not destroy monopoly on power of the ruling grouping in Belarus. The issue of retaining power by A. Lukashenko was the main task of country's government in advance of presidential pre-election campaign of 2015 (the head of Belarus is balloting for the fifth term).

The president of Belarus found himself between the beetle and the block in 2014. On the one hand, he feared application of Kiev Maidan scenario against him by the West. A. Lukashenko took into account that in fact

his power is supported by the adherence of a small, but well-trained force subdivision, which can be quite easily dissipated by the trained militants, applied against forces of law and order during unrests. Turn to the West under such circumstances had its logics – there appeared necessity to avoid the threat of own Belarusian maidan by showing the West that the government of Belarus is quite loyal to the European Union, the USA and NATO, and the services on infringement of interests of Russia by Minsk can be in demand for the West.

On the other hand, the President of Belarus was much impressed by implacable and bloodless process of expulsion of Ukrainian authorities and military units of Ukrainian Army from the Crimean peninsula that enabled him trying this scenario on Belarus. Moreover the notion "Russian spring" itself was awesome for the president of Belarus, like for the leadership of other post-Soviet countries, including Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan etc. As a result the crisis of confidence between Moscow and Minsk reached a high in 2014. In addition, great dependence of Belarus on Russia practically in all the fields, starting with strategic import of energy (about 100% of energy resources are imported by the republic from abroad) and ending with military and technical collaboration has always been burdensome for A. Lukashenko, who finds restriction of his personal power potential extremely painful.

At the same time we should take into account that in two decades of A. Lukashenko being in office, there occurred a significant evolution of the role and the place of Belarus president in modern political reality gradually in the conscience of Belarusian political class: from the leader, who came to power on the tide of rejection of the results of the USSR breakup and nationalistic reaction and who made integration with Russia the cornerstone of his policy, A. Lukashenko started embodying the task of preservation of country's sovereignty and independence in the eyes of the greater part of political class of the republic. Understanding of great dependence on Russia started converting into the threat for existence of the state.

The problem of the change of dependence from Russia into dependence of Russia from the new status of Belarus remained. In solving this problem, from the point of view of Belarusian government, it gained an unseen since the end of the Cold War "window of possibilities".

New Status of Minsk against the Background of the Ukrainian Crisis

The basis of evaluations of opposition between Russia and the West by the government of Belarus is formed by non-critical perception of existing might of main countries of the European Union (first of all Germany)

and the USA, which is characteristic of political classes of the states of Western and Central Europe. The government of Belarus has no doubts, that as a result of consolidated pressure on the part of the West Russia will come to significant terms in territorial, military and technical, as well as economic sphere (Crimea will be returned to Ukraine, Russia will be deprived of nuclear weapon and its resources are to be split among the neighbors and as a result, RF shall break up). This radical scenario does not frighten the government of Belarus at all, which believes that even if Russia will be able to formally withstand economic sanctions and political pressure of the West, the federation shall be sufficiently weakened, it shall lead to the change of authority and it will fall under the influence of the USA and China, what provides a totally new role for Minsk, which shall become extremely important for Russia as the "window" to the West.

In its turn, Minsk staked at the fact that further on under conditions of opposition with the West Russia, fearing to lose "the only ally", shall be obliged to make concessions to Minsk and not to insist upon strict observance of its duty as an ally, what opens new possibilities for Minsk at international arena.

In particular, declaration of V. Shadursky, dean of the Faculty of Foreign Relations, Belarus State University: "From philosophic point of view Belarus is tired of being an "outpost", now it is a "bridge" and "place of meetings"… There are two approaches. What is Belarus? What is its geopolitical position? Belarus is the "bridge", "portal", "place of meetings", "place of dialog", I mean from philosophical point of view, or Belarus is an "outpost", "civilization outpost", "religious outpost" etc. The situation, when Belarus was an "outpost", was very much destructive for Belarus, as outpost always suffers… Not an outpost, but a bridge. If someone doesn't like the name "bridge", let it be "place of meetings", but it has historically established so, this is economic need. And here, I think, our partners should not take offence", appears rather symptomatic from this point of view." [2]. It concerns the new role of Belarus as a kind of "sluice" between the West and the isolated Russia. In this case Minsk appears to be political and economic intermediate, by actively using all the benefits of its new geopolitical positioning, whereas the victory of Moscow in oppositions with the West is not taken into account in Minsk, as it means final loss of confidence to Lukashenko from Russian government.

New policy of Belarusian government under geopolitical crisis from the tactical point of view is to provide removal of sanctions of the West against administration of A. Lukashenko, what against the background of

strengthening sanctions against Russia was to prejudice authority of V. Putin and Russia according to the formula "Lukashenko was able, and Putin failed" greatly and to help to distance itself from Russia. In its turn, strengthening Western vector of foreign policy of Belarus in conditions of aggravation of opposition between the West and Russia was to create exclusively favorable conditions for economic blackmail of Russia, which would not be ready for international scandal with though a formal, but an ally under existing conditions, not speaking of Russian and Belarusian crisis, which can undermine Eurasian integration project.

From the strategic point of view Belarusian government set a task to gain recognition by the West of the programmed results of presidential elections of 2015, what would provide for A. Lukashenko not only preservation of power for a decade, transfer of the republic to the hands of his successors, but also the long-expected liberation from control of Moscow. At the same time roles in liaison Russia-Belarus are to drastically change due to Ukrainian crisis. Objectively government of Belarus is interested in isolation of Russia, but not in final defeat of Russia, as in this case Belarus itself is posed to threat. Minsk is in a hurry, as it counts upon the fact that Russia starts yielding to the West in Ukrainian subject matter in the nearest months. On the ground of these hopes, Belarusian government delayed opening of Russian air base on the territory of Belarus until 2016.

Peace-Making Status of Minsk

A. Lukashenko used the war in Ukraine as an instrument to break foreign-policy blockade, withdrawal of sanctions from Belarus and for a new entering by A. Lukashenko on the level of balancing between the West and Russia. By autumn 2014 A. Lukashenko achieved a certain level of dialog with the West, what promoted holding the meeting of Contact Group and Summit EU-Russia-Ukraine in Minsk in the end of August. Providing ground for negotiation, government of Belarus objectively promoted concluding Minsk Agreements in September 2014, what is an obvious contribution to establish peace in Donbass. Though, it is early to speak of the fact that Minsk was able to form peace-making policy apart from Russia in respect of the war in Ukraine. A. Lukashenko has many a time claimed that Minsk has its own plan of conflict settlement, but we were unable to find the traces of this plan both during the meetings of contact group and during the summit in Minsk on February 11-12.

The peak of diplomatic success of the government of Belarus proved to the choice of Minsk as the place for summit in "Norman format". It is notable that offer of A. Lukashenko to provide Minsk as "ground for nego-

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tiations" was made by P. Poroshenko, what was stated by the President of Belarus during his meeting with V. Putin in Sochi on February 8 ("We came to an agreement with Putin in Sochi. He told me: "Can you arrange it from the point of view of security? It's not a simple task." I told him: "Listen, don't worry. You know, we can do everything in Belarus, we shall make everything on the highest level…") [6]. A. Lukashenko, using summit in Minsk on February 11-12, 2015, did his best to settle all his problems with the EU at the same time, by trying to rally support of the EU in advance of presidential elections in 2015. Though, the scenario of February summit in Minsk fell short of expectations of the EU and the government of Belarus. A. Lukashenko, like leaders of the EU A. Merkel and F. Hollande, was sure that summit would be devoted to fixation of concessions from Russia and in this case he shall be in the most advantageous position, being the host of the summit. The whole process was to take not more than two hours, but when negotiations developed in 16-hour marathon, the President of Belarus was taken aback.

In course of negotiations A Lukashenko tried to support P. Poroshenko, met him in private, cracked jokes at V. Putin during the dialog with A. Merkel. But, as a whole, Minsk summit on February 11-12 made effect on the President of Belarus. He was convinced that his hopes that Russia, represented by its President, would start retreating and make concession weren't justified, what appeared in first interviews of A. Lukashenko after the end of the summit. In particular, on February 12 the head of Belarus declared: "How can I go to sleep? How can a war be conducted at the peaceful front without ammunition?... My task was to bring ammunition in time. That is why I tried to fulfill my function (i.e. "treated to everything that is produced in Belarus and Russia. We ate fried eggs, cheese, dairy products, drank several buckets of coffee – A. S.) [16].

Though such a modest status of the President of Belarus against the background of negotiations, having no precedence, was quickly recognized in Minsk as not worthy for A. Lukashenko. In course of information campaign, which started in Belarus, Ukrainian context of the summit, held in Minsk, gradually disappeared, and they started suggest to the population of the republic that the Chancellor of the Federative Republic of Germany and the President of France arrived in Minsk with the aim only to meet the President of Belarus.

Just in a week after completion of the summit, A. Lukashenko, who became concerned over the fact, that the theme of his participation in the summit can be forgotten, decided to raise his status to the level of "secret"

negotiator: "But we work mostly work nonpublic. Sometimes it is much more important than some kind of PR. I want you to know, we didn't announce this, but we expressed our attitude to negotiations (on settlement of Ukrainian crisis) and all the participants knew it. I am sure that our position as to the issue of Ukraine shall be demanded in the nearest future." [3]. Though, as is known, during the summit of "Norman format" no plan, proposed by A. Lukashenko was reviewed; the President of Belarus wasn't admitted to the negotiating table.

On February 18, seeking to preserve the status of a peace-maker, A. Lukashenko proposed himself as the executor of Minsk agreements: "Today we observe a rather earnest situation in direction of Debalstevo. Belarus could play a great role in settlement of this conflict if the parties, involved in it, wanted it… Today we proposed to Ukrainian and to the other party, involved in this conflict that the problem in Debaltsevo can be solved within a few days, if Ukraine, Russia, DPR and LPR want it… We are ready to be not just a mediator, but to adequately end this conflict in Debaltsevo and to withdraw all the Ukrainian soldiers from there against our securities, that they shall never be at war… And if someone is bothered by the weapon, which Ukrainian soldiers, surrounded in Debaltsevo, have as of today, we are ready to accept this weapon on the territory of Belarus… [5]. This offer of the President of Belarus caused misunderstanding at the world arena, as on the day, when A. Lukashenko announced his offer, the soldiers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, surrounded near Debaltsevo, started surrendering and trying to escape from the "pocket" on their own. Nevertheless, A. Lukashenko's offer was actively used in internal political arena. The deputies of the Belarusian Parliament supported their president by noting that "with the shudder of the heart they observe how events are unfolded in neighboring Ukraine." [1].

The theme of the war in Ukraine is used exclusively for political purposes in Belarusian media-space. The idea is suggested to the population that Belarus remains "an island of peace and stability" exclusively due to the efforts of the President of the republic A. Lukashenko. On this reason the horrors of war, which is lead not for one month in the neighbor state, didn't give impulse to the government of Belarus and the community of the republic to raise and send humanitarian aid to the area of the conflict. For the whole period of the crisis Donbass didn't receive from Belarus a single kilogram as a support for people, who are in the area of humanitarian catastrophe.

Gradually the consequences of the specific Minsk positioning as to the conflict in Ukraine, start reflecting on the level of republic. In particular, on February 13, at 8.00 via Belarusian wire radiocommunication it was announced that on signing of agreement in Minsk on February 12 and cease-fire withdrawal of Ukrainian forces "and Russian forces together with the secessionists from DPR and LPR" would be started. And further on during this radio broadcast the following word combinations were used "Russian troops in Ukraine", "secessionists", "militants", and "terrorists". In official Belarusian press hints on the fact, that "Putin tackled the taboo (we are not at war, do not participate, we don't know anything, we are not a party to the conflict, that has nothing to do with us etc.) and decided, came and showed to the EU and others that he is ready for serious agreements, having direct relation to Russia today and tomorrow" can be found [17]. At the same time the newspaper of the Administration of the President of Belarus advises Russian government "Of course, for this reason both Moscow and Kiev are to reduce the grade of hatred and hypocrisy at the TV channels, one of them is to hide its favorite words about "Bandera chastisers junta", when it concerns the government of Ukraine…» [17].

By March 2015 A. Lukashenko managed to take maximum advantage from Ukrainian crisis for his own political goals:

- As a result of the summit of the "Norman fourth" on settlement of Ukrainian crisis, A. Lukashenko was legalized by the EU after elections in 2010. It appears that if he preserved the policy of support of Kiev, he would have no problems with recognition by the West of the results of the elections in 2015, what should, beyond doubts, theoretically increase his political independence of Moscow;

- A. Lukashenko with assistance of the West, by using Ukrainian background, gradually overcomes isolation and is inspired by the possibilities of unfolding a new stage of the policy of balancing between the East and the West from new, pro-western positions, which open before him. That shall balance the formal participation of the republic in integration projects with Russia;

- In principle, in perspective, with assistance of the West, the President of Belarus can adopt the status of V. Yanukovych in 2012-2013 and in theory, on the basis of perspectives of association of the Republic of Belarus with the EU, can unfold a large-scale policy of pressure against Moscow, demanding not only increase of grants, but also securing the status of the main mediator between the East and the West for Belarus.

In case of more obvious going over of A. Lukashenko to the West and Ukraine new perspective is open for him. The President of Belarus is partially released from the control of the Kremlin, his sole power of Belarus is strengthened, nationalistic opposition is finally liquidated (it gradually joins existing authorities), previously oppositional slogan on the struggle with Russia for the sovereignty in the face of the "threat" from Moscow ("annexation") becomes the main slogan of the government. Though at the same time the republic, being deprived of customary support from Russia, may enter into deep economic crisis, what shall call in question the existence of Belarus as an independent state.

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UDC 327:330.101(477)

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THE CONFLICT IN EASTERN UKRAINE AS A RESULT OF SYSTEMIC CRISIS IN UKRAINE (WHAT HAPPENS?)

The article represents an attempt to deal with the events that are now taking place in Ukraine. Certain historical retrospective of last year`s Ukrainian history must make their origin more understandable. Based on this retrospective, author does not try to make the final categorical conclusions, but only offers a certain logic of questioning. This methodological approach, on the one hand, allows unusual and, in some sense, unpopular way to look at Ukrainian today, and on the other, it seems that it has some heuristic advantages. According to the author, the philosophical understanding of the Ukrainian realities will help better understand also in pragmatic aspect what is happening, and will allow you to make the right decisions, even in the toughest conditions.

Keywords: *system, strategy, Angst, advocacy, crisis, conflict, revolution, manipulation, power.*

Once K. Jaspers, when highlighting one generic concept, called the period from the VIII till the II century BC "an Axial Age". He combined the

processes occurring in the ecumene from China to Greece at that time, because he saw something common in them. This similarity can be identified by a rational breakthrough to the transcendence: Confucius and Siddhartha Gautama, Zoroaster and the Hebrew prophets, Socrates and Plato − each of them in their own way, justifying the moral laws, conceived of the world of the intelligible. It was the first attempt to get closer to the person's own otherworldly, to grasp the sacred. It is this shared orientation of giants of the human spirit, not similar to each other, that allowed the German philosopher to see something common in such differentiated cultural integrities.

Perhaps, the current time can also be classified according to the model of anything and setting its common definition. And we don't mean globalization with its unification force, regardless of the types of cultural types or national traditions, or even the gender constants.

No, this is more about feeling the spirit of the difficult moment, about the explication of its existential loading. The attempt to determine this common base through fear is very likely. Exactly, it would even be more properly to use Heidegger's *Angst* (literally "horror") - existential, uncompromising horror. In the context of the analysis of today's time this term looks very convenient. The horror of the present is not just a fright, as, for example, fear of the child who is afraid of the dark: in this case, the recipe is very simple – to switch on the light and the fear disappears by itself together with even the memory of it. No, we are talking about something quite different: it's a horror that you feel with all your essence, when you only realize that you are struck dumb and not able to resist it. That is a feeling when you are confronted with something incomprehensible and feel helpless; the petrifying horror. It has the classic formula: the horror does not know what horrifies it.

That's enough, the pessimistic tone is quite clear, - someone can say and then ask: what is the reason for this situation? The answer is the following: a terrible situation in Ukraine, and even the problems that it has exposed rather than the situation itself.

Indeed, there is a point of view that it is a local problem, only the Ukrainians and, perhaps, the closest neighbors of them are interest in it and. Yes, such standpoint is known, and it is obvious that the degree of perception (but even not always the discussion) is reducing proportionally to the increase in the distance from the epicenter of events. But it is also the fact, that this problem is bothering all thinking people regardless of geography (and this fact can be confirmed by both the headings of front pages of the world newspapers and other things, including personal experience). There have been written

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many articles. There have been declared many recipes and there have been suggested sufficient quantities of strategies, but the way out is not visible, though almost a year has passed from the begging of the conflict. Therefore, there is a feeling of that very *Angst.*

But could it be otherwise, if at the beginning of the XXI century, after the horrific lessons of the XX century, at a time when one would think that a strategy of non-stop movement towards the Welfare State and, possibly, of "the eternal peace" has been found, it has turned out that the rules of international law fail, and there are logical errors in the values that the Western model of democracy professes and universal human values (the greatest heritage of a secular age) sometimes are used as a bargaining chip in the geopolitical game. All these questions don't let you see just a local conflict on the periphery of Europe in the Ukrainian events.

Yet the main objective of this study is not an analytics of the clash of civilizations analyst or explication of the post-history situation. We do not even set targets to provide answers to some specific questions. But we believe that it is essential to put (define) these questions meaningfully. We know that the question, put correctly, provides itself more than fifty percent of answer. Anyway, we are not interested in these statistics. Perhaps, a well-aimed question will help us to understand: What is happening? How did it happen so that a well-developed country in the center of Europe is in a state of war, where the Ukrainians kill the Ukrainians? Can these events be explained only with foreign intervention? What is being done to stop this conflict? And, finally, what is waiting for us in the end of this process? It is not our objective to find the answers to these and other questions, the objective is to build a question of certain logic that outlines a clear lighting way (as if pointing spotlights on dark places). So, let's try in such way to find out what really happening. It is logical to start from the beginning.

In the autumn of 2013 the country faced an existential choice of way of further development. One of the critical factors of further tragedy events was the position of authority that ignored public opinion by changing the declared European integration a few days before the Vilnius Summit. The accelerator for the further process was "Maidan" - the mass protests on Independence Square in Kiev, which later after the new leadership of the country coming to power and during the glorification of the events of the winter of 2013-14 received the name of the Revolution of Dignity. But first we should define the terminology.

Ever since the Soviet historical school times we known that a revolution is a radical, fundamental overthrow (rotation), a qualitative change, a

leap in the development of society, nature, etc. Here, clearly, it can be said that the methodological vision is out of date and its personification in history hasn't stood the test of time. Of course, this point of view makes sense. But let's refer to the New Philosophical Encyclopedia and deal with the definitions. Thus, here we read: "Revolution is a surge, violent perturbation of motion, interval of explosive activity of any phenomenon, in the process and consequence of which it changes its quality, essential and holistic definitions ... In contrast to the reforms, a revolution is the most concentrated, the most rapid and deep update of phenomenon, that provides the unprecedented possibilities of self-realization, self-existence of the phenomenon"[1, 429].

The question immediately arises: what essential changes have taken place after the events of February 2014, which would force us to admit the unprecedented opportunities of self-realization and self-existence? Yes, new people appeared in the government offices. But what has changed? Are the promises they have given to people in the streets and squares carried out? Are the responsible for the tragedy punished? And what is even more importantly – is the fault of those who today are announced the criminals and traitors proved? Do we know who is guilty of shootings and kidnappings?

If reflect closely on this phenomenon, another connotation of a non-routine term "revolution", which now justifies a lot and give even more rights, is more relevant. This term first appeared in the XIV century and meant then a circular motion, walking in a circle, that's why the most famous work of Nicolaus Copernicus is called *De revolutionibus orbium coelestrium* («On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres"). It refers to a bitbrace, in a certain sense, we can say, using the terminology of Nietzsche, that we are talking about the return of the same. With such concept of revolution, looking at the current events in Ukraine, it is hard to disagree. The next shift the previous without any essential transformations. I think this description accurately characterizes the nature of Ukrainian events. Back in the XVII century a revolution meant the cyclic change of leaders or ruling elites. For a wonder, such a definition meets the Ukrainian realities, yet at the present moment even such a definition can not be considered relevant. So in whatever light we view it by applying a scientific methodology, we fail to see a "revolution" in those events. Or, perhaps, should rewriting the Constitution be understood as a radical upheaval leading to qualitative changes never seen before?

If you set a goal to deal with the demands that people came to the protests with, and to compare with those to which these protests have led in

February 2014, you'll be surprised: how the transformation of the legal requirements for denial of the existing laws was possible? Do we have the next substitution of terms, taking into account the consequences of the events of that time? Here, it is appropriate to recall Kant, who in his political philosophy formulated some positions have become today the fundamental principles of formation of the state and formed a framework of public-private dialogue [2]. Among other things, Kant denied any possibility of rebellion (the term of I. Kant): for the German philosopher it's inappropriate because it violates the main rule – to respect the law. He repeatedly insisted on a government of laws, and not of men: the only way to get closer to "the everlasting peace". In a situation of rebellion it's the primary law and the significance of the law comes to nothing. Here quite different rules come into force, which in no way contribute to the approximation of the desired far reaches. But he does not leave it at that: if the revolution does take place, the most important thing you need to do is to follow the existing laws (thus, by the way, Kant denies the possibility of counter-revolution). Disorder cann't lead to order. However, the leaders of Ukrainian protesters were desperate practical men, so the first thing they started doing was changing the laws, and it seems that this is what unites all their subsequent steps[1].

But let's back to the attempt to figure out how we mark the events of February 2014, that have taken place in Ukraine. And there another terminological analogy comes in handy. All this time we quasi have had the surreal conceptual worldview constantly, behaving rough with the terms and constantly trying to legitimize some practices through an appeal to certain values, but with the conscious substitution of concepts. Yes, justice in this period gave way to street lynching, but the majority of TV channels justified such transformation. Like if there is no confidence in the law enforcement authorities and the courts system, then we can take the matter into our own hands, as if the Maidan represented the will of the whole people, and the letter one is the only sovereign, so all actions were legitimized. Freedom was replaced by tyranny and information – by propaganda. Today it can be stated as a fact. But then the question immediately arises: why are they trying to represent these events in democratic colors?

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[1] The spectrum of these changes is very wide - from the immediate reformation of the Constitution to the creation of the Ministry of Information Policy. But if you look closer at such changes, it seems that they do occur not because it is better, but because it is more profitable to their initiators.

This strategy of behavior has other names, and none of them are in tune with democracy. Therefore, the next question seems logical: what is such manipulation necessary for?

The involvement of the foreign officials in these events looks very interesting too. There is no sense in talking about political bias and partiality of their points of view, but the complete violation of all diplomatic ethos looks simply unprecedented. The certain foreign leaders repeatedly not just spoke on the stage on Independence Square (which in itself seems strange, while maintaining diplomatic relations between the countries), but openly called to struggle with the authority being absolutely legitimate at that time.

So, we should understand the neighborly relations in that way. So to say, to put good face on a bad game. It seems that we have normal relations between the countries, and some foreign officials come and openly support the anti-government protests. This is, perhaps, should be understood as a manifestation of democracy and the personification of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of another state too. In a certain way, the whole situation is expanded with the refusal of foreign ministers from those guarantees that they provided at the conclusion of agreements between the government and the opposition[1].

It looks strange, not speaking about the artificiality of many events of that period. This unnaturalness is clearly visible from the very beginning (of breaking up Maidan) through the strange circumstances of kidnapping of the future minister to the tragic events of the last days of confrontation when more than a hundred people were killed (the most of deaths occurred on February 19-21, when the protocol on reconciling the conflict was preparing and signing. The agreements were achieved, however, it seems that someone wanted the conflict be settled in different way. And all those unnatural, artificial events are accompanied by one line of infernalization of power. Everything was done (and the governance itself sometimes helped it) in order to demonize the governance to the maximum degree, in order that everything associated with it was seen as impure, that the whole social universe was divided into good and evil warriors, and the very confrontation gained metaphysical attributes.

We will not go into a political myth-making, but, as we can see, the technology has worked. However, the question is not removed from the agenda: what is all of this for?

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[1] It refers to the agreement dated February 21 between the government and the opposition, guaranteed by the foreign ministers of Germany, France and Poland.

Here we can give an example of Colonel Aureliano from the immortal work of G. Marquez "One Hundred Years of Solitude," who just got into a rage (because, unlike many of our contemporaries, he was a decent man) when he realized that one could fight simply for power or just for power. Yes, not for the high purposes or ideals, not for the right to create a better world and get a better fate, but for getting the power, which is a goal in itself, which is a real desire, although the true motives of this struggle are just disguised behind the great slogans of greater democracy, solid equity, social justice and the like. However, this is just the beautiful shape, behind which the real essence of the calls for fundamental reforms can hardly be captured. Power for power's sake - it seems not just Latin American archetype!

it gets worse and worse as it goes on, as the classic said. If the events of February 2014 do not seem to be a revolution, but the strategy of behavior clearly correspond to the best examples of the change of the symbolic field, ranging from the so-called "Leninopad" to the cancelation of the old holidays and the appointment of new ones.

That's why one of the main steps of the new government had to be a step of ideological character (for example, creation of the Ministry of Information Policy) and all opponents must be eliminated in one way or another. As the French philosopher F. Fedje noted at his time: "The government, strictly speaking, does not tolerate anything that in any way does not compromise with it" [3, 114]. The Ukrainian politics have learned this rule very well. Today we have no real opposition, any criticism are completely absent, midly speaking, the press looks selective and biased[1], and information from the news agencies disappeared completely, freeing up space for interpretations and propaganda[2]. The following question may seem logical: how should we deal with critical state-

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[1] I insist that today in Ukraine the honest, objective journalism is very problematized. And I want to ask a question to the journalistic brethren: and where is the corporate ethics? Where are the standards of journalistic objectivity? Or is it more convenient and comfortable to service faithfully to shareholders than to reveal the truth? Where have these truth-seekers, constantly screaming about the violation of the norms of impartiality, gone? For a deeper understanding see this link which there are tens if not hundreds "walking" on the Internet, may be shame is still not completely lost: http://youtu.be/gf32sOftOuo.

[2] In exemplification of this, just note how much the information campaign around Hadiia Savchenko is similar (in some moments up to matching) to the same process concerning Jessica Lynch, the American heroine of the Iraq war. The shooting angles of some photos make us suspect almost one and the same operator, not speaking about the same schemes of glorification

ments and sharp talk-show? On this subject, as well as in the regard of opposition we can only send once again to the opinion of the quoted philosopher. Severity of any statement only defines the framework in which the compromise was found: no opposition topics are proclaimed now, if they have not received a pre-negotiation of the responsible persons. Try to place some critical news on the top media resources of Ukraine and after all the failures once it becomes clear what is meant when officials speak of democratic values and independent and free fourth power. Even the Jacobins knew this rule, proclaiming it as a kind of credo: "There is no freedom for the enemies of freedom".

But the question is not settled at that. How it happened so that after the terrible events in Volnovakha the all-Ukrainian mourning with funeral procession in Kiev was announced, and when exactly one week later a mortar attack in the Leninskyi district of Donetsk killed thirteen people not even the national flags were lowered? So do you have to die only on the territory controlled by Ukraine in order that your death will be noticed? Or were people, killed in Donetsk, "less Ukrainian" citizens? Or if a person stayed at home and had nowhere to go, does he immediately become a separatist? From the analysis of trends in the last few weeks we see that the economic problems will soon have to go out in the foreground. All this is very similar to the work of the Ministry of plenty from George Orwell's "1984", that publishes quarterly the reports on the basis of which the standard of living rises [4], and in fact the name of the goods and the number of products are reducing and the real standard of living is getting worse. It seems that with this policy bulk of the population will soon be put on the brink of survival. The devaluation of the hryvnia (which drove the majority of Ukrainian below the poverty line), the rapid reduction of industrial production and GDP, loss of jobs, the suspension of production, the destruction of infrastructure - all this is an essential characteristic of modern economic policy. This can not but affect the economic health of the country as a whole and each citizen in particular.

The state on the brink of disaster, however, they all are saying that someone bothers them to work. This is very handy when someone bother to work, because every time when one failure to do something, it can be attributed to the fact that someone hinders from doing it. It is very convenient policy to cover their failure. The worst case scenario for the officials today is that this hindrance will disappear. Because the veil, behind which a real "professionalism" is hidden now, will vanish at once, uncovering the real situation in the country. This is like when the mist disappears, and it appears

that you stand on the very edge of the abyss. The disappearing of mist can not be allowed.

However, the question remains again: what for? The answer will not be given, as agreed originally. However, if not for the sake of power, for the sake of what? If, instead of peace we are increasingly funding the war! If, instead of welfare the average Ukrainians began to live three times worse! If, instead of information and news there is complete propaganda, with the help of which they try to compensate for all other losses! What for then if not for the sake of power, if the situation in all sectors, which the public officials assumes the responsibility for, is only getting worse? But there are those who are not getting worse in any way. May it be because they have authority and do everything to save it? Finally, there are a few more questions. What is happening in the economic sphere today? We mean, in addition to a total disaster, what is being done to overcome it? The question is not about the crisis moment of the present time, but about the strategy. What do we have in the capacity of the economic strategy? What can be seen from the actual actions of the government? We hear: let's raise tariffs for the population, raise the retirement age, abolish the subsidies for farmers, and so on. All this is doing for only one - to get a new tranche of the IMF, which will help just to repay the old debts and to fulfill social obligations during some time. This money will be directed on to earn new money. We do not even hear about the modernization of the economy, the creation of new outlets generating the additional value, about new jobs and so on. It seems that simply there is no any economic strategy.

Unfortunately, it's hard to escape the same conclusion, when thinking of a military aspect. Obviously, it can only be the situational actions related to instant threats. There is no forethought strategy, no one. All that our leaders have managed to do is to complicate the life of his people to the greatest possible extend. First, all social payments were suspended in ATO zone, then all the operators of the banking system were disconnected, but it was not enough: today there are many problems related to communication between the occupied territories and Ukraine. And finally, the decision to impose the state of emergency in the Donbass has been taken[1]. The question arises: what is it for and who is getting worse because of it? I'll provide a reflection of a personal nature. In ATO zone even now I have left both grandmothers who are almost eighty

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[1] It is very naive to believe that in the situation when no one of the old laws of Ukraine work in the occupied territories, the new Decree will establish the law immediately. Those, who have not fulfilled the law, will not start implementing it through the new regulation, but instead it will make difficult the life of those who well respected the law.

years old, and they refused to leave their homes. Last time they receive a pension in June (although all their life worked at the mine and have the legal right to social security), it is impossible to transfer money to them because the banking institutions do not work, and now it has become more difficult to come to them or take them out of there. It turns out that the policy of the Ukrainian authorities in the Donbass is aimed primarily against the Ukrainian people. Maybe if people stayed in their homes, if they have nowhere to go or not to live on, if in such a difficult time they are continuing to work there is no point in recording them immediately as the separatists and starting bombing? Maybe there is another, more productive logic?

And these decisions are made when there are systemic problems of another nature. Today, we must state the presence of private armies in Ukraine (no one wants to admit it, but obviously it is so), which, besides that it's not clear whom they obey and whose commands perform, sometimes engaged in outright looting [4].

Today they carry a system threat to the integrity of country. However, while it's convenient to use them, nobody wants to think about it. To think about what to channel the energy of the young men, who returned from the war, towards, and there will be no place in the social aspect for them. To think how to take away their weapon, that it was not an argument in social dialogue. To think finally about how make the existence of private armies impossible in peacetime, because it seems that just military conscription will not be enough. The lack of answers to these questions leads to the conclusion that there is no military strategy too. Today such attitude is now worth hundreds of lives, and tomorrow, it seems even more expensive.

Based on the situation, one would have to say that the political (both internal and external) strategy does not exist too. Or if it is, it leads to self-destruction of the country. However, certain stratagems do exist, however, they are far from to be countrywide. It seems that their living nerve is to remain in power at any cost. And so there is no matter what promises to give on the election races, with whom to form a coalition in order to have a controlled majority and guarantee a certain position. The situation has reached the point that it's even a shame to interpret the death of Ukrainians in a certain way in order to build an information campaign correspondently[1]. In such situation, we cannot but recall the Nietzsche's will to power.

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[1] It is hard to believe that all the victims among the civilian population are the responsibility of terrorists only. And the real number of victims among the Ukrainian military has been also questioned recently by foreign experts. This opinion was, in

There is no economic strategy too (but there is a lamentable state of the average Ukrainians), the military strategy does not exist too (but a humanitarian disaster is obvious, and thanks God, a technological disaster one has not yet occurred). There is no political strategy (however, the increasing imbalance of power inside the country and the outside systemic crisis are obvious). Instead of these vital elements of statehood there is just advocacy, with the help of which they try to compensate for the lack of systemic vision.

Therefore, it's obvious, we do not have to talk about elimination of that horror (Angst) by asserting which we have begun this meditation. Especially because the present situation is hardly controllable. It is rather similar to the situation when people are racing down a slope in a trolley, and from a distance it seems that they are managing them, however, the first attempt to slow down or change course immediately shows that they are just passively rushing to the abyss. The saddest thing is that after the mobile device with the crew reaches the bottom, it'll not be better. Therefore, we shall not wait for peace in the territory of our native country. That's why, based on these futuristic perspectives, the question arises: what happens?

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particular, given in the issue of Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung dated February 8, 2015

UDC 930.1

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HYBRID WARFARE IN UKRAINE: THE OLIGARCHIC DISCOURSE

The article is devoted to the consideration of the phenomenon of hybrid warfare. Based on the fact that the military operations are a particular process, it is proposed to analyze the phenomenon from the standpoint of the technological approach. The study of the phenomenon does not occur within the traditional "democratic paradigm", but is based on the assertion that in modern Ukraine an oligarchic-centric model of social and political order has formed. We consider the goals, objectives, principles, directions, forms, methods and techniques of conducting hybrid warfare. The general and particular aspects in the phenomena of traditional and hybrid warfares are determined. The attention is focused on the complex nature of the phenomenon, its layered structure. The attention is drawn to the fact that the participants of the process perform different roles at various levels, which is fixed by experts, analyzing the situation from different ideological positions. Thus, Ukraine can be considered as the subject of hybrid warfare at the regional level, but it also becomes a means, and its future role is the goal, purpose and objective for the subjects of the geopolitical level.

The phenomenon of hybrid warfare is characterized by the absence of principles in the forming of the process technology. In the case of Ukraine, the lack of clear guidelines in the organization of the process is dictated solely by economic interests of oligarchic clans that have joined the struggle for the redistribution of the model of consolidation in the ownership of the instruments of labor and means of production. Other elements of the technological process of hybrid warfare serve for the implementation of their own corporate interests. The main tool in this struggle is informational, which is the main resource of the era.

Keywords: hybrid warfare, technology, oligarchy, information resource.

The dramatic events in the south-east of Ukraine, which have become a logical continuation of the Maidan in 2014, are considered by most experts as the most critical in the years of the existence of the independent state. Indeed, the state of a permanent political crisis has reached its climax, when the question about the continued existence of the state of Ukraine, its sovereignty arose. At this the assessment of events from different perspectives is not straightforward, because of the complexity of the phenomenon, incorporating the elements of a civil war, as well as the elements of external aggression. Therefore, the expert community is increasingly appealing to the term "hybrid war" for the description and analysis of the events. This trend in the definition of this phenomenon is in line with the modern mainstream – the attempts to describe the complex system from the standpoint of a chaos theory. And in such attempts a formal approach dominates, when, in spite of the fact that the model describing the system is a deterministic, the system behavior is accidental.

However, any system lends itself to a certain systematization, analysis, etc. If we present the events as a process, it is obvious that technological approach can be applied to its description. In other words, any process can be divided into technological elements and we can highlight: goals, objectives, principles (strategic line), means, forms, methods, techniques, levels, etc. (tactical line). This approach provides, first of all, the definition of the main participants of the process as subjects and objects. It is the definition of the major players in the phenomenon of a "hybrid war" in the south-east of Ukraine, their interests and abilities that is the **aim** of this work. Such an attempt proposes solving **a number of problems**, in particular:

1. The description of the characteristic points of a "hybrid war", the allocation of general and special.

2. The identification of causal relationships, being the foundation of a "hybrid war".

3. The establishment of the subject-object relationships in a hybrid war process, their legitimate conditioning.

4. The identification of the role of the social group of oligarchs in the mentioned processes.

It is obvious that the term a "hybrid war" contains both general and special. Therefore, it is advisable to say a few words about the general, i.e. the phenomenon of war, to determine the special. Sufficiently system analysis of the phenomenon and different views on it are led, in particular, by Didier Julia [1]. It contains just the technological approach to the war proc-

ess. Special attention should be paid to the position of the author, who reduces the causes of war to the "two: 1) hunger: until the time that dependent nations are close to the rich nations, the people tormented with hunger are close to the people, wallowing in luxury, there will be the threat of war. 2) political freedom: "the war is holy – Fichte said, - when independence is under the threat - the development of culture". This point is particularly relevant in the context of the events in the south-east of Ukraine. The causes of the conflict are in the contradiction between poverty and wealth, and the reason of the conflict is "an attack on cultural values".

It is also not superfluous to recall the traditional dialectical materialist approach, in which the "war is an organized armed struggle between states (or groups of states), nations (nationalist or colonial) or classes (civil war characteristic of antagonistic class society" [2]. Under this approach, the "war is the continuation of politics" of one or another class; and in every class society, in slave and feudal, as well as capitalist, there were wars that continued the policy of the oppressor classes, as well as wars that continued the policy of the oppressed classes" [3]. From these definitions, it seems appropriate to distinguish, on the one hand, the "arms" of the collision, which is a formal indication of the war in its traditional perception. On the other hand, the essence of a war is that it is a continuation of the policy of a particular social group in the struggle for power as the possibility to impose its will on other social groups. In other words, a war is a means to achieve political goals. It can be assumed that the specificity of the phenomenon of a "new war", a war in new, changed conditions should transform its structure: change its shape; leaving relatively unchanged its essence and content. Such transformations can be observed by analyzing the phenomenon of a hybrid warfare.

Considering the phenomenon of a hybrid warfare, it should be noted that there is scanty information on the designated topic in modern native scientific literature. An exception is S. Datsiuk, who is systematically working in this area [4]. There is much more enough conflicting information at the level of mass media. Most journalists very intensively introduce this concept at the level of mass consciousness, often using it more as a formal, comfortable, fashionable newspeak term than the term for which there is a stable image at the level of public consciousness.

The conception of a "hybrid warfare" is borrowed from foreign literature. So Victor Diachenko states: "The term «hybrid warfare» is extremely popular in recent years in the Western media in the context of the events in the south-east of Ukraine" [5]. The most generalized representa-

tion is provided by the corresponding article on Wikipedia [6], which is becoming an increasingly popular source of information at all the ambiguity of the relationship to its reliability and quality. Summarizing this information, we can say that a hybrid war is different, first of all, by the complexity, i.e.by a combination of different kinds of specific military actions; a manifestation of activity in several areas, directions and at different levels; at different scales; using various forms of approaches, methods and techniques. Moreover, it is a wide variability in the selection of the technological structural elements that is a particular feature of this phenomenon. At this particular attention should be paid to the fact that most researchers necessarily focus on the information component of a hybrid war. Information warfare, media wars, network wars, cyber wars, propaganda and counter-propaganda, information and disinformation do not compose a complete list of conducting active operations, which are based on the information component. It can be assumed that the leading role of the information component is due to the fact that the resource of information is the basic source of the modern information age. It is this resource that is the basic "conversion resource", which allows transferring one significant resource to another, and speeds up the whole process of the said conversion. In its turn, the rate of conversion of one type of resource to another is the criterion of the efficiency of the increment of the total capital or resource potential. At the same time it should be remembered that the level of the total capital or resource potential is the basic indicator being the foundation of many phenomena and processes that define their identity. In particular, the ratio of "relative deficit-surplus" of socially valuable resource defines the roles of the "subject" and "object", respectively, in the relations of power, i.e., in the political sphere. The party that has a relative excess of socially significant resource becomes the subject, the party that experiences its deficit becomes the object.

It is at this point, experts say that a hybrid warfare is determined as a method of action in an asymmetrical war [7]. That is, the hybrid warfare is a forced form when the parties with a different structure of resource potentials come into conflict. In order to achieve a favorable outcome of the military confrontation, each party tries to offer the enemy "to play by its rules". The aim is to transfer the confrontation to that plain, to that sphere, to that scale at which the designated member has an advantage at the appropriate resource. It should be noted that the enemy does not always accept the conditions that are put forward; that's why each party is playing "its game" that is perceived subjectively as "chaos". On the other hand, it can be assumed that

the "lack of principles" in the selection of the basic technological parameters of the system is also the principle of a hybrid war. But this is just in general. In each individual case, the party chooses precisely those principles that are perceived by this party as the most favorable exclusively for it. Moreover, this "benefit" has a purely situational character. With a quick change of a multifactor situation the evaluation of a new situation is quickly changed as well and, accordingly, the principles of the entire technological chain of a hybrid war change. Thus, it can be assumed that the success in a hybrid war is largely provided by mobility in the evaluation and corresponding adjustment of the elements of its realization.

Special attention should be paid to the fact that during the organization of the corresponding hybrid activity its organizers have to change tasks quickly, and then, in accordance with the objectives, the whole technological line of the warfare as well. At this a strategic goal of the organizer (technologist) of the process should remain constant. This remark is particularly relevant in the case when the organizer-technologist is associated and is inlined into various systems, into systems of various fields and levels. In this case, he will inevitably have to subjectively rank the priority of these systems according to his subjective perceptions about the value of these systems.

You can't fail to notice one more important point. Upon closer examination of those technological elements that are put into effect during a hybrid warfare, we can note their relative traditional character: they are "updated" only at the expense of the component of the technical progress – first of all, there is a change of means of warfare. In connection with this techniques, methods, shapes, and, respectively, the strategy and tactics change. But it is peculiar of the development process and the "traditional" war. So you can see that "additional specifics" of a hybrid war is mostly given by a novelty of combination of technological elements. "The effect of chaos" at the level of perception is precisely formed by the relative strangeness of such a combination. An analogy can be drawn with the perception of a Surrealist painting: traditional, real objects and non-traditional, unrealistic links between them.

All of the above is fully applicable to the current situation in Ukraine, to the processes taking place in the Crimea and the Donbass. Moreover, the complex character of this phenomenon in Ukrainian conditions requires a separate multi-faceted study. In this article we would like to draw attention only to some important points.

The issue about the subjects of a hybrid warfare is extremely current. A subjective assessment of the experts on this issue varies, depending on the one hand, on what level of a hybrid war is considered, on the other hand, the ideological bias of the expert should be taken into account. Analysis of the process of conducting a hybrid warfare at different levels allows selecting the subjects-initiators, organizers, manipulators, driving forces, etc. at a particular level. However, at the other level, the same social groups serve as an object and means in solving the problems of subjects at higher levels. Thus, the current Ukrainian conflict is estimated by some experts as a civil war, i.e. the struggle between different social groups. And here there are different interpretations as well: the struggle of "pro-Europeans" against the "pro-Asians" (continuation of Euromaidan); "regions" against the "center" (for decentralization); some oligarchic groups against the others; "Russian nationalists" against "Ukrainian nationalists", etc.

The same conflict is considered at the international level as a conflict between two subjects: Russia and Ukraine; or as a conflict between the United States and Russia (and Ukraine is a "battlefield", "small change", "tool in the wrong hands" etc.).

On the other hand, the conflict can be considered a continuation of the struggle of transnational conglomerates for the sphere of influence. In this case, the state and the unions become a mean to achieve the corporate goals of the geopolitical scale players.

In another dimension this conflict is a manifestation of the civilization struggle: as it is a civilizational choice for Ukraine. At the same time, it has a religious-confessional component as well. In general, this level can be defined as the level of spiritual paradigm. It should be noted as well that the so-called "conspiracy component" is intentionally not taken into account within the framework.

Summarizing all the above, it can be concluded that Ukraine within the framework of the global hybrid warfare is simultaneously, but at different levels, subject and object, and means and tactical tasks ("achievements"), and the strategic goal, but from positions of different participants in the process! Accordingly, depending on the level or system selected as an object or subject of the study, different subjects in a hybrid warfare are fixed by experts. Thus, it should be noted that the conflict between them occurs with a different intensity, but simultaneously at all levels. Moreover, in a hybrid war a very important role is played by the subjective factor – the moment of the most complete and adequate understanding of what is happening. That is the level of awareness of the participants (potential subjects)

of the hybrid warfare that depends on what role they offer to the system they are representing.

Thus, in assessing the current situation with respect to Ukraine, most experts traditionally come from the fact that Ukraine has reached at a certain degree its political ideal – democracy. In this case, the main character, as well as the subject is the people, represented by the State in the form of legislative, executive and judicial branches of government. However, it should be noted that the assessment of the situation is undergoing significant changes, if Ukraine is considered an oligarchy or oligarchic-centric system [8], i.e., socio-political system, in which all institutions of the government and segments of a civil society are in a tough financial and economic dependence on the social group of oligarchs. In this case, the main character as well as the subject at certain levels of the hybrid warfare, is the oligarchic clans, personalized in the images of particular oligarchs. At the same time the state as well as the civil society (Ukrainian people), is a means of oligarchic groups in achieving, primarily, their economic goals. But then the oligarchic component gives considerable specificity to each technological element of the hybrid warfare, it fundamentally changes the emphasis in its evaluation.

In particular, Ukraine has entered the hybrid warfare without a clear strategic goal. Under the pretext of deideologization, beneficial for oligarchs, Ukraine, in contrast to the Russia or the United States, has not declared its role and its place at the geopolitical level. Moreover, such "uncertainty" through all the years of Ukrainian independence was due to different orientation of the priorities, vectors in the economic relations of the leading Ukrainian oligarchic clans. The absence of paradigms, concepts, philosophy, and mission lowers the rating of Ukraine as a system, and does not allow going to higher levels of conducting geopolitics, including the highest levels of conducting hybrid warfare. This reduces the list of processes where Ukraine stands as the subject, automatically becoming the goal, task, means, an object in the hands of other participants. Of course, this "inferiority" is immediately manifested in the "moment of truth", which is the military conflict.

Events in the south-east of the country have become a logical continuation of Maidan-2014, which, in its turn, has a strong oligarchic component. In this context, Maidan-2014 can be considered as a reason for the deployment of further events in the south-east. But the reasons are the same – a blatant shortcoming of the formed socio-political system, or as mentioned above – the oligarchy. In this context, Maidan-2014, as well as Mai-

dan-2004, can be generally characterized by the fact that existing objectively existing revolutionary situation has been reduced to the apical coup. In other words, the revolutionary enthusiasm of the masses was used by the group of oligarchs who drove another group of oligarchs from political power for the redistribution of the existing system of ownership of the instruments of labor and means of production, on the whole leaving the system unchanged. In addition, each of the oligarchic groups during Maidan in one way or another appealed to the various subjects of the geopolitical level, with a view to the additional resource support in the internal struggle. In this sense, the armed conflict in the Donbass is the result of the mentioned oligarchic appeal to external sources, subjects of world politics. It is this moment that is a cornerstone in the understanding how the oligarchic Ukraine becomes a potential subject of geopolitics from the object. The absence of the geopolitical concept of development of Ukraine, as well as the investigation and the lack of concrete steps for its implementation, have not allowed to realize the potential opportunity for Ukraine to become a geopolitical player. In this case, an assumption seems to be appropriate: the purpose of the Ukrainian oligarchs is not to build their own sovereign state as a relatively self-sufficient system, but integrate to a higher level in a more global system, using their own state as a base, springboard, i.e. means to achieve the designated goal. Perhaps the most striking example of such a position is a "multi-faceted" activity of Viktor Pinchuk, who is more a "globally minded person" than a "citizen of Ukraine", and who has "dropped out of sight" in the context of modern military confrontation!

There is also its own oligarchic specifics at the level of the tasks of the hybrid warfare. In particular, the re-division of the existing system of fixing the tools and means of production in a certain system of ownership is possible, in particular, on the results of the warfare as well. And the oligarchs as a social group with exclusive features for the corresponding analysis of the situation are best aware of this opportunity. In this case, it is a format of the hybrid warfare that is also advantageous, especially for the oligarchs, what they perfectly understand. As this format allows, on the one hand, carrying out real military actions, and, on the other hand, not to stop the production as much as possible, not to break off trade relations, traditional production and economic ties, which minimizes the loss of profit. Moreover, it should be noted that the oligarchic state holds the same hybrid policy – in particular, the government does not make logical radical actions, in order the external financing does not cease. The issue of redistribution of the resource base between different social groups and classes within the

system is not put. On the contrary, the struggle is a great screen to hide the fact that there is a struggle for the redistribution of property between the clans of oligarchs. Moreover, the oligarchic state in these extreme conditions parasites on the patriotic feelings of the citizens. In particular, it "plays the general mobilization", which covers all but the oligarchs and their environment. All are tightening their belts, except them. Their industrial and economic schemes, that are profitable, continue to work "without noticing" the real front line! It is worth noting that in general, manipulation of public opinion is going "very well" for the oligarchs. Rare adequate assessment of what is currently happening may be considered the exception to the rule; for example, Nina Matvienko, said that "today in the area of the ATO there is a struggle not for Ukraine – this is a clan struggle of Akhmetov, Poroshenko, Kolomoisky and others, "protecting their business by the blood of our children" [9].

With regard to principles, as mentioned above, the basic system principle of the hybrid warfare is a "lack of principles". In the case of Ukraine, this system principle is clarified: a "lack of principles in order to solve the corporate goals and corporate objectives of the oligarchic groups". For all other social groups, principles in the form of oligarchic Act must be strictly adhered to. It is sufficient to recall the many trials on "desertion" in an officially undeclared war. At the same time, for example, the oligarch Igor Kolomoisky could afford to joke about the fact that Ukrainian law prohibits dual citizenship, but does not prohibit the triple [10].

Attention should also be paid to one more demonstrational principle: in the current situation the Ukrainians are not "handed out weapons", which also indicates that the state is not democratic, but an oligarchic. The weapon is not handed for a quite reasonable and objective reason: it will highly likely be directed not against the external enemy, but against the internal – class.

Special attention should be paid to the so-called "principle of a key link" of the hybrid warfare which, if grasped, can pull the whole chain. In the context of this work, it is obvious that we are talking about an information component, as the information resource is a leading resource of the era. The information component is present in all technological elements of the hybrid warfare. It needs to be given the most attention, it is necessary to make a bet on it. In this respect Ukraine is largely losing to the main participants of the hybrid warfare, to temporary allies, as well as to time enemies, especially to Russia!

The specific feature of the hybrid warfare in the choice of destinations is in its complexity – in its running, if possible, in a wide range of areas. In general, this moment in Ukraine is present and observed. But here it is necessary to note that, for example, the direction of the "people's diplomacy" is virtually absent, although it is thought to be the most effective. It is clear that in an environment where the main weapon is the propaganda, the main weapon in the fight against propaganda counter-propaganda may become. This increases the effectiveness of the counter-propaganda repeatedly under the conditions of the "targeting", i.e. careful segmentation of the audience. The second condition for improving the effectiveness of such work is that the level of trust "to their people" increases (i.e., miners believe miners, doctors believe doctors, etc.). This segment of the information resource in Ukraine is practically not used.

With regard to the choice of methods of the hybrid warfare the approach remains the same: the wider is the range of techniques, the more successful is a project to achieve the goal – the likelihood of success for the subject increases. But this is in general. In the specific case of the hybrid Ukrainian warfare we can say that it is profitable for the oligarchs to artificially narrow the spectrum, i.e., to display and focus attention on that part of it which beneficially presents the position that the given oligarchic clan occupies. In general, it should be noted that the dominant method is not scientific, in fact, anti-scientific – it is "ideological" because there is an ideological corporate oligarchic order. A striking confirmation of this is the assessment of the described conflict that comes, on the one hand, solely to the civil conflict in the country (to the civil war), on the other hand – only to foreign intervention. It is obvious that in fact both components are present. However, such "one-sided" evaluation is connected with the "different vector" of interests of the oligarchic clans that have joined the struggle, and as a consequence - the different coverage of the events in the media controlled by the oligarchs.

Means of the hybrid warfare are defined in each form of the components of the war, due to its characteristics. The success, effectiveness and efficiency of the whole hybrid warfare in general also depend on how all possible means are involved. Even at first glance, Ukraine underestimates the principle of "using all means". However, it is also dictated by the oligarchic corporate setting – everything that is profitable to a particular oligarch in a particular situation is used, even if it is in conflict with the interests of the majority of the population, i.e., with a democratic base system.

Therefore, the main point that needs special attention: people with their patriotic enthusiasm are used as a means to achieve the objectives of oligarchs. The people are skillfully manipulated, its energy being directed (e.g., of patriotic enthusiasm in the southeast, or a thirst of social justice – at the Maidans), to the right direction needed to oligarchs. The corresponding oligarchic system of institutions serves this purpose, including the state power structures, oligarchic mass media, affiliated political parties, controlled trade unions etc.

Techniques of the hybrid warfare are characterized by special abundance and diversity. This attribute of tactics in the context of the hybrid warfare must be non-standard. In this case, its efficiency repeatedly increases. So, in general, we can agree with S. Datsyuk, who offers a completely non-standard (innovative) approach in resolving Ukraine-Russia conflict [11]. Particular attention should be paid to the fact that most experts agree that Ukraine in its resource potential is not able to win the war against Russia alone. However, by using non-standard methods, you can balance odds. In this regard, we would like to draw attention to the fact that the Ukrainian party does not use the potential of the Ukrainian diaspora in Russia.

From the foregoing several general conclusions follow:

In the hybrid warfare real, not declarative, strategic goals of all participants must be cleared. Choosing tactical allies, it is necessary to clear not only tactical but also strategic implications. The more the evaluation of the rapidly changing situation occurs, there is reconciliation with the strategic goals and intermediate predictable indicators, the more the appropriate adjustments in tactics are made, the higher the probability of success in the strategy of the hybrid warfare is. The fundamental change of the technological model of the processes at different stages of the hybrid warfare is characteristic. So, the analysis of processes model in the first phase of the conflict in the Donbass allowed characterizing actions as "terrorist activity". Two months later the situation has changed dramatically, but Ukraine continues to "live in the format of the ATO".

The relationship of our oligarchic clans with external geopolitical players, representatives of multinational companies, which are essentially oligarchic structures of higher, global order is of particular interest. In this case, even Russia-US conflict is transferred to another plane, as with such an approach, even such state-giants are a means to achieve global oligarchic results.

In any case, it can be concluded from the above mentioned that all the structural elements of the hybrid warfare have a clear oligarchic compo-

nent: the whole course and character of the hybrid warfare is defined by the interest of the named social group. The oligarchs play a key system role in shaping the hybrid warfare as relevant to the particular process. This is the objective side.

However, attention must be paid to the subjective side of the hybrid warfare, namely, to the time of the perception of this phenomenon at the level of public consciousness. It should be noted that in many ways the image of the hybrid warfare is formed by the oligarchic mass media. It is characteristic that in most cases the emphasis was on the "novelty" of the phenomenon of the hybrid warfare: it is constantly emphasized that Ukraine is not ready to such novelty; the novelty is identified with the treachery of the enemy, etc. In fact, on closer inspection, it turns out that this "novelty" is quite relative. V. Dyachenko convincingly proves that on closer examination, each element of the hybrid warfare in Ukraine, whether it is a means, techniques, methods, or a form, has a counterpart in history [12]. Only a particular combination is new, in fact! Moreover, it is easy to notice that this "novelty" is ideologically given. In particular, the novelty is largely a manifestation of the new focus and a new "research position" in the examination of the phenomenon. So, if earlier diplomacy and direct military actions were considered separately, now it is proposed to consider these areas as elements of a single process of the hybrid warfare, its various stages.

But here the oligarchic component may be traced as well. It is the "novelty" that can be attributed to the failures and mistakes in the conduct of the hybrid warfare and hide the true purposes, the absence of decisive measures and actions that could potentially violate the model profitable for oligarchs!

It is easy to conclude that in the hybrid warfare oligarchs are interested in exclusive access to information, as originally they create a closed information system. This is their corporate-group setting, dictated by narrow corporate interests of the group. In other words, the peculiarity in the subjective perception of the hybrid warfare, "novelty" is an ideological justification of the need for just such war. This is a corporate order to manipulate public consciousness on the part of the oligarchic social groups.

The main objective moment is that the hybrid warfare, happening in Ukraine has deeply anti-national, i.e., anti-social nature, since its goals and objectives meet the interests of the oligarchs midget social group (and the bureaucrats who serve them), while being in the system contrary to the interests of the overwhelming majority that is made up from the rest social groups.

EAST UKRAINIAN CONFLICT IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS

Thus, the analysis of the phenomenon of the hybrid warfare in Ukraine leads to the conclusion that the specific nature of the phenomenon is given by the interests of oligarchic structures at various levels, who are trying to realize their economic goals (get excess profits), using the widest range of resources in the struggle for access to even more volumes of resources. Ukrainian oligarchic structures are the link, the conductor and the exponent for the interests of oligarchic structures of a higher global level. The main tool in this struggle is the main resource of the era – the information for which the oligarchs are trying to win a monopoly. All the above mentioned gives rise to talk about the oligarchic discourse of the hybrid warfare in Ukraine, as of constantly present oligarchic component in all its elements.

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PREREQUISITES FOR INTERNAL CIVILIZATION CONFLICT FORMING IN UKRAINE

The objective factors that weakened the unity of the social organism of Ukraine were the background of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine. Among them one should mention the historical and cultural heritage, based on civilizational characteristics of the region; the impact of globalization on international legal status of Ukraine characterized by the loss of its subjectivity and becoming an object of manipulation of the leading countries of the world; Ukraine ceased to express national and general public interests; neoliberal reforms led to the formation of the oligarchic regime in the country, while Ukrainian people turned into an "endangered nation"; socio-economic and socio-political changes in Ukraine show that society does not function as a whole any more but has broken into rivaling segments. Among the subjective factors that contributed to the formation of the conflict in Ukraine one should mention the following: all Ukrainian Presidents represented the group interests rather than national ones; the regional elite of Donbass sought to control other regions of the country, but due to Euromaidan they faced the threat of losing influence even in Donbass; armed separatists in Donbass are supported by some part of the region's population.

Keywords: social organism of the country, territorial and political asymmetry in public relations, civilization factor of regional development, national interests, the subject of international politics, the object of international politics, oligarchic regime, the social base of the state, separatists, internal civilization conflict.

The problem of searching ways out of the conflict in the south of Ukraine needs a more deep understanding of the conditions of its emerging,

as the conflict in Donbass has more deep roots than the direct impact of Russia on the residents of this Ukrainian Region. During the whole period of its independence Ukraine didn't pay due attention to strengthening those connections, which unite social subjects and regions into a single organism of Ukraine.

Studying historical and socio-cultural conditions of conflict situation in Donbass, specialists recognize that the half of success in treating the disease consists in correct diagnosis. It is easier to ascribe enormous human victims, deterioration of industrial potential, loss (temporary, as we hope) of territorial integrity only to the cunningness of the external enemy. It is more difficult to look at a complicated history of Ukraine open eyed and to look for both objective roots and subjective reasons for the pronounced asymmetry in regional interests and public moods, which finally turned the territory to the battlefield and the citizens to the hostages of the corruption in business elite and political top, populism, political ambitions [1, 4].

Agreeing with such approach to the analysis of the conflict situation in Ukraine it should be acknowledged that Ukrainian scientific society didn't pay much attention to studying those threats, which Ukrainian people faced, on systemic level, including prerequisites of intercivilizing conflict forming. At the same time scientific researches were carried out, analytical materials were published in Ukraine, pointing to the existence of threats of systemic character. Scientific works, which warned Ukrainian society of the increase of threats to its stability, include studies of Iu. Zbutniev, N. Senchenko [2], O. Bilous with composite authors [3], M. Pavlovsky [4], N. Shulga [5] etc.

The purpose of the article is to analyze prerequisites of internal civilization conflict in Ukraine.

The first prerequisite for internal civilization conflict forming in Ukraine consists in historical and cultural heritage of Ukrainian society. In course of historical development of Ukrainian lands differences between the culture of the population of different regions of Ukraine acquired civilizational character. According to evaluation of V. Lytvyn, these are historical and cultural conditions of forming of Ukrainian people, which conditioned considerable outlook differences of population of various regions of the country. "Due to long absence of the state and territorial partition Ukrainian ethnos had no real changes to crate consolidated political nation and was sentenced to territorial and political asymmetry of social connections. Being formed on the civilization borderline, in the orbit of influence of the Eastern Church, Roman Catholic and Muslim outlook systems, suffering constant

administrative pressure and moral humiliation it was divided not only by directives from foreign capitals, but also by own outlook sets and political orientations." [1, 4].

When studying regional peculiarity of socio-cultural nature of Ukraine, S. Krymsky and Iu. Pavlenko substantiated the influence of internal civilization interaction at the specific character of culture in regions of Ukraine, forming of its types. "On the territory of Western Ukraine Western Church and New European civilization directly overlapped the world of Eastern Church, what lead to (at substantial influence of Jewish Church) forming of peculiar socio-cultural medium of intermediate, transitive type. It organically united absolute majority of simple inhabitants of Galicia and trans-Carpathian Region, and to the certain extent Bukovyna. In Russia access to the western culture was given only to the representatives of enlightened circles, taking into account that here it was represented only in books. Russian intelligentsia was aware of European literature, philosophy better than educated strata of any western country, but neither this intelligentsia, nor public at large had any experience of practical western life, whereas on the territory of West Ukraine everything was vice versa. Thus we can see, that well-known differences in mentality, value orientations and behavior of the population of Western Ukraine and the rest of the regions consists in civilization factor. But reducing everything thereto would be unnecessary simplification of the problem. It is necessary to pay attention to other circumstances, in particular to socio-cultural, historical, cultural and ethnographic, as well as religious factors" [6, 238-239].

The second prerequisite for internal civilization conflict forming in Ukraine is determined by the influence of globalization at international legal status of Ukraine. Over last 25 years external and internal conditions of development of Ukrainian society formed so, that Ukrainian state received only formal independence, but it didn't succeed to achieve real self-sufficiency. First, leading countries of the world, for which support ruling circles of Ukraine hoped so much, could never have been interested in Ukraine turning into modernized, strong and flourishing state. Secondly, for almost the whole period of independence almost all the representatives of the ruling class of Ukraine, with only a rare exception, were engaged only in issues of personal enrichment, bun not in problems of life and modernizing of Ukrainian society. These are there two major factors – internal and external – which provided for impossibility to choose the ways of development of the society, which would correspond to the requirements and national interests of Ukrainian people. If at the dawn of its independence

Ukraine depended on supplies of energy resources from Russia, over the following two decades it has not only got rid of this dependency, but also became dependent of financial institutions.

It turns out to be that Ukraine hasn't manage to get the status of independent subject of international policy and acts as its subject, by which leaders of great power. Historians acknowledge the acute character of the problem of restoration of the role of the state in conditions of conflict in Western Ukraine. It is necessary to do everything, so that Ukraine could come out of the unprecedented trials not only as a single, but also as a strong and competitive state on the world arena. It depends only on realizing the necessity of coordinated efforts of the government and our society, whether Ukraine could regain its competent authority of subject of policy and whether it remains only the object, springboard for implementation of other people's interests and outside influences [1, 5].

Internal policy, which was lead by the ruling circles of Ukraine, wasn't independent and was not aimed at national interests of Ukrainian people, that is why it generated those processes, which not in any way promote unity of social organism of Ukraine, and vice versa, destroy its as a unity. S. Krymsky and Iu. Pavlenko estimated in condensed and substantive form external influence at changes in life of Ukrainian society. They established that the course, chosen by Ukraine at command of the WMF and other "international" (in practice – Western) organizations, lead it to systemic degradation, which embraced all spheres of life, from industrial and agricultural manufacture to the system of health care, education, science and culture, from the branches, providing the life of the society to life spheres, spheres of its biological and socio-cultural reproduction" [6, 255].

N. Senchenko discovers in the dependency of Ukraine from global center the greatest threat to the existence of Ukrainian people itself. "The tragedy of Ukraine unfolds in front of our eyes. People die out. In 1991 the population of Ukraine comprised 52,2 mln. According to the data as of January 1, 2012, 45,63 mln. of people resided in Ukraine, and as of September 1, 2012 they made 45,56 mln. Thus over 21 years of "democratic reforms" the population of the country reduced by 6,64 mln.; it makes 12,7 % of the total population of Ukraine. Employment in the branches of industry of economics reduced as compared to the year 1990 from 24,7 mln. to 14,9 mln. of employees. Consequently, ten million of Ukrainians, able to work, lost their places of primary employment and constant income source, possibility to receive sick payments. As we can see from data provided, everything happens so, as if someone plans economical state of the country

purposefully, leading to depopulation of Ukrainian people. Globalization ideologists quite definitely plan that Ukraine shall be mounted not to the core of global economic system, but to its periphery. That means for our country its liquidation as a country and as a culture. Most likely, it means physical destruction of the most part of the population, first of all Ukrainians" [7, 22-23].

The third prerequisite for internal civilization conflict forming in Ukraine consists in the fact, that over the first decade of independence the state ceased to be mouthpiece of national and public interests. Firstly, oligarchic regime has formed in Ukraine, and Ukrainian oligarchs entered world oligarchy, were subordinated to the global centers and conduct their activity in compliance with their interests. Secondly, isolation of domestic oligarchic clans and their servants from the interests of Ukrainian people lead to a large-scale destruction of economic, defense, industrial, agricultural, educational, scientific, cultural and moral potential of our society. Thirdly, the result of oligarchization of the society was transformation of Ukraine into raw-material adjunct of the leading countries of the world, market for inferior products, acquisition of role of supplier of cheap labor force, in particular, due to "brain drain". Fourthly, for two decades ruling circles of Ukraine proved to be unable to elaborate the Strategy of National Development, which would rely on natural and cultural resources of the society, which could unite all the social groups, communities and all the citizens in implementation of the Modernization Project, providing for progressive development of the country. Fifthly, there occurred transition from the domination of methods of scientific corroboration to the predominance of methods of manipulating public conscience in implementation of state administering.

Unfortunately, the government of modern Ukraine lost the ability of successful implementation of national projects, raising the quality of life of the society to the new level. Ruling circles of the modern Ukraine implement only projects like "Euro-2012", only allowing people, approximate to the government, to enrich themselves but do not solve national problems and do not provide any conditions for modernizing of the state as a whole.

The priority of national interests in activity of the state government was changed by the priority of private interest, as a result the character of the government changed, which lost its ability to unite citizens, social groups and communities into a single organism of the country. State authority turned into the tool of unbound enrichment and shameless depression of the general mass of population. This way the government became the source

of uncountable social conflicts. Such government began lose its value in the eyes of the citizens rapidly. Split between the ruling circles and the mass began acquiring threatening character.

By analyzing political risks in modern Ukraine, N. Mykhalchenko emphasized the problem of isolation of the government from the people. The political scientist points out, that "our political theory is aimed at studying and forming of the government and almost not filled by the problems of forming procedures and mechanisms for administering such a complex social organisms as people, nation, society, cultural community etc. The problem of sovereignty of Ukraine is viewed in a qualified sense as a problem of creation of political and economical apparatus and race for power, but not as a problem of representation of the people in collective acts, aimed at creation, regulating of power, strengthening of the state. It causes the main political risk in modern Ukraine: isolation of government from people, imminent conflict between them and as a result – weakening of the state as a whole and the threat of disintegration of its social organism [8, 4].

The fourth prerequisite for internal civilization conflict forming in Ukraine is connected with consequences of neoliberal market reforms according to the model of Washington consensus (worked out by the economists of Chicago School M. Friedman and F. Hayek) for Ukrainian society. In the collective research, edited by V. Geits, the estimation of neoliberal reforms is given, their anti-national essence is disclosed. It divulges project mechanism: "neoliberal strategy of socioeconomic transformation of Ukrainian society was not self-reliant work of the governmental community of Ukraine, these were actions at command of the pro-capitalistic powers, but this community accepted this way of "entering world society of civilized countries" as it gave possibilities for surprisingly quick enrichment, even at the cost of prognosticated and controllable social catastrophe. Proclamation of no alternative of the course chosen was added by ideological masking of its essence and actual purposes. It was declared that creation of "free market economics" is the way to economic growth and through it to solving of the greatest portion of social problems, way to socially oriented economics. That is, achievement of such a result was proclaimed, which neoliberal reforms could not possibly lead to" [9, 656].

As a result of market reforms in Ukraine industrial manufacture in Ukraine dropped and by 1999 it made some 48% from the level of 1990. Over twenty years of its independence Ukraine has never been able to achieve level of its economic development of 1990. In 2010 this value

dropped again by 63% from the level of 1990. By its economical values Ukraine fell to the lowest rank among post-Soviet countries. [5, 24].

The meaning of neoliberal reforms in Ukraine lies in the fact, that on the one hand they gave birth to oligarchic regime, on the other hand, they turned Ukrainian people in "endangered nation" (what is registered in the UN Report on Demographic Trends for 2001). In 1990s due to neoliberal reforms the majority of citizens of Ukraine were displaced to the category of the poor (according to estimations of economists in 2001 the share of the poor in the structure of the population of Ukraine was over 80%). This means that Ukrainian government was left without a broad basis of social support.

The fifth prerequisite for internal civilization conflict forming in Ukraine lies in change of its socioeconomic and socio-political order. According to the sociologist, N. Shulga, first 20 yeas of independence of Ukraine could be called the period of cardinal social transformations, leading to the change of socioeconomic and political order. In the field of economics in these years deep transformations occurred, communal and state forms of property were destructing, formation of private, first of all large property on their ruins was in progress As of 2011 90% of communal and state property were privatized. Its allocation occurred by the method of privatization checks, which served as a screen for shearing basic masses of citizens. National economy was depleted. Not only money for renovation was not invested thereto, even depreciation costs were consumed. Basic funds of industry, communal property were worn out by 75-90% for these years [5, 3].

Further the researcher points out to the sources of that threat in Ukraine, which ruling circles were categorically inclined not to notice *"The society stopped functioning as a whole, fell into separate segments* (italics – S.V.). Private interest began prevailing over the public one". The owners of the majority of privatized enterprises transferred received incomes to foreign banks, in off-shore zones. For twenty years of existence there appeared sharp differences between the citizens of the country as to political, ideological, outlook, valuable, regional, language, culture, ethnic, religious and other signs, which in most cases developed into opposition stage. Having no real productive uniting idea, the society is in the state of uncertainty, leading to gradual organizational, intellectual and moral degradation. This is overlapped by the processes of social marginalization and anomie, what strengthens the phenomenon of social entropy even more [5, 4-5].

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It is necessary to point out subjective factors, alongside with above objective factors, which more or less provided negative impact at the life of social organism of the country and created basis for internal civilization conflict in Ukraine.

The first subjective factor of internal civilization conflict in Ukraine lies in the fact, that all its Presidents have always been mouthpiece of group, rather than of national interests. According to the opinion the Head of the Security Council of Ukraine, V. Nalyvaichenko, military actions in Donbass were preceded by the treason at the highest level of the country. The conflict in Ukraine is the result of total state treason, frank ignoring of the issues of security and defense by the previous rulers of the state [10]. The given estimation reflects attitude of the government of independent Ukraine to the problem of national security and defense of Ukraine, but it should be pointed out, that it concerns not only the regime of V. Ianukovych, but of all of his predecessors, beginning with L. Kravchuk. We shall remind you that L. Kravchuk was in the office only for 2,5 years, instead of 5 years and lost the office due to socioeconomic crisis, which caused protests of miners from Donbass and the workers of industrial regions of Ukraine against "anti-popular policy" and resulted in early election to the Parliament and early presidential elections in Ukraine. L. Kuchma went down into history as the "father" of national oligarchy, his reforms turned into social and humanitarian catastrophe for the society. N. Mykhalchenko points out that V. Iushchenko came to power under the slogans of battle with corruption and oligarchy, protection of interests of a "small Ukrainian", who received nothing from "orange events". The regime of V. Ianykovych proved to be a mature form of oligarchy, in which certain groups are enriched at cost of national wealth.

The second subjective factor of internal civilization conflict in Ukraine lies in the fact, that regional elite formed in Donbass, which sought to control other regions of the country, but due to Euromaidan they faced the threat of losing influence even in Donbass. A.Fisun and A. Krysenko characterized the specific character of elites of Eastern and Southern regions of Ukraine. These regions for last decades had the system of parallel administering ('oligarchate'). The period 2010-2013 was marked by the efforts of oligarchic elites from the East of Ukraine to spread the model of control, which functioned mostly in eastern and southern regions of Ukraine, over the territory of the whole country. With the help of politically motivated appointments (mainly from the lines of people from Donbass) at managerial positions in regional bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Security

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Council of Ukraine, public prosecutor's offices, tax inspection, customs and authorities of justice subordination of regional business-political elites and their co-optation into political machinery of the Party of Regions occurred. Achievements of this tactics in various regions were different. In western regions this tactics didn't lead to tangible effect, on the contrary, it became one of the main reasons of Euromaidan and its mass support among the citizens of the western regions of the country. In Crimea this tactics lead to actual seizure of this Ukrainian autonomy by oligarchic grouping, the co-called "Macedonian" (from Makiivka and Donetsk) and removal of the local elite from executive authorities in the region [11].

The third subjective factor of internal civilization conflict in Ukraine is marked by the emerging of armed separatist, having support on the part of a certain part of the Donbass population. E. Golovakha explains the aggravation of the conflict situation in Donbass as follows: there was Euromaidan, which Donbass citizens didn't understand. "Donbass logics are as follows: we lived normally, didn't mess with anybody, worked, everything was stable. There appeared some people, threw Molotov cocktails, overthrew legitimate government (moreover, our candidate from Donetsk" [12]. The position of regional elite was other than the position of simple people. "Local elites in Donbass wanted to take advantage of disorders in order to bargain with new central government. When the situation came too far, local oligarchs simply fled to Kiev" [12]. Thus, the element of secessionist moods in Donbass went out of control of regional elite and led armed separatists to the surface.

There were also objective reasons for secessionist demonstrations in Donbass, which ignoring is inadmissible for any responsible government. E. Golovakha points out the following factors of conflict in Donbass. Here there has always been a great part of people, who feel nostalgic for the Soviet Union. There are such people in each region, but their amount in Donbass makes about 85%. In the neighboring Donetsk region – 60% and somewhere in Galicia – few people. Donbass is the center of this nostalgia and pro-Russian moods, connected therewith. This region is unique for Ukraine due to the fact that it is more than any region in Ukraine mentally, psychologically, culturally, industrially, and territorially connected with Russia. By the way, the share of ethnic Russians was the highest there. In addition, Donbass was the hearth of criminals, who actually created the skeleton of organizations of terrorists-secessionists. (In 1990s there were appalling posses, which divided the power, property and everything else. But they were then reformed by local oligarchs). As to public health values

(socially dangerous diseases, suicides, criminality, alcoholism, in short all kinds of deviation) the most difficult regions were also Donetsk and Luhansk Regions [12].

The analysis of objective and subjective factors of internal civilization conflict in Ukraine gives reasons for the following conclusions. Among the basic prerequisites of internal civilization conflict in Eastern Ukraine the most important role belonged to those objective factors, which weakened the unity of social organism of Ukraine: 1) Historical and cultural heritage of Ukrainian society, based upon civilization peculiarities of regions; 2) globalization impact at international legal status of Ukraine characterized by the loss of its subjectivity and becoming an object of manipulation of the leading countries of the world; 3) during the first decade of its independence the state ceased to express national and general public interests in Ukraine; 4) due to neoliberal reforms there appeared oligarchic regime in Ukraine and Ukrainian people turned into "endangered nation"; 5) the change of socioeconomic and socio-political changes in Ukraine lead to the fact that society ceased to function as a whole, broken into segments, which relations are characterized by competitive activity and oppositions. Among the subjective factors, promoting forming internal civilization conflict in Ukraine the following are to be singled out: 1) all Ukrainian Presidents represented the group interests rather than national ones; 2) there formed regional elite in Donbass, which sought to control other regions of the country, but due to Euromaidan they faced the threat of losing influence even in Donbass; 3) the element of secessionist moods in Donbass originated armed separatists, who have support on the part of a certain part of population of the region.

The perspectives of the problem further research lie in studying geopolitical context of internal civilization conflict of Ukraine.

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UDC 323

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THE PROCESS OF PACIFICATION IN UKRAINE:
TRANSNISTRIAN AND CHECHEN OPTIONS

The article is devoted to the understanding of the existing world experience out of the intra-civilization conflict and the search for the best option for Ukraine. Depending on whether the country's territorial integrity is saved or not save the possible scenarios of conflict resolution are summarized in two models, tentatively called "trans-dniester" and "Chechen" options. Although at the moment "trans-dniester trends" dominate in Ukraine fraught with the separation of the DNR/ the LNR, the more desirable is the "Chechen model", the essence of which is to preserve the territorial integrity through a well thought-out and implemented by the state

policy of pacification. It is proved that the process of pacification is vital for the social and spiritual health of the nation; recurrences of the conflict are possible without it.

***Keywords**: Ukraine, Donbass, conflict, pacification, Transdniestria, Chechnya, strategy.*

According to calculations of L. and M. Bressler, over the past five and a half millennia, humanity has gone through 15.000 wars and armed conflicts that have claimed the lives of more than three billion people. Beginning with 3600 BC and ending with 2008, when the results of these calculations were published, only 292 years had been peaceful, accounting for 5% from this chronological interval. The rest of the time the mankind constantly fought. But, despite such expressive figures, not the war, but the peace is the normal state of society. There are no doubts that the conflict in the Donbass we are witnessing will end up with peace. In an effort to approximate the time of completion of the fratricidal carnage, in this article I would like to draw attention to the important point that the act of the cessation of fire would be irreversible only if it is accompanied by procedure of real "pacification" of the parties.

Everyone is familiar with a beautiful ritual of the North American Indians, strengthening exit from the state of war and the transition to the peace: the chieftains and elders of the warring tribes gather around the fire of the board and smoke the "pipe of peace". At the same time they utter conciliatory speeches to the address of yesterday's enemies and vow to live in peace forever.

Grueling hours-long negotiations in the "Norman format" in Minsk on February 12, 2015 ended with the signing of the ceasefire agreement in the Donbass, withdrawal of heavy equipment and a number of other activities, consistently leading to the exit from the "hot phase" of the East-Ukrainian conflict. The optimistic assessment of the results of Minsk-2, as the summit became known, in the press quickly gave way to disappointment. As entry to Ukraine of dozens of Russian tanks followed the negotiations, the attack of militias and output of the APU parts from Debaltsevo projection, the incessant barrage of Donetsk and attacks near Mariupol largely neutralized the reached agreements. The two sides do not trust each other, continue to conduct information warfares and seek the best use of the lull to regroup and build strength. Obviously, it is far from the "fire of the board" and "pipe of peace" in Ukraine.

However, pacification is not only a declaration of presidents and diplomats, but also a complex and contradictory process of reciprocal adjustments at all levels. This is a search for compromise, finding ways to justify moral position not only of the won, but of the lost party as well. Pacification is the art of living together of those who completely excluded this possibility yesterday.

Pacification policy is a long and costly process for the budget, but it is vital. Without this long-term strategic direction the conflict relapses are possible, which can negate all the intermediate successes and achievements. The history suggests that if brothers-Slavs somehow learned to fight, their pacifying experience is miserable. The Russian Empire and then the Soviet Union, leaving the war as the winner, sought the complete destruction of the enemy and in case of defeat – did not bring into subjection, but saved their strength for the subsequent revenge.

For example, chronologically adjacent to the First World War the Civil War in Russia was not marked by the spiritual reorientation of society toward peace at the end of it. The "Reds" won, "white' were defeated, interveners are expelled, but the peace did not come. The tension did not decrease; the losers did not know the grace. Interested in total mobilization of the people for the accomplishment of plans for the construction of the socialist party the Soviet elite immediately organized a hunt for the numerous "enemies of the people", "unexposed" and "not disarmed". Wave after wave endless comb-out covered the party and administrative apparatus. Collectivization and industrialization, constructions of the first five-year industrial plans were carried out at the backdrop of the ongoing class struggle. The repressive machine that emerged from the dictatorship of the proletariat untwisted the flywheel, involving new strata of the population to the millstone of GULAG.

Unlike the United States of America, which also went through a bloody civil war of 1861-1865, but gradually managed to overcome a deep internal split into

the "northerners" and "southerners", the Soviet Russia has not conducted a deliberate policy of pacification. Moreover, the apotheosis of the latent ongoing war a "theoretical" conclusion of I.V. Stalin became that as we move towards socialism the class struggle will not weaken, but only intensify. Having perfectly cleaned the country from "class alien elements", and then – from all dissidents, the Bolsheviks spread to neighboring countries: Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, thus providing the social basis of nationalism in the Baltic States, Western Belarus and

Western Ukraine. And the inhabitants of Lvov, who met "liberators" with flowers in 1939, having tasted all the delights "of increasing class struggle", massively went into the forests, swelling the ranks of Melnik and Bandera, taking revenge for the destruction of fates.

Relapses of the unfinished civil war in Russia made themselves felt during the Great Patriotic War in the form of a huge number of collaborators: Vlasov, Krasnov, police goons and so on. And even after more or less peaceful decades of "Khrushchev's Thaw" and "Brezhnev standstill period" the historical memory of unpacified society at every opportunity has fueled resentment, aggression, hatred.

S.B. Stankevich, one of the Russian right-wing politicians, answering questions about the anniversary of the August coup of 1991, said: "The civil war in Russia is not ended. It continues. Although there are no visible barricades and actual tanks, but people are still willing to kill each other for ideological reasons. Give the will to them, and they will begin now. Hence, there is an attitude towards August – it is formed through the prism of the civil war. The "Reds" do not go to the holidays of "white" and vice versa" [1]. The current conflict in the Donbass can be easily interpreted, inter alia, in terms of the paradigm of "unfinished civil war".

In fact, we are talking about the hidden and lingering illnesses of society, and therefore the pacification after the conflict, war, and aggression is the essential procedure for the social health.

Today, it is still difficult to imagine that this process can begin – the chasm dug by the media and communications between "We" and "They" is too deep. Those who diligently deepened it, irritated hatred among the people, appealing to the long sunk into oblivion images of the Nazis and Bandera, who came up with all these "slaves", "crucified boys", "shot bullfinches", "Hitler's image on one thousand hryvnias bill" were not aware of the wound in the hearts of people that they leave and how much time will be needed to heal it. They just had other purposes. And obviously, not they will be engaged in the procedure the opposite to pacifying. It is also possible that at the end a complete change of generation will be required.

Analyzing the numerous intra-civilization conflicts of the late XX – early XXI centuries, we try to pick up the analog, the most suitable to the current events in the Donbass. Despite the apparent diversity, there are not a lot of basic options of conflict resolution emerging from the "hot phase". Using as a criterion the sign to save/ not save the integrity of the state in the process of emerging from conflict, we will offer two speculative models.

The first model assumes that during the armed conflict, the central government, as well as the breakaway regions managed to retain more or less large areas of the country, capable of independent social reproduction. Of course, we are talking about the decay of the pre-conflict states, new public formations appear. As a rule, the center standing as the assignee of the pre-conflict state, is gaining recognition of the international community, and a "grey area" appears in the separatist regions with a very problematic prospects for effective development. The standard of this model is the Republic of Moldova, from which Moldovan Transdniestria Republic (MTR) distinguished itself as the result of the war. Earlier united political space received various civilizational "poles of attraction": Kishinev is focused on Romania, and through it – on Europe, while Transdniestria – on Russia, without military, financial and economic assistance of which it would hardly have existed for such a long period. With some reservations to this particular model all conflicts should be included, ending with the loss of territorial integrity of the country, including Yugoslavia, which new Balkan states came from (Slovenia, Bosnia, Croatia, and so on); Azerbaijan that lost the Nagorno-Karabakh districts; Georgia that lost Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and so on.

MTR emerged as a splinter of the Soviet Union and is a perfect example of a "frozen conflict". In his interview to the TV channel "Rain" the Russian analyst, senior editor of the portal Slon.ru Alexander Baunov reasoned: "Transdniestria has already lived for 23 years with some unknown Holy Spirit. We do not understand what is happening there. There are experts, it is necessary to ask where Transdniestria gets the money. I think it gets part of it from us. But the size is different. Transdniestria is a strip of land with a population of several hundred thousand people, just a couple of hundred thousand. And here (i.e., in Donbass) we are talking about millions. And completely different territories with very different destructions. The war in Transdniestria was not so destructive. But the Transdniestria option is something more preferable for Ukraine, because it does not contain the region, and most importantly – Transdniestria formally remains on all maps as a part of Moldova, but has no impact on the Moldovan politics. It is such an esoteric thing in itself. It lives on its own" [2]. We will only add that after the rejection of Moscow in January 2015 to allocate 100 million dollars to MTR as financial aid the row broke out, largely dispelling the mentioned "esoterics" [3]. And the German Chancellor Angela Merkel has put Transdniestria in line with Abkhazia, South Ossetia, the DNR and the LNR, calling these formations as the Russian tool in destabilizing the situation in

the countries opting to sign an association agreement with the European Union [Op. by: 4].

The second model is based on the premise that the central government manages to overcome the conflict, without losing the final breakaway region. After the active phase of the conflict, a period of adaptation on both sides to the new conditions comes, requiring significant and, more importantly, a conscious effort to address the whole range of political, economic, military, social and humanitarian problems. As a reference of this model the Chechen Republic should be indicated, which, after two bloody wars with Russia has remained in the Federation.

As you know, the second Chechen war ended up with a military defeat of the rebels. When it became apparent some pragmatic Chechen leaders showed their willingness to cooperate with Moscow. Then, in early 2000 several major federal programs were taken to restore Chechnya's war-ravaged economy. Among them we should highlight the federal target program "Restoration of economy and social sphere of the Chechen Republic (2002 and afteryears)" and the federal target program "Socio-economic development of the Chechen Republic in 2008-2012" changed it. 41. 540. 470.000[1] rubles were allocated from the federal budget for the implementation of the first of these programs Chechnya. The main result of this program, as it seems to us, is the transformation of formerly rebellious Highlanders, irreconcilable fighters for freedom of Ichkeria, at least in Kadyrov's men loyal to the Kremlin. And to be perfectly honest, in the national division of labor Chechens occupy niches related, first of all, not to the work places within the established program, but to the police service, security business, drug trafficking, racketeering and outright looting, which we see nowadays in the Crimea and Eastern Ukraine.

So, in the above two models the process of "pacification" is provided either through the establishment of borders and divergence-insulation of the

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[1] Under the federal program 5.473 facilities have been restored or commissioned: residential units with the total area of 679.1 thousand sq. meters, 71 schools for 23.521 pupils, 70 health care facilities for 9.750 beds and 10.785 visits, 6 institutions of social services, 7 typography and printing facilities, 48 kilometers of long-distance heating mains, 201 electrical and distribution substations and over 484 kilometers of electrical networks, 5 industrial enterprises with the production capacity of 458.7 million rubles, 428 communication objects, 4 enterprises of the construction industry and 23 enterprises of agroindustrial complex. 21.316 jobs are created, including 9.700 – in construction, 6.752 – in health care, 2.104 – in education, 1.186 – in industry and 1.574 – in the agricultural sector [5].

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conflicting parties (Transdniestria variant), or through the corrupt practice of the elite and recreation of the social basis for the peaceful development of the region (the Chechen variant). Returning to the East-Ukrainian conflict, we will try to compare it with the experience of the armed conflict in Transdniestria and Chechnya.

In fact, the situation in the Donbass is developing according to the Transdniestria scenario. This is evidenced by the proclamation of the new state formations – the DNR and the LNR, the establishment of their militia that went to war with the "Kiev junta" with the active support of the Russian Federation, conduction of the referendum and elections to the supreme authorities in the republics.

Kiev in response to the blatant looting of the state property in the Donbass decides to terminate the activities of state institutions, including financial, on the uncontrolled territories, stops servicing bank accounts of businesses and households in the area of the ATO, strongly stimulates the evacuation of organizations and individuals, finally introduces significant restrictions for free movement of citizens between Ukraine and the unrecognized republics. Deepening of the incipient "Transdniestria scenario" will contribute to: the establishment of borders with the introduction of a special border and customs control, disabling Ukrainian mobile operators, making notes in the passports of inhabitants of Donetsk and Lugansk about their new "citizenship" or, alternatively, the exchange of passports, the transition to payments in rubles or the introduction of its own currency, payment of debts on wages, etc.

It seems that in the case of the implementation of these measures by the DNR/ the LNR Kiev will not stop them, but will even aggravate the situation by counter moves in the same direction, prohibiting, for example, to enter its territory to owners of new passports. As a result of the refusal of Kiev "to fight" for its eastern regions of the humanitarian, economic and social fronts, millions of Ukrainian citizens for the time being loyal to the center, will turn away from the Kiev authorities, surrendering to "the mercy of the victor". And then "new Transdniestria" appears on the territory of Donbass – a grey area with a fake national identity, a high level of crime, always aggressive and hostile, financed by unknown people and surviving not knowing how.

Is not it the ultimate goal of the Ukrainian authorities?

Even acknowledging the natural reluctance to finance the uncontrolled territories, Kiev is hardly dreaming of legitimation of the DNR and the LNR. After all, there cannot but understand that Kharkov, Dnepropet-

rovsk, Odessa and other "people's republics" join the queue. The "Chechen variant" seems more preferable to us in this situation, where the required peace is though "drawn" in time, but is more reliable.

Let's note that the proposal to follow the "Chechen scenario" in resolving the East Ukrainian conflict was made by Russian President at the talks in the Australian city of Brisbane on November 15, 2014. As the "Financial Times" notes, V.V. Putin said to Angela Merkel that Kiev should conduct the same policy in respect of the self-proclaimed republics, which Moscow led with regard to Chechnya: to buy their loyalty in exchange for money and autonomy. Merkel was shocked and refused to consider such a possibility. A. Baunov commented on this passage: "The Chechen option is when Putin says to the West: "What you have done to me, so let's do with Ukraine. Why do I keep the former separatist region at the expense of the national budget, and Ukraine does not want to keep its breakaway region, which agreed to make peace at the expense of the national budget" [2]. And then there is a very important, as we can say, key thought: "Of course, the whole story with separatism in eastern Ukraine has been started (emphasis added) to create a region in Ukraine with a blocking stake in the decisions, some territory, which has its political weight and does not let Ukraine into NATO, where we are most afraid to let it go" [2]. In other words, the Russian analyst admits conscious, planned and directed nature from the Russian side of the East Ukrainian conflict.

Offer to take the "Chechen variant" was done by V.V. Putin and directly by P.A. Poroshenko, but it was rejected as well. Putin has hinted on the "Chechen scenario" at the press conference after the Australian summit. Criticizing the failure of Ukraine to pay pensions to Ukrainian citizens on the territory of the DNR and the LNR, the Russian president called it a mistake and said that Moscow "even in the darkest days" did not stop the funding of the Chechen Republic and this ultimately yielded positive results.

Here, however, we must take into account two important factors that fundamentally differ the situation in Chechnya and the Donbass. Firstly, the "Chechen variant" was made possible thanks to the victory over the rebel region of Centre, Loyalist and federal – over the separatists. Moscow was at the peak of military success and its policies in Chechnya were held from the positions of strength. The state border was closed, large garrisons of federal forces were located in Grozny and other towns, the Russian air fleet dominated in the air. The very essence of the "Chechen variant" lies in the fact that the Centre that has kept the breakaway region is committed to its pacification in economic, social, humanitarian relations.

And what about the situation in the Donbass?

Kiev has no control over any significant stretch of the Ukrainian border or territories of several districts of the eastern regions. The loss of the two regional centers of Donbass by Ukraine, the offensive of militias and the Russian "volunteers" to Novoazovsk and Mariupol in August 2014, Illovaysk "trap", later – the destruction of the Donetsk airport, the withdrawal of troops from Debaltsevo projection – all this cannot testify victorious for Kiev during the conflict. If to draw an analogy with Chechnya, it is only since August 1996, when separatists seized Grozny and detained. Then-Russian President B. N. Yeltsin ordered to withdraw federal troops from Chechnya and start talks. The result of the latter was Khasavyurt agreement that has become a symbol of the failure of Russia in the North Caucasus.

Secondly, the scenario of the conflict resolution in Chechnya did not assume the presence of any state entities in Russia, conducting separatist policies and hatching plans to "march on Moscow" with the active support of the hostile superpower. The constitutional order was established on the whole territory of the North Caucasus, and the Chechen Republic was entirely within the legal framework of the Russian Federation. In our case, the exact opposite is happening: the rebellious republics declare going beyond the constitutional framework of Ukraine to determine its laws and are openly supported by the Kremlin, and obviously are financed by it. The leaders of the "independent" Donbass – regardless of the legality of their election, wittingly or unwittingly, will always be puppets of Moscow. The question of the profitability of the base region of the coal industry has been problematic in the past, and without the support of the center and additional investments these areas will become a "grey area" for many years.

The desire of Putin to create a "black hole" here absorbing money from the Ukrainian budget is unlikely to be implemented, if only because that Poroshenko has no such opportunities that are offered to Russia by its oil and gas industry. According to Mikhail Minakov the lobbying of the "Chechen variant" for Ukraine by Putin is nothing as "forcing to a soft option of surrender to the rebels and supported Russia. Ukrainian politicians are aware that the signing of the "new Khasavyurt" threatens not only their own careers, but also will lead to the incitement of separatist appetites and growth of centrifugal tendencies in the east of the country" [Op. by: 6].

In other words, the experts are inclined to think that the purpose of the Kremlin in the east-Ukrainian conflict is the permanent destabilization of the situation, and the "Chechen variant" is the optimal legalized version

of this destabilization. In our opinion, for these faithful, but deep situational output that constructive beginning of the "Chechen variant" is lost which is its essence, namely – the preservation of the territorial integrity of the country and the process of pacification. The "Russian Spring" in the Donbass became possible after the annexation of the Crimea, and if it gets more autonomy where is the guarantee that this parade of sovereignties of "people's republic" will end?

If Ukraine in relation to the Donbass will choose not the "Transdniestria", but the "Chechen" version of the resolution of the conflict, then we should all have patience and wisdom, because the process of pacification cannot be quick and painless.

Such process would need to be started from afar, correcting those distortions in the perception of the Donbass by the mass consciousness of Ukrainians who were formed long before the Maidan and the "Russian Spring". Virtually every election some political forces were under the slogan of "features", "exclusiveness" as a minimum "otherness" of residents of Donbass to the residents of the central and western Ukraine. Of course, the real reasons for the regional peculiarities of Ukrainians exist, but they are built on a much more powerful layer of mythology. Cultivation of these myths became a fertile soil on which the election programs of political parties often polar grew. Some went under the slogans "The sun rises in the Ukrainian Donbass" and "Donbass does not drive empty", while others – with the slogans "Bandits – to prison!" and demands to enclose the entire area with barbed wire. There were also "scientific" justifications of the axiological incompatibility of western and eastern Ukrainians developed by sufficiently authoritative Ukrainian scientists (P.P. Tolochko). Speculations on this issue fairly quickly escalated from harmless jokes into an ideology of hatred that largely supplies the East Ukrainian conflict.

Therefore, the first step that needs to be done in the direction of reconciliation is a rejection of the use of division of the citizens of Ukraine on the first-class and second-class in the struggle for the electorate.

As a next step, the government should clearly define its strategy for the Donbass. It, according to Eugene Shibalov, may say: "We are fighting to win, until the DNR, the LNR and all of their formations will not be completely destroyed". Or: "OK, we have seen that you are not with us, we are aimed at the separation of these territories". Or: "We accept the political reintegration plan, we put forward the only condition – the preservation of the territorial integrity and all the rest – the status of region, autonomy, its linguistic, cultural, economic rights – we are ready to discuss" [7]. Of

course, for the process of pacification the last strategy is the most suitable, though nowadays we are forced to conclude that Kiev has not a clear vision of the future of post-war Donbass. Those clear messages that reach the population indicate a strong influence at the highest levels of the Kiev authorities of subjective factors affecting old grievances, a desire to get even. And at the same time – a rational understanding of this dead-end path for Ukrainian national identity. Hence there is a shy in the strategic sphere, combined with the lack of a realistic assessment of their own strengths and capabilities. But still they will have to decide.

And then it will be necessary to produce "the dismantling of insolvent doctrines and projects from the mental space, with which violence begins and which give rise to new cycles" [8]. This quotation, by the way, is taken from an article by Russian ex-minister for nationalities, director of the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Valeriy Aleksandrovich Tishkov, who oversaw the humanitarian aspects of the post-conflict adaptation in Chechnya. Many of his expressed concerns are applicable to modern Ukraine. Taking the "Chechen variant" out of the conflict, we must stop talking about joining the Donbass to Russia, about Novorossiya, the DNR and the LNR as unrealized or implemented policies until the end of projects, focusing on the construction of our all-Ukrainian home. Paraphrasing V.A. Tishkov, we note that the independence and self-determination of Donbass are two different things. The full state independence of Ukraine's Donbass is impossible for many reasons, in particular because:

- according to the recent case studies[1], most of the population of Donbass does not want that, including those who are forced to leave its territory;

- the majority of the population of Ukraine does not want that[2];

- by virtue of geography and composition of the population the independent Donbass cannot have unconflict-borders with neighbors and a self-sustaining economy;

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1 According to the poll conducted in January 2015 by the "Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation" and Ukrainian Sociology Service, only 20% of the inhabitants of the Donetsk region would like to secede from Ukraine and gain independence, 15% wanted to join another state, 58% of respondents would like Donbas to remain in Ukraine: 30% – as the autonomous region as part of a federal Ukraine and 30% – in the unitary Ukraine, but with more powers, and 2% are satisfied with the current powers of the regions [9].
2 According to the same poll, only 11.5% of Ukrainians agree that Donbas secedes [9]

- population that has moved to other areas of Ukraine, Russia and CIS countries will not return to the independent Donbass and without it a legitimate government cannot be formed;

- it is impossible to provide normal conditions for economic recovery, if the conflict has "frozen" status.

We can and should discuss the self-determination of Donbass, its forms and methods. It is clear that there will be the need to make concessions to all – both Moscow and Kiev, and self-proclaimed republics. Submissions that political goals in the XXI century can be achieved by force are dangerous illusions. Only dialogue and tolerance will provide the desired peace.

An important issue of the pacification policy is the problem of consolidating force in this area of social forces. The so-called associated "subject of the peace" is to be collected. Today it is weak, scattered with the crumbs, and is obviously inferior to the importance of the collective "subject of war". Let us not dissemble – the war is profitable for many: the oligarchs, dividing ownership of the "Donetsk bandits" in a gambling chill; and generals that are for many years undervalued by the state and now have got the chance to "catch it"; and yesterday's unemployed that have lost faith in everything, but suddenly "found themselves" in the military service; and "noble" soldiers of volunteer battalions that send via "Novaya pochta" "trophy" home appliances from the Donbass... While the war is cost-effective, while it attracts people by the possibility of plundering this rich region, "the subject of the peace" will be in the minority. Unfortunately, it will be formed only at the cost of deaths, miseries, blood and the impoverishment. But the state is able to accelerate the process of the formation of the "subject of the peace" or at least not impede it artificially.

And here the representatives of the 'fourth power" – the media may play the important role. They have already demonstrated their power of inciting hatred; they can also use the manipulative technologies at their disposal to promote peace. It is necessary for people to believe in the possibility of peace, to talk about it as a reality. As the same was rightly pointed out by V.A. Tishkov, "speaking on the topic of peace affairs and plans is peacebuilding" [8].

In summary, we will note once again that the armed conflict in the east of Ukraine will end sooner or later, but you need to think about the world now. The "Transdniestria trends" currently dominate that are fraught with separation of the DNR/the LNR from Ukraine after the Crimea. A more desirable for our country is the "Chechen scenario", the meaning of

which is to preserve the territorial integrity at the expansion of the powers of local authorities. The process of "pacification", so necessary for the social and spiritual health of the nation will be more effective as earlier it starts. The specific forms of the postwar country can be discussed; the main thing is that this debate will take place, that our leaders will not lose the ability to light this notorious "pipe of peace".

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BEING ON THE EDGE: FEATURES OF SOCIAL AND EXISTENTIAL SITUATION IN THE CONDITIONS OF EAST UKRAINIAN CONFLICT

UDC 17.022:327(477)

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of strategies of global development and adaptation

HOSTAGES OF MYTHOLOGICAL MIND, OR WHY EASTERN UKRAINIAN CONFLICT BECAME POSSIBLE

The article gives a study of the situation of existential threat, connected with social reality falling down. An assumption is made, that this is the threat of existence of that structural part of reality, which was formed on the basis of religious and mythological forms of social being, is perceived by a human being as a reason for self-defense. Purposeful external influences over human conscience lead to the forming of ersatz-realities, in which "fight for values" is only the rationalized form of pre-rational aspiration to identity preservation. Though it is this condition of minds, connected with this self-defense, which allows igniting such conflicts, as East Ukrainian one.

Key words*: social reality, identity, objective, intersubjective, being.*

> */in the tragedy in Donbass/ two systems of values were brought together –*
> *the Russian and the European ones. For the first time*
> *over a long period of time it resulted in war for values on the Continent.*
> *Viktor Yerofeyev*

Possibly now it is not the time to make philosophical generalizations, but some peculiarities of time, which we experience, are too unconventional and socially dangerous, so that we could leave them without attention. Firstly, our society, i.e. people, who just a few months ago could hardly point out the values, for which protection they were ready to sacrifice not only something significant, but at least something, have suddenly arose to

armed struggle for the right on their own axiology. Its not that these values have just arose in explicit form, though the threat exactly to having them suddenly changed average relativists and cynics into ardent fighters. Uncompromising strand of the struggle reaches such a great heat, that a rather positive in its sense activation of social conscience brings destructive consequences. Due to extreme antagonism of the parties to the conflict we have, secondly, the situation of mutual inability to have a rational dialog. It is of no such importance that the dialog is impossible, so to say, physically, as a matter of fact it began many a time at various levels, though each time it ended in better case in nothing. One and the same facts are interpreted in the opposite way and just strengthen each of the party in its righteousness. Mind, which equally substantiates both thesis and antithesis, proves to be antonymous helpless.

The thing is that critical situation unveiled those cultural grounds, which usually remain hidden behind the flow of everyday events. As a matter of fact, we are hardly aware of the fact, which mental furniture and skills we possess. It is exactly here, in the depths of our nature, where we are to search for the reasons of those dramatic clashes, witnesses and participants of which we became.

This article is an attempt to present Eastern Ukrainian Conflict as a collision, which is perceived by the parties involved therein as, first of all, axiological; but, as a matter of fact it has other nature. The situation in Donbass has the nature of existential shock, connected with unveiling of those underlying levels of conscience, symbolizing for an average man the symptom of personal catastrophe and which is the signal to immediate self-defense. It should be noted that this is this subjective perception of the threat, which is understood as axiological challenge and becomes a foundation and the benchmark for rebirth of identity. No external interventions or internal catalysts would have never had disastrous effects: aggression of other states and collisions of oligarchic clans, as well as any variations of these facts are fed by the atmosphere of existential tension and "trigger" (it is better to say, even become possible in our situation!), and only due to it. That is why we should try to look into the reasons of the pointed out state of social conscience and of separate minds, which resulted into dramatic events in the East of the country, and try to understand, what is going on in the sphere of pre-rational conscience, which bearers we are, without being aware of fact.

Usually a human being never thinks of what they are absolutely sure of. Meanwhile, the nature of such conviction is possibly the most interesting

subject of theoretical research. It is not for nothing that Ernst Junger once pointed out that "man is the most interesting in those spheres, in which he sees no problems and which are outside discussion for him." [4, 513]. It shall be logically to put a question of the nature of those everyday convictions, which we connect with the world of objectively existing, objective per se.

We learn "perception" of the objective as children under the guidance of socialized tutors, who help us to acquire mechanisms of joining familiar sensory and mental subjective complexes with socially legitimate intersubjective conceptual structures. The "meanings", which are formed at the moment of such joining in human mind, are a complex symbiosis of the sensual and mental, subjective and intersucjective, during which we turn socially canonized perception patterns into real things, present here and now, in our own experience. That, what is not fixed in this "beholding", is the representation of the "objective "itself.

By forming during the first months of life of a child, exactly at the time of absence of both differentiation and centering of primary actions (according to terminology of J. Piaget), the skills, enabling separating out from pre-sense singularity the idea of the subject and the object, are based upon ability to synthesize sensations and actions with elaboration of conceptual abstractions, which Jean Piaget called "assimilation schemes". Peculiarity of these "proto-concepts" the Swiss researcher saw in the fact, that they, from the point of view of logics, have a certain content or sense (intentional), but they are deprived of meaning (extensional). In fact, a baby at a certain stage of development can already single out familiar sensory and mental complexes from the chaos of external information, but it has no possibility to apply this complex to a line of the same situations, absent in actual perception. We can speak of the fact that the "idea" is deprived of the volume at this stage of its existence in individual thinking, and thus in the light of Quine definition of existence[1] the sphere of existing as such is absent for the child, i.e. all contents of proto-notions, present in psychological reality of a baby, resemble "revelation", a phenomenon of something that is present, but unclear.

This thesis is also corroborated by psychological researches. The works of a famous psychologist, Maya Lysina, give a number of observations of children behavior, which are in different cognitive situations: in first of them the child was shown an unfamiliar toy, in the second one a

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[1] Under O. W. Quine to exist means to be the value of apparent variable.

familiar adult tried to attract child's attention to the toy, which has no longer evoke interest in it. The difference between appearance of unfamiliar thing and the one, already known to it, in the sight of a child proved to be rather significant. The role of the adult in the second case was determining: activity of babies grew by dozens of times. On the contrary, in the first case researchers pointed out fascinated detachment of a child, who didn't pay attention even to the presence of one of the parents. It can be supposed that the difference in reactions obviously demonstrates the tasks of early primary socialization, which is to introduce a child into the circle of the existing, by channeling the energy of "transcendental" into notional objectivations: showing the example of earlier unknown situation, parents gradually fill the memory of a child with ordered sequences of same sensory and mental complexes, which with time shall form the volumes of sensible and practically acquired notions. This process of turning sensory and mental complex (proto-notion) into the circle of culturally significant and practically mastered is to be deemed the birth of the sphere of the objective.

It should be pointed out that such understanding of objectivity as a result of cultural "fixing" of reality as apodeictic prerequisite provides for representative social convention in learning, based upon "exploitation" of physiological peculiarities of a human body. At a certain stage of child's development direct intervention of authoritative teacher is a necessary prerequisite for forming of ability to sensible practical actions with it. Further man preserves "the feeling of the objective", an ability to reduce information about external world to canonical sensory and mental complexes, acquired in childhood, for the whole life.

Thus we can say that thinking is not only the process of operating with senses, but is rather reduced to the permanent transfer from mental states to sensory and corporal feelings, which kind of verify (by means of turning to canonical, mastered as exemplary, states) the correctness of the perceived and sensible, as well as objectivate perceptional information as intersubjective reality. Objectivity here appears as a function of the social, and this is why reality (the world of objectively existing) blends with reality (the space of social action). Rationality in this case marks the relevance of conscious activity to the objective order of the universe.

Ontogenic scheme of the birth of individual conscience may act as a model for understanding of phylogenetic "entry" into the notional universe. Let us try, after the attempt made on the excursus into the phenomenology of proto-thinking of an individual, to present the process of the origin of the thinking as such schematically. It should be stressed that it is spoken exactly

of the cognitive dimension of this process, i.e. of its formal side without statement of a question about the nature of the world, which is opened to human mind.

If we are not tied to Darwin's sketchiness (which, from the point of view of philosophy of conscience, looks too naturalistic), by using previous considerations as heuristic model, to assume the existence of such a stage of the process of thinking formation, at which a significant part of human experience was in the zone of "meeting with transcendental". Intersubjective (in collective experience) fixing of the content of proto-notions (schematically representing a certain information), which lies in similar pragmatic reaction of individuals (similar thoughts and actions) forms a) the space of conceptual thinking, b) strategies of collective vital activity and culturally significant life-world, c) collective of the "users" of notions and algorithms of action – social community. At a certain stage of development of rationality, it is, and this holds true for any traditional culture, is purely religious, mainly due to the absence of ideas and presence of contexts, "containing" the aggregate of cultural situation, i.e. the idea of the world as a whole. In such a situation each step of a human requires "concurrence" with external authority, personified in mythological images. Thomas Luckmann thought that extraction of ideas of physical universe as a whole of social reality in a separate horizon of things in existence is "an axis in global rationalization process." [2, 192].

Complication of the structure of cultural systems leads to forming of "generally available" regions of social reality, unified and homogenized spheres of everyday life, which is no longer on the front line of relations with the sacral. This part of reality is connected with procedural (the term from cognitive psychology) thinking, which is extended to everything, does not require principal innovations and funds "high-society rationality". At the same time, in spite of seemingly invariant place of high-society regions of reality and high-society rationality in the process of development of human thinking, they appear in different cultures at a certain stage of their development, we are to refrain from temptation to believe, that it is spoken of one and the same high-society rationality.

For example, aesthetically marked original principles of being, "responsible" of ancient Greek ideas of cosmos, are not identical to either anthropomorphic principle of yin-yan in Chinese tradition, or to ethic ideas of cosmogonic sacrifice of the deity in Indian tradition, or, in the long run, to ideas of transcendency of the God with Jews. Though these are these ideas, which play the role for substantiation of rationality in each culture.

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Our personal universe was formed as a result of several civilization "mutations". First of them was connected with transformation in the middle of the 5th cent. BC of ancient Greek mythology under the influence of external factors (more close and broad cooperation with other cultures) and external reasons (first of all, rationalization of social practices, connected with complication of cultural systemacy), which gave birth to specific type of high-society rationality, a philosophical and theoretical one. Intuitive ideas of the beauty, harmony and proportionality of "superlunary" (i.e. eternal, sacral) world in the language of notions of high-society rationality were transformed in times of Socrates and Plato in the doctrine of true reality, which consists of divine archetypes, prototypes of all things, comprehended by the mind. Empirical objects are everything surrounding the human in everyday life, were interpreted as synthetic formations, having divine attributes, but the earthly nature. This was the way of destruction of mythological figurativeness and at the same time of forming ideas of a new world order, acting as an heir of sacral universe. Rationalized twin replaced mythological reality, just like settings in the theatre change. Though social, political and even religious life of Hellenes now unfolded in new realities, with new guidelines and with the help of adequate type of thinking.

Collision of mythological universes, similar in structure, lead to the birth of synthesized mythologies in past, in which extensity of the total regulation of everyday actions were replaced by intensity of spiritual determination. Collision of more large-scale religious systems lead to forming of cultural universes with their own "logics of sense" and simple logics (just like that of Aristotelle). One of such revolutionary collisions took part in Christian universe, which, as the matter of fact, was ready to it due internal cultural processes. Among the variety of appropriate dates we may call, together with Stephen Toulmin, 1769, when Europeans not only discovered "one more wild people", but also acknowledged, that there is a certain rationality in its ethics and perception of the world [3, 57].

In the light of above we, among other, receive a tool for more consecutive understanding of the essence of rationalization, secularization and globalization processes. Under rationality it should be understood, first of all, the subsequence of deepening and widening of "profane" regions of social reality, constituted by actions within the scope of procedural rationality. Secularization, in its general meaning, matches rationalization, and in the special meaning it stands for the process of evisceration of religious meanings from the Christian universe, which began in scholastic epoch and was activated in the epoch of discovery of alternative cultural worlds. Ex-

tension of totally irreligious life-world to the cultural areas of the planet (potentially to the whole cultural universe) is to be deemed the essence of globalization.

Though it is modern experience of the objective, which remains determining in individualized, totally unified and secularized world. When speaking of objectivity, our contemporary means not only socially fixed, intersubjective area of meaning, but also integral characteristics of reality, which is an integral part of understanding, thinking and conscience – we know/understand/realize not only with our mind, but also with all our corporal nature, which special states fix that "objectivity", which is translated in culture as transcendence, rationalized in meanings. Returning to the problem of initial reality, within the framework of which a human being begins its vital activity, we are to acknowledge, that from the early childhood we are aware of the existence of the "objective world", as it is exactly this awareness is necessary prerequisite for the presence of horizons of the existing, of those "areas" through which "quantified variable runs". Logical individuals in the scopes of notions are real or intended objects of our cultural practices, crammed into these scopes by the "will" of collective cultural subject. Our world is boundless areas, in which logical individuals, "tamed" by procedural rationality, coexist; and we are rational exactly then, when we do not cross the borders of the laws and the content of this logical universe. Though it should be stressed one more time that each culture has own peculiarities of organizing of logical universe of its mind (content and the volume of notions, as well as their structural order) and social activity, its peculiar idea of itself and others. It is within the boarders of this universe where the life of the society and its single representatives unfolds.

We shall point out that the initial reality, in which a human being is able to take rational actions, i.e. actually becomes homo sapiens, is not the material medium, but a certain space of senses. At the same time, senses do not exist somewhere beyond human mind and action as a ready structure or filled container. The senses live in mind – acts of "comprehension" form the canvas of conscience, at which thinking weaves its own pattern. In fact, when taking the position, denying naturalism, it is necessary to beware of other philosophical extreme – terminal subjectivization of reality, up to epistemiological solipsism, which champions declare that reality exists only in mind of an individual. The clue between Scylla of naturalism and Charybdis of solipsism as of 17th cent. is Kant's transcendentalism, a doctrine of existence of universal forms of perception and thinking, which impart subjective dimension of reality intersubjective status. Reality is a men-

tal formation, though it is here where we find everything necessary for communication and social actions. A. Schuetz developed transcendental doctrine of social reality as of the world of objects of culture and institutes, in which life of socialized individuals takes place. On the basis of the above conclusions about social characters of objectivity it is necessary to slightly develop our ideas of the structure of social reality as that mental sphere, in which our life practices are implemented.

In spite of the fact that "notion" of material cannot be deemed to be something purely ideal, it "is included" into structures of thinking as apodictic element as awareness of algorithm of legitimate actions, which support conceptual scheme (system of notions), present in a social group. The sphere of the objective, as has already been pointed out, is funded not only by external factors (which, strictly speaking, are always transcendental and are present in mental world immediately), but also by sociocultural conventions and is connected with public consensus. At the same time, everyday actions of a human, though allowing them to make sure of the successfulness of own interpretations of reality, never exhaust semantic potential, inherent therein. Spatial and temporal limitation of a human being makes its personal experience a meager drop of the experience, which is potentially possible.

If actually existing is fixed in reality by the procedures of bringing the present in psychics to the conceptual scheme, the horizon of the generally existing proves to the an aggregate of fundamental notions and categories of culture, which determine the type of the possible as such. The unique image of matrix of all such categories (V. Stepnin mentioned that categories of culture are tied up rigidly in the so-called cultural matrices) always has religious and morphological origin, as it fixed the way of a community to realization of itself and of the world. The idea o of the world whole, which "rules" cultural activity of the community, is thus determined by conceptual field, forming around a peculiar core of reality, a matrix of category of culture. To be consistent until the end, it is necessary to recognize the presence of central formation in categorical core as well, though everything one can say about it shall be said in a language of categories and thus is destined to tautology.

One should distinguish between the objectivated image of the world and social reality itself, which is intersubjective structure, based upon mental states – knowledge, intensions, background knowledge. That, what a human being shall see or hear, depends on this structure, laid in his "mind" in course of primary socialization, whereas not only in part of the type of objectness, but also from the point of view of modalities of existence, up to

existence/non-existence of transcendental horizons of the world and their scales. All these purely particular features of social reality turn its champions into ontological "conspirators", who by their personal inclination to a certain type of thinking form the body of their personal culture. The idea of oneself, which, again, is implemented in the categories of the same matrix, is general for all the champions and is laid in the basis of social identity. The group of co-actors, united by common thinking, acting, identity, it is better to say by common otology, turns into a community.

In the light of above most important prove to be two following conclusions: 1) religious core of social reality and the matrix of categories of culture, formed around it, are metaphysical and ontological centers of social reality respectively, which make individual senses possible and determine adequate ontologies of strategies of rationality (e.g., clarification through appeal to ontological myth in totemism, biblical symbolism of medieval Christianity or historical reconstructions of the epoch of postmodernism), by they themselves are in "extrarational" sphere; 2) destruction of religious and ontological core of social reality is destruction of cultural thinking and existence, destruction of the community, which emerged due to it and is perceived by adepts of culture as mortal threat. That is why challenges in this sphere are existential challenges in their essence.

This sphere of pre-rational guidelines include self-determination of a community, so to say, "the idea of itself", which always has ontological and metaphysical content. Actually, the birth of a community and forming of its idea can be viewed as a single process. Cultural values do not arise out of nothing and usually from transformation of pre-rational centers of ontological realities ("areas" of cultural life of communities) a new social unity takes its origin. That is why collisions of different realities are understood mainly within the framework of religious and mythological narratives, in which rational constructs are perceived as rather nonstrict. The ideas of communities are either mythical in their nature or acquire the status of mythologems in course of maturing. For example, natiogenesis in modern community was accompanied (and is accompanied) by the birth of national myths. [1]. All the treats to communities and realities, and to be more precise, of their symbolic representations – tabooed categories and things, sacred objects, language or boarders, values, memory and history, which legitimates them are perceived as mortal threats (threats for destruction of religious and ontological core of reality) and cause adequate reaction.

The issue of national self-identification in everyday life is solved more or less intuitively due to adherence to some algorithms of thinking and

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acting – one can speak of some explicit definitions only with some portion of caution. But in situations of existential threat, when our contemporary needs to consciously turn to the definition of the nation and national identity, to make an effort to make rational constructions in this sphere, he is threw off to the mythological times of nations emergence. That is why territories of nations are either replete by mythologems or teleologems turn into purely constructivist constructions, proclaiming artificiality of any national formations. In this case a modern human is little distinctive of their archaic predecessors, whose each step was regulated by mythological determinants. It is at this place, where paradox synthesis of rational and mythological appears: mind can speak only using categorical tools, but it is driven by irrational, mythological in its essence impulse, aimed at self-defense, often rather aggressive. We have something like the case of cinematographic Frankenstein: a human seems to say something (i.e. the presence of some internal rational activity can be supposed, but this something is not only senseless, but in no way influences the direction of his actions.

Thus, existential threat to social existence, which is felt at the level of influences, which are rationally realized but are perceived/understood as axiological challenge. A large-scale war for values, or to be more precise, for the right to personal interpretation of their formulation and the content is unfolded. Due to the fact that pre-rational grounds of reality are involved in rational discourse only on the level or ideological and journalistic conceptualistics (i.e. in the form, adequate to mass conscience), we have corrupted ersatz-realities, artificial constructs, in which the sky and the ground are changed with settings. The problem liens is the fact that the blood, which is shed, is real.

In the war for political dividends Russia and Ukraine have started staticist ideological campaigns, indirectly aimed against concurring interpretation of the same historical events. Whether purposefully or not, axiological tension was maintained in the East of Ukraine within a few decades. Political elites deliberately employed cultural specific character of the region for their own purposes without thinking of possible consequences. But we are to understand, that "collision of axiologies" is the level of conflict, which can be realized (and is realized), but a rather more large scale and significant collision is hidden behind it.

The problem laid in the fact that instead of political process, which acquires ontological meaning (i.e. that which poses a threat to existential or ontological identity of a human being) only in case of interstate conflicts, like world wars, and in other cases it pertained identities of variable (ideo-

logical, party etc. ones), we faced the processed of totally different direction. Conflicts of last years have demonstrated impossibility of retaining political conflict at the level of "construction" of social reality and time after time frustrated it at its "ontological peak", at which subjects to conflict felt the threat to their personal existential identity and arose to struggle not for political primacy, but for the life. In such a situation a mind turns from instrument for search of optimal strategies of action into a type of weapon, and arguments lose their sense. It is exactly principal impossibility of consensus proves to be an indicator of the presence of ontological crisis today. Failure to understand the fact turns fronts of such collisions into bottomless absorbers of energy, health and human lives resources: the more obvious something in some ontological ersatz-paradigm is, the more threatening and false it proves to be in an alternative world.

A far greater threeat lies in the fact that active influence at the conscience at, so to say, rational level leads to unforeseen changes in pre-rational spheres. Spinning two gigantic propagandistic flywheels, which accompanies military actions in the East of Ukraine, aggravated perception of information extremely, which is provided to an average citizen. Real and potential threats shifted the discourse into pre-rational dimension, where only mythological or metaphysical conceptualism remains relevant and a human being is to make marginal choice. It is noteworthy that this ways is not natural and takes place rather under the influence of mass media and external circumstanced. But when it is spoken of the act of self-preservation, there can be no way back. That is why a great amount of "spontaneous" identifications occur lately, after which a human being sides with one of the parties to the conflict and turns into its implacable adherent.

Such a process is a necessary attribute of military clashes, but today in Ukraine it is very important to take into account those negative consequences, which shall have informational influences at the population of the state in future. Infrenalization of the population of Donbass, an attempt to rally support of the bulk of Ukrainians on the issues of restriction of social payments and transport connection in the occupied territories, as well as such emotional attacks at the mass conscience, aimed at satisfying needs of mobilization raise the degree of psychological tension in the society in an unjustified way. In addition that part of population which does not feel to be direct object of propagandistic influence is thus hinted at anti-Ukrainian identifications. All this only makes axiological confrontation inside Ukrainian society even worse and decreases its immunity to external destructive influences.

Is there a collision of civilizations in the East of Ukraine, or opposition of axiologies is apparent and emerges as a result of influence at the conscience and the mind of people, divided by boundaries of artificially build opposite realities? If a human being has a ready, or even more – apparent – answer to such questions, it is difficult not to suspect, that he is exposed to propagandistic technologies.

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THE NONLINEAR CHARACTER OF MANIFESTATION OF CONFLICTOGENIC FACTORS IN THE LOCAL SPACES: FEATURES OF URBAN AREAS OF SOCIAL REALITY

The article offers a look at such region of social reality as a city. The thesis, which defines the processes taking place in the city as non-linear, is grounded and it is shown that the search of limit (irrational) reasons of public order operation of the urban community could fill a gap in the research in explaining the influence of nonlinear factors and their impact on changes in social being. It is proposed to take a look at the East-Ukrainian conflict as the result of conflict-factors in conjunction with deterministic myth of the city, the strategies of behavior of citizens.

Key words: nonlinearity, social reality, city, the city's myth.

EAST UKRAINIAN CONFLICT IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS

The Ukrainian society of recent years is increasingly taking model behaviors of Western European society. This is demonstrated by the social and political events, Maidans (since 2004) and "The revolution of dignity". But with their social relevance the causes and consequences of such acts of civil status are still somewhat different than those "equip" the daily life of a European and protect social order of the European society. Ukrainians are faced with the fact that such "copy" brings sometimes contradictory results because the context of the country, its history and time are not taken into account. If we recall the course of events of winter 2013-14 in different cities of Ukraine, we can see that the processes are not just patchy, often they are opposed.

What lies at the basis of the socio-cultural environment in which the life of ordinary Ukrainians unfolds? We believe that the named heterogeneity grows on the basis of characteristics of local interpretations of national narratives, in accordance with the available urban nature of consciousness, mentality and behavior patterns that are inherent to the townspeople.

Different cities respond differently to certain factors and requirements, for example, urban residents call different national characters, or have different definitions of their posters. We saw that the cities, which, according to historians and political scientists, belonged to a common historical region and expressed quite similarly at national elections responded in different ways to the seemingly alone "signals", but the fate of these cities was generally the opposite. This applies not only to the Ukrainian cities and not so much to revolutionary or military events. We note that the reaction of the urban consciousness, the reaction of a city for identical events (signals) is different, unpredictable in terms of the logic flow of a certain social process and is dependent upon certain external factors.

The aim of this ***article*** is the explication of the factors that lie at the foundation of the nonlinearity of the city and the urban region of consciousness of social reality as the deployment of the planes of consciousness and thinking; that affect the behavior and reaction of the urban community as a whole and each citizen in particular.

The issue of non-linear processes is studied by many scientific disciplines of different directions. Abstract measurement of issues of nonlinearity is studied by the exact sciences like logic or mathematics and in interdisciplinary research of synergetic orientation. The contribution is made by the social sciences and humanities, immersing the resulting methodology in social and anthropological plane.

The works of V. Stepin [7; 8] are dedicated to the investigation of synergy as a methodological principle; the basis of linear and nonlinear behavior strategies is described in detail in the works of Yu.A. Polunin and

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I.N. Timofeev [5]; foundation of the study of the city, as part of a complex structural framework of social reality is laid in the works of V. Turkina [10] and E. Saiko [6]. The results of statistical and sociological research of the Razumkov Centre, Agency Research & Branding Group, Foundation of Ilka Kucheriv [3; 4], materials of magazines "National security and defense" are used in this article as well. The system material of the monograph "Donbass in the ethno-political dimension" [2] can be considered informative as well. But still, there is a certain lack of works relating to the grounds of non-linear nature of the life practices of the urban community.

Confidence of man in the future, in the correctness of the settled order of things is determined by the picture of the world of today (the scientific picture of the world), formed by the general principles of the methodology and the worldview. Every fact, including life, is checked, it has its own logic, it is possible to collect statistics by it that will give an idea of patterns of events and confidence in the possibility of their modeling. If we draw an analogy between the theory of Kuhn's "normal science", according to which the activities of the scientist on the decision of puzzles requires a knowledge of the rules that determine the human activity under the prevailing paradigm, the human actions in everyday life is a "normal life" in which every human action does not go beyond the adopted picture of the world. Y.A. Polunin in the monograph "Nonlinear political processes", defining the linearity as a part of the worldview, points out that it is prone to a certain apologetics of a particular valuable institutional invariant, and approach to history as the movement toward such invariant [5, 6]. In this sense, socialist or liberal programs of social development of the community with their movement toward the common good are linear, according to scientist.

But the scientific paradigm and the social reality faced a random facilitation. All social facts, knocked out of the coherent theory are the result of chance, unrecorded variables in the linear theory that cause system instability, its bifurcation (which is defined by us after V. Stepin [7] as a term of categorical apparatus of synergy and is a phase of change in the stable operation system). The processes, the dynamics of which is difficult to be explained from the standpoint of scientific methods and approaches, or a solution of which is not straightforward – get the name of the non-linear. The nonlinear development of social processes appears in the analysis of dynamic systems. Such analysis is carried out within the framework of the synergetic approach, which focuses on the unstable processes, at conditions of dynamic chaos, generating a particular organization, an order. Any system interacts with other systems, and thus it may itself have a complicated structure. It can exchange matter, energy, information with surrounding

systems [8]. All this complex network of interactions can be represented integrally as a nonlinear environment or a set of non-linear, including social in nature environments.

From the perspective of a synergistic approach, cities are complex systems which, in the apt remark of V. Turkina, "are united in the genetic basis socio-spatial organized structures that are in various phases of development. At each stage of the historical development the city emerges as a carrier of appropriate forms and norms of socio-economic, socio-cultural relations, acts as a self-developing organism of the social space organization" [10, 180].

Such organism is a part of a wider system – social environment and social reality, but each new city in the making process is released from the socio-spatial structure of the society in the era of which it arises. Therefore, during the study of processes that involves the urban community you cannot but ignore these fundamental individual characteristics inherent in the formation of the city.

Despite the various aspects that come to the attention of cities' researchers, they intuitively feel that the city appears as an isolated reality. For example, E. Saiko says about the city: "There is something in common, which constitutes its specific character as a special social organism in all ages and in different regions, it defines it as a city" [6, 17], with the city referred to as "a united special social organism, which existed and exists as an objective reality, showing in the public consciousness" [6, 5].

In the plane of worldview patterns of residents of different cities, conflictogenic factors, shaking the city system, launch the mechanisms that make the urban community to rally around their own identity, historical memory, social memory, and stereotypical behavior patterns, make contact to the formation of categories that substantiate the urban community. Their crystallization goes its way as a rule, and is formed as a result of the bifurcation that changes the value bases of the city. The roots of such different reaction on the same events in the cities are reviewed in the functioning of a specific principle of urban thinking, which can be defined as the myth of the city.

The myth of the city is marked by the peculiarities of local mentality, and is based on self-perception and the perception of the city, it becomes an emblematic narrative about the city, being formed under the influence of natural, geopolitical, ethnic, social and many other factors, and becomes a consequence of the symbolic space design in motion of historical features of the local community development which is formed under the influence of natural, geopolitical, ethnic, social and many other factors, becomes a consequence of the symbolic space design in the spirit of the historical features of the development of the local community[1] [1].

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Being on the edge: features of social and existential situation in the conditions of East Ukrainian conflict

To illustrate this thesis, let's turn to the studies related to the city of Donetsk [1, 268]. With the first stage of formation of the Donetsk myth, along with the registration of a specific worldview with close connection to which this myth was formed, industrialization of the region is connected, which put before the representatives of the traditional society the task to master such types of work that has not been practiced until now. Calling for any of the exceptional work associated with a mortal danger, has led to the rise of the collective of such workers, gave it the moral right in accordance with its election not to obey the usual rules of the existence of the society, their marginal behavior has become to be justified by the way of existence: "the tension of existential" "standing on the edge" which in the view of the Orthodox peasant characterized the work in "hell", and the reverse side of such violation of the "normal" order of things, a violation of ethical standards – a riot and drunkenness resulted in commonalities of "Donetsk" mentality of the period of the city formation" [1, 266]. Further, the primary, miner mythologema, according to which a person is fighting heroically against the elements (Chaos of the underworld) after the "watershed" of the revolution is transformed, distorted and fused with the worldview of the new state, which includes lands of the Donetsk region. Since then ideological conformity of workers of the mining city with the idea of the Soviet worker and his cosmic role, the explicit industrial appointment of the city, have generated confidence in the welfare of their connection with the prosperity of enterprises, and there was a tab of social practices and stamps f behavior under the influence of the Soviet ideologeme. The third stage of the formation of the Donetsk myth, where its social and cultural context is experiencing transformations and changes in the 90s – the 2000s, associated with the degeneration of the Soviet mythologema about class and labor exclusivity into a new narrative of the Donetsk selectness, which is relevant to new social and cultural realities.

The mining component of the Donetsk myth is another unstable factor in social forecasting. But it is worth remembering that its action also fits into the logics of the Donetsk "peculiarity-speciality". This uniqueness defines all the plans of existence of the citizen. It developed in the early stages as a result of lifestyle associated with a debilitating labor (miners sometimes did not raise to the surface for several days) and an unsuitable life, mortal danger and heavy "sprees", but at the same time with the possibility to earn good money, and later entered the structure of the local identity. I. Mitin said that the feeling of exclusivity of the territory leads to the formation of an opinion of the "people selectness". For Donetsk this is the selectness of

the population, which appeared in the working environment in the form of a special Donetsk mentality, "Donetsk iron character".

Another important aspect that explains the behavior of Donbass during the periods of fluctuation (random deviations in the system) is a feature of development of relations between the inhabitants of the cities of Eastern Ukraine with the local authorities, elites and big business. This is also the result of the perception of itself as the exclusive collective, whose members, which is logical, have an exceptional talent for business and are successful in it. Such loyalty to the business and the business entities is based on the feeling of benefiting from them for the common good. For example, prior to the Euro 2012 in Ukraine, Kiev Research & Branding Group, Lvov Ukrainian Fund "Public opinion" and Donetsk company DIAZ conducted a poll, "Who according to residents of Donetsk and Lvov, put more efforts for Euro 2012 in their city", according to which out of all cities, Donetsk gave the highest percentage of the contribution of business and business structures [4]. This high level of confidence of the Donetsk inhabitants for the business elite, became the basis of considering it as the tool for "the radicalization of the population in the regions" [3]. Therefore, we cannot ignore the internal motives and interests of the "capitalists of Donbass", but it is impossible to conclude that the final outcome of the conflict meets their expectations. It demonstrates the "work" of nonlinear processes, as according to the synergetic theory, since fluctuations are random, the state of the system after the bifurcation is due to the action of total random factors.

The team of authors of the monograph "Donbass in ethno-political dimension" consider the current situation in Ukraine as the "purposeful action of Donbass groups of the ruling class of Ukraine (still known as the "owners of Donbass" – that is already accustomed to the title of big business, establishment and development of which occurred in the region in close ties with criminals and corrupt criminalized power) with the "ingraining" to people of the region the inadequate representations about community of socio-economic and political interests of these groups with the interests of the population of Donbass" [2, 540].

This statement is self-evident and compelling, but not just counted manipulative will of political and other elites stands for the described situation, but an existential sense of community of Donbass that this choice results from the ontological foundations of their existence, the roots of which stretch to the city's myth.

Moreover, as indicated by E. Taranenko, "the mythologema of the Donbass strong character became the basis of the myth of the "Donetsk" who made a separate state of "lawlessness" in their own city and are spreading this order throughout Ukraine; the myth is frankly aggressive, not of

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industrial-heroic, not economically successful, but of the criminal nature" [9, 106]. That is the myth of the city has, so to speak, its external being, including the perception of it by other cities.

Let's emphasize once again that this is an example of a non-linear "work" of the myth of one of the Ukrainian cities, but such an irrational myth lies at the heart of each city, it changes with the historical contexts in which the urban community appears and regulates its behavior. Therefore, when studying the city as a space of dynamic processes, we must consider the impact on the part of the irrational factor, which is a set of stable representations "about itself" and plays a crucial role in the formation of social identity. The city as a self-organizing structure of its immediate response has nonlinearity, different cities develop in accordance with their various internal intentions and what is the most important in the context of this article, they react differently to seemingly identical external influences: such dynamic processes like revolutions, population explosions, accelerated urbanization and de-urbanization, industrialization of cities or simply crisis – all these are states where in one way or another any city could be, but the strategies of the choice of behavior mechanism in such processes are dependent on the characteristics of urban consciousness, "implicated" on the city's myth.

Conclusions. The myth of a particular city appears with the idea of the city, and regulates all aspects of social life of the community. As a rule, it is not singled out, the mythological narrative is not discursive and is not perceived critically, but simply becomes a part of the daily life, according to Losev, it is the "actual reality" that is rooted in the "ontological" structure of the social reality of the city and the urban consciousness that it based on it. The urban area of social reality is the mode of existence of common cultural reality, but that one that always has its own principles of organization and existence. It reminds the opinion of O. Spengler, who noted in "The Decline of Europe" the link between culture and that "delimited landscape" to which it is attached, such as a plant.

Although the article was able to touch a few examples of non-linear "work" the of the city's myth, they do allow us to show the direction in which to move when studying such non-equilibrium systems as the city. Since the urban society appeals to an urban myth, and it is looking for salvation and "hint" for behavior strategies. The city's myth, thus, serves as unstable factor in the mainstreaming of development strategies and behavioral strategies, unbalances the system of the city, and pushes it to an unexpected action, to the nonlinear behavior strategies. It is obvious that this

irrational factor appeared in Ukrainian events of a year ago and is still play-ing its uncommon role.

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UDC 327.5

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CONSERVATIVE MODERNIZATION OF RUSSIA AND THE SOCIALIST ABERRATION OF DONBASS

The article analyzes the political situation in the East of Ukraine, studies the causes of the armed conflict in the region. The first semantic unit of the article substantiates that Donbass in its current form is a product of Soviet industrialization, and therefore the mass consciousness is character-ized by nostalgia for the recent past. It is the socialism that calls for social

justice, equality, democracy, against theft, corruption, oligarchs and private property are connected with. Although these provisions are not recorded under the heading of "building socialism in the DNR and LNR", residents of these political formations in all their undertakings are inclined to see the very socialist component. The self-government is forced to reckon with the mood of the masses, sharing socialist rhetoric at least "in the outer form". The article analyzes the program of socio-political movement "Novorossiya Party". The second semantic unit of the article studies the strategy of conservative modernization in Russia, which includes: first, consolidation of the elites; second, uncompromising struggle with the moral justification for violations of the written law; and third, movement towards realistic legislation. The course for conservative modernization does not imply socialist methods in public administration and functioning of the economy. Thus, there is a real contradiction between the political expectations of some residents of the DNR and the LNR for the restoration of socialism and the real transformations in Russia itself, which have no relation to the socialist transformation.

Keywords: *aberration, conflict, socialism, modernization, conservative modernization.*

The political situation in Ukraine nowadays is extremely tense and volatile, resulting in the armed hostilities in the east of the country. The dramatic events in the Donbass force to look at the established form of government, political decision-making processes, stereotypes about the relations between the political authorities and the population from a new angle. Ukrainian political elite, on the one hand, attempts to resolve the pulsating conflict, on the other hand, it demonstrates clearly not tolerant, aggressive attitude to the people, forgetting that if "Donbass is Ukraine", the people who live in that territory are true Ukrainian citizens. One gets the impression that the irrational components in the managing prevail over rational decisions. Or we are dealing with a weighted selfish approach to solving political issues.

Nowadays, in the scientific and journalistic literature, the media many factors are discussed that have led to war in the Donbass, including political, geopolitical, economic, cultural. We can assume that one of the factors that triggered the military conflict in the Donbass, witnesses and victims of which we are, there are mental differences between the regions of Ukraine, the difference between values and worldview of the east, center, west of the country. The most simplistic understanding of the mentality was

given in a small collection called "The debate about the main", which appeared in the 90s of the last century. The mentality there was treated as "history sediment", "memory of the people of the past". It is obvious that the different regions of Ukraine have their own individual, hard won memory, which in modern conditions is skillfully manipulated by someone. One of the painful facts, which have become the subject of manipulation, is the attitude to the socialist past.

The *aim* of this article is to assess the mass public expectations of new states in the east of Ukraine with regard to socialist transformations and correlation of these expectations with strategic installations prevailing in Russia.

It is an indisputable fact that the Donbass in its present form is the product of Soviet industrialization. By virtue of this the population of Donbass tends to idealize everything connected with the Soviet period of history. The older age groups continue to identify themselves with the Soviet people, even despite the fact that for almost quarter of a century such community does not exist. Donbass is the region of Ukraine, where the events of the Soviet history have continuously been updated, the memories of the socialist past are still alive, and moreover, they are always exaggerated and nurtured. The constant discourse that can be extended by each of its members was artificially maintained and kept. Based on the phenomenon of intertextuality, each participant of the discourse can interpret in his own way certain events or facts, make his own adjustments, his extremely subjective understanding, i.e. construct the social reality building his small Lebenswelt.

The discourse that is unfolding in the occupied Donbass about the "bright future" is supported by gunfires, volleys of installations "Grad" and "Tornado", which makes it more dramatic, and the slogan "building a society without the oligarchs" found an echo not only among the aging population, but also among the young generation of the Donbass. All the "nuances" of the civil war the people of this region know not only from literature, but have felt on "their own skin", by what they are different from theorizing representatives of "sofa hundreds".

Political space of the east of Ukraine nowadays is described by the well-known dilemma "Friend-enemy", proposed by the German political philosopher Carl Schmitt. The intensity of social relations came to the extreme, where hatred and malice stands, the willingness to see the enemy in the opponent. And if one part of the population expects the "liberation/ conquest" by Russia, the other expects this from the Ukraine. Residents demon-

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strating liberal democratic values want to return the Ukrainian political field while people focused on the authoritarian form of government, on the contrary, dream to join the Russian political space in the "USSR-2".

In the mass consciousness of Donbass people not only fond memories of the "early years" filled with persistent creative work are alive, but also hope for the revival of the Soviet system. Socialism in the Donbass is not something critically overcome; it still remains the most desirable social system. The negative aspects of the real communist construction are not overshadowed in the minds of eastern Ukrainians generally positive socialist ideal. Therefore it is not surprising that they are waiting for changes in the spirit of the restoration of the Soviet system from the new government. And calls for social justice, equality, democracy, against theft, corruption, the oligarchs, against what is important, the private property are linked with socialism.

It is noteworthy that these expectations were not originally something verbalized, fixed in the program documents of the new government, in the speeches of the leaders of Novorossiya and other documents. However, despite this the people of Donbass are inclined to see the Socialist component in all endeavors of political growths. If in the early stages of the conflict in eastern Ukraine, the two sides have seen in the inhabitants of the controlled territories a passive mass, a kind of "award" winner takes, then as the conflict was tightening support of the population was becoming increasingly important, including electoral. Consequently, the self-proclaimed government in Donetsk and Lugansk was forced to reckon with the mood of the masses, sharing socialist rhetoric at least "on the external form". With particular strength it was evident on the eve of the election of the management of DNR and LNR on November 2, 2014.

Let's turn to the program of socio-political movement "Novorossiya Party" published in the newspaper "Novorossiya" No. 1 from May 21, 2014.

The first statement of the document reads: "The creation of the State of Novorossiya is not only the withdrawal of all the south-eastern lands of Ukraine subordination of Kiev authorities, not only the liberation from the yoke of the fascist junta, but also the building a new, genuinely fair, scientifically, technologically advanced state, all resources of which are not only in words, but in fact belong to the people and are fully used for the benefit of it" [1, 1]. Immediately attention focuses on the federal structure of the national state. "The State of Novorossiya will be a sovereign state, established by the will of the people, which is the only source of power. Popular

rule will be the basis of the state system of Novorossiya, based on the principles of direct democracy in making important decisions determining the future of the people and the state" [1, 1].

The second statement concerns the economic system of Novorossiya, namely: "land, its minerals, waters, flora and fauna, as well as large industrial and financial assets created by the labor of the people, cannot be privately owned. The use and disposal of natural resources cannot be done to the detriment of the people". The key point of this provision is the denial of private property which is basic for socialism. However, it is further stated that "the economic structure of Novorossiya will be based on the principles of social justice and multiculturalism" [1, 1].

This position resonates with people in this region who have not found an answer to the question why everything created by all Soviet people for generations was got by a few families? Because they appeared to be more cunning, quirky in matters of "equitable distribution" of socialist property? Everything that happened in the perestroika era, caused resentment, pain, and anger of Donbass people, the majority of which had to survive, although in the recent years of the existence of the Soviet state it used to live in dignity. It is obvious that such social splash in the Donbass had its good reasons, and the Ukrainian authorities had to anticipate and pre-empt it. On the other hand, people were robbed by their "home" local oligarchs who leaked to the top of the political ladder.

Next. The program states that "the results of economic and business activities of the people of Novorossiya, as well as the operation of industrial and financial assets owned by the state, will belong to all the people, and can be used only for the benefit of the people, through the equitable distribution" [1, 1]. Thus, equal opportunities for all inhabitants are declared in Novorossiya. Ensuring equal opportunities will be achieved by the anti-corruption activities of the state. "Enrichment through theft and corruption is impossible. Remuneration of each person will be a measure of the usefulness of this work for the community". Between the lines the familiar slogan can be seen: "From each according to his ability, to each according to his need". And the economic block of the program ends with the statement that small-scale private property would still exist: "... small production facilities and objects of economic activity created by the hands of private traders, may be in the hands of private ownership. Further, the land used for private residence or individual agricultural activities, may be in the lifelong use with the chance of inheriting the right to use it" [1, 1]. Thus, the economic

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foundations of the alleged State are certainly closer in nature to socialism than to the liberal democracies of the Western type.

Not less expressive the provisions of the section "Social sphere and culture of Novorossiya" of the analyzed Program are. It should be noted that it declared the following provision: "The social order of Novorossiya will be based on the principles of equality, justice, freedom of religion and cultural identity" [1, 1]. There is hardly anyone who would object to the implementation of this thesis. However, the normative form of spiritual and religious education will be belonging to the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate that "readily admits the freedom of religion, except the alien for the Russian culture forms of aggressive totalitarian sects" [1, 1].

The geopolitical component of the program should be emphasized, paying attention to the fact that the ultimate goal of Novorossiya as a state is a "reunion with the Great Russia culturally or directly". Next we read: "From the point of view of geopolitics Novorossiya will focus on the Eurasian vector of development and adheres to the priority of developing strategic relations with the East, especially in the framework of the Eurasian supranational structures". Cooperation with the countries of the West is possible only if they are "focused on Russia from a geopolitical point of view" [1, 1]. With regard to the entry of Novorossiya in the military blocs, the document noted that it will be part of those military-political blocs, in which Russia is included. In other words, the dependence of the foreign policy of the state is initially laid and its dependence on the Russian Federation. Though there is no common point of view among the followers of Novorossiya on this question.

There is a very interesting and always current problem in the philosophy – a problem of correlation of due and matter. The program is "due", and in this respect its provisions do not cause hostility. Moreover, they deserve respect as an attempt to rectify the mistakes, errors or even deliberate abuse of power in our country. In general, the program declared democratic values; the totalitarian spirit is not visible between the lines. The public movement "Novorossiya" seeks to make a "little man" happy (although in the section "Rights and obligations in Novorossiya" the death penalty is mentioned, to which this "little man" could be sentenced by the decision of the people's court).

On the other hand, the matter is not the full scope of areas described in the program: "Nowadays Novorossiya is a political, cultural, historical region that combines Donetsk, Zaporozhe, Nikolayev, Odesa, Kherson,

Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkov and Lugansk regions" [1, 1]. Declared in this way political space does not exist in reality, but is only a speculative construct, or virtual reality, existing only in potency. There is no Novorossiya as a political, territorial, economic entity and "at the present moment", but there are only a few regions of Donetsk and Lugansk regions, controlled by a new pro-Russian government. Armed hostilities are needed for Novorossiya to become a reality, to find its being, and Ukraine is not going to give up its territories without holdout. Thus, even before the incarnation of due to the matter a war is waiting for us that may change everything so that matter will have a completely different view.

But now the socialist values are no more than slogans, uniting extremes disgruntled with Ukrainian politics and eager to revive the USSR. It is considered on default that Russia defends social equality in the face of the threat of NATO, USA and EU seeking to enslave the Slavic world. Many still believe that the armed men in the Donbass defend socialism against capitalism. "The slogan was introduced that Donbass today is Spain of 1936, mercenaries were compared with the international brigades who fought against fascism. They began to talk that the separatists were fighting with fascists-oligarchs for a socialist economy" [2].

At the same time it is somehow forgotten that the Russian Federation itself is very far from socialist values and perspectives. Reverences towards socialism in the DNR and the LNR are no more than aberrations (lat. aberrare – "to leave, to reject"), a departure from the mainstream of Russian politics. Nowadays on the agenda Russia is the question about not socialist, but a conservative modernization. In this phrase-concept the major role is played by the word "conservative" and "modernization" is added more as a tribute to the fashionable rhetoric as a kind of balance between the direction of the vector into the past (conservatism) and the present. Actually it is about modernization of the system of state capitalism with the transfer of workers deprived of trade union to the rights of serfs.

According to political scientist Iosif Diskin, the key problem of the conservative modernization is reformatting the entire institutional space in accordance with the conservative values of the majority. "The fact is – he writes – that "liberal" institutions in the illiberal social environment inevitably generate hypocrisy and cynicism, encourage dodge, or scientifically, opportunistic behavior, moral justification for violations of legal norms" [3, 5].

The main conditions of the conservative modernization are, first, the consolidation of the elites: "...consolidation of those we recognize as "our" is necessary, with whom we are prepared weighed and responsibly discuss

the pressing problems of the country, with whom we can agree on joint action... Not only ideological, but ideological and political class consolidation is needed". Second, "... an uncompromising struggle with the moral justification for violations of the written law. A conservative, appreciating moral foundations of his own actions, that is intended to even throw dogma imposed by nihilists that the real intellectual is obliged to oppose the government. ... It is important that at least among them a tough selection of opinion leaders was conducted by the well-known criteria of professionalism, patriotism and civic responsibility". It is necessary to overcome the situation, "when the social status is created by the reckless criticism of any, even the immediate actions of the authorities". Third, we need to move to the realistic legislation. The principle "we will draw – we will live" still reigns among our legislators. We must break this vicious system. The conservative tradition requires assessing the real possibilities for the changes of social practices that we are trying to regulate" [3, 5].

As you can see, the spiritual situation in the modern Russia is not aimed at the progressive ascension, but on the consolidation of existing relations with a strong idealization of the past. The oligarchs in Russia are not interested in the changes, the manipulation of the mass consciousness initiated by them appeals to the samples of pre-Soviet, imperial, Orthodox identity. "In this case, – M. Kantor writes, – the oligarchs of the Kremlin, which are richer than Ukrainian ones, are arming Donbass. Freed from the yoke of the rich Ukrainians, workers will not unite in the communes; and it is not the proletariat – workers and their families run away. At the same time the leaders of Donbass talk about joining Russia, in the economy of which there is nor a penny of socialist intentions. The flag of the DNR depicts the Russian monarchy two-headed eagle, the Prime Minister of the DNR Boroday (FSB general, sent from Russia) stated the need to recreate the Russian empire in its former borders, and the chief of the armed forces of the DNR Russian colonel Girkin (Strelkov) said that he was fighting for monarchical values" [2].

Conservative modernization involves correcting of "errors of history", among which, without a doubt, the Kremlin considers the independence of Ukraine. Russia is seeking to regain its lost territories, naming the former imperial space Russkiy mir". Suppression of Ukraine is nothing like an ordinary imperial practice: imperial Russia suppressed the Ukrainian and Polish revolts regularly. Soviet Russia, as the successor of the Russian Empire, suppressed the rebel Czechoslovakia and Hungary – manifesting itself not a de-

fender of the socialist ideals of equality, but the protectress of the imperial borders. And nowadays Russia raises the same tradition.

Describing modern Russia, M. Kantor believes that we are dealing with an incredible social formation – post-socialist feudal system. "The owners of the quasi-state are a hybrid unprecedented in the history of social science: they are officers of the state security – and billionaires at the same time. Theoretically, the combination is not possible – but in a post-socialist feudalism it proved to be natural. The Russia's desire to return to the status of the Russian Empire (the desire which no one hides) actually represents a return to serfdom. That is how, and not in another way, that it is possible to control the people in the long and barren expanses with the destroyed economy" [2].

Thus, the real (not speculative) Russia has already ceased to be an attractive role model. Is it because the Russian futurist Mikhail Kalashnikov is categorically against the unification of the future Novorossiya with Russia? "It is in any case should not be included in the present Russian Federation: in order not to be subject to the destruction of industry and agriculture. To get under the authority of the current "effective managers" – God forefend! That's the beauty of Novorossiya that there never was Gaidar and Chubais, that there is still no dvorkovichs, ulyukayevs, nabiullinas and siluanovas with grefs ... Independent Novorossiya should become a stronghold of reasonable design of industrial policy. It should become the focus of the agricultural revival. In this sense, Novorossiya should become a powerful factor in the change of the Russian Federation, its exemption from the fifth column of liberal monetarists in power. You may say that Novorossiya will be a springboard for the reconquest of Great Russia, a powerful stimulant of the Russian Federation" [4, 2]. Thus, the position of M. Kalashnikov, not without a reason, but is radically different from the main ideologists of the geopolitical setting of the future Novorossiya.

Summing up the material, it is necessary to focus on the following positions.

Firstly, the socialist tendencies in the Donbass have deep roots, and these Ukrainian authorities should oppose only informed decisions that would pre-empt many emerging conflict situations. In Ukrainian politics the "speciality" of the Donbass was always emphasized. It had a dual nature; the region was "shown" from a negative, as well as a positive side.

It seems that the negative image of Donbass was actively supported by public opinion, rather than a positive. Of course, one cannot deny the fact that Donbass people during the existence of the USSR unduly devel-

oped a consumer psychology: "We work so hard, we suffer so much, and we should be paid for this by our country". But in fairness, we must recognize the fact that people in the Donbass want and know how to work. An urgent task of the current political elite is to develop a healthy idea of unification of Donbass and Ukraine in the future. We should find such grounds for convergence of the center and the region, which would be a positive change for Ukraine, as well as Donbass.

Secondly, the authorities in their actions should not be guided by stereotypes. Those political leaders who called all residents of Donbass as "quilted jackets" cause irreparable damage to the present and, more importantly, the future of relations between Ukraine and the inhabitants of the occupied territories, they cause personal insult to the citizens of this region. Donbass is different, heterogeneous: active and expectant, creative and ordinary, dreaming and nostalgic, aggressive and resentful. Some of its representatives are fighting on the side of Ukraine, and others – on the side of the DNR, and that is an existential choice of each person. Moreover, in the militia army of the DNR is not just fringers and fringe urban population groups, as it is trying to impress the heads of Ukrainians. The vision of the essence of the conflict situation in the eastern Ukraine differs from the view on this problem of Ukrainians from central and western Ukraine.

Thirdly, in terms of information war and manipulation of consciousness the "little man" loses a foothold in his own reasoning, in argumentation of its provisions, he "jumps" from one political platform to another. Today we have a chaotic plexus of socialist, imperial, nationalist arguments, which indicates randomness of mass consciousness. And this applies not only to residents of the DNR and the LNR, but to all the citizens of Ukraine. Therefore it is not surprising that people cannot "see" the real foundations of a political platform, but they try to read into them, to wishful thinking. This fully applies to the project of Novorossiya. Two major myths are firmly entrenched in the minds of people in the Donbass: "Donbass may be Russia" and "Donbass is a USSR-2".

Each country, as well as individual, decides, makes its choice; it is responsible for the choice of its citizens. In his turn, each person hopes for the right choice of the country, on the rationality of the decisions taken in it. So love for the motherland, to the native land is cultivated. It seems that the conflict of different levels of identity – civilizational, national, regional – is a great tragedy for the people who have to make choices.

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UDC 338.27

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FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE CURRENT RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN CONFLICT

The article describes the results of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and its impact on the depreciation of the national currency, the deepening of the banking crisis, and impossibility of the state budget execution and recovery from the energy crisis. The estimation and forecast of the economic condition of the state, depending on the effectiveness of the Government in overcoming the consequences of the conflict is given. Perspective directions of development of Ukrainian economy and the occupied territories in the context of political instability are outlined.

Keywords: economy, crisis, expectations, policy.

Problem statement. The current situation in Russian-Ukrainian relations requires the formation of fundamentally different conceptual, strategic approaches to the co-existence, revision of the system of interstate contacts, implementation of specific measures on the counteraction to the economic crisis accompanying the Russian-Ukrainian confrontation. As a result of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in eastern Ukraine, there is a set of economic

consequences caused by the deterioration of relations between the countries, by direct military actions as well. The most significant consequences are:

depreciation of the hryvnia;

banking crisis;

failure of the implementation of the State Budget;

energy crisis.

Despite the conclusion of several truces at the global level, the conflict continues, which in its turn, aggravates the effects of the economic crisis.

The aim of the article is to identify the main economic consequences of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, to assess and forecast the development of the country's economy in conditions of political instability.

Statement of the basic material of the study. Let's consider each of the identified consequences of the conflict in detail and its impact on the economic situation of the country and the occupied territories.

Depreciation of the hryvnia

In 2014 hryvnia devalued in the average annual estimation 1.47 times, or 1.97 at year-end (Fig. 1).

Fig. 1 The dynamics of hryvnia in 2014 on the interbank currency market of Ukraine

Together with the objective reasons for the depreciation of hryvnia, such as economic decline and growth of crisis expectations, as well as the global growth of the dollar (during 2014 the dollar index rose by 12.3%, becoming the leader among industrialized countries), largely the depth of the fall of hryvnia is due to the actions of the NBU. The volume of NBU refinancing in 2014 amounted to almost 200 billion UAH, which is more than 4 times higher than the corresponding index number of 2013. A significant part of the refinancing was directed by commercial banks in the foreign exchange market. Refinancing was often provided to the banks, which had no real problems with liquidity. At the same time control of the refinancing was absent, and the measures to administer the foreign exchange market were not carried out or were delayed. All this has led to the whipping of the depreciatory spiral.

Besides the main negative effects the depreciation allowed to get minor positive trends. So, there was a reduction in the deficit of a foreign trade balance. The introduction of fee from the transactions on purchase of foreign currency, the depreciation of hryvnia, an increase of customs duties in addition to other tasks were aimed at the reduction in import volumes and leveling the trade balance. The volume of imports decreased in 2014 by 28%. As a result, Ukrainian enterprises got the possibility of import substitution – the production of a number of goods in Ukraine has increased significantly: 93% of sugar, 33% of sunflower oil, 40% of frozen pork, 40% of cosmetics, 64% of pneumatic and hydraulic tools and equipment, 90% of conveyor belts, 47% of thermostats etc. The negative result in this case is a significant reduction in purchasing power of the population for imported goods that do not have Ukrainian counterparts. Also, the depreciation of hryvnia in conjunction with the signing of an association agreement with the EU ensured the growth of exports to the EU countries by 10% or $ 1.3 billion (for the first 11 months of 2014). At the same time, exports to the Customs Union countries fell by 30% or $ 4.8 billion, mainly due to the RF, exports to which declined by $ 3.7 billion. The total fall in exports in the first 11 months of 2014 amounted to 9.4%, or $ 4.8 billion. Taking into account the depreciation of hryvnia, it is reasonable to assume that in 2015 the volume of Ukrainian exports will increase significantly.

On the whole, the negative effects of the depreciation of hryvnia at the moment have significantly exceeded all positive. The depreciation continues, not having any economic justification, and is being whipped by speculative actions of some banks and exporters, as well as by crisis expectations.

Banking crisis

In 2014, 33 banks turned bankrupts and dozens were in the risk group in Ukraine. Taking into account the difficult situation in the banking system, the National Bank of Ukraine expanded the grounds for the introduction of the account managers for the supervision of banks, but it has been made a little late. Some banks that belong to the entourage of Yanukovych turned bankrupts artificially. Others were expectedly unstable in conditions of the general economic crisis. However, about 14 billion UAH were lost by individuals who held more than 200 thousand UAH at deposits and now they have no chance to receive compensation from the Deposit Insurance Fund (Table 1). Approximately the same amount was owed by failed banks to legal entities.

Table 1

The dynamics of household deposits in 2014

	Total	In national currency	In foreign currency *	
	mln. UAH	mln. UAH	mln. UAH	mln. $
January	437.562	256.361	181.200	22.230
February	449.028	236.818	212.210	24.644
March	442.727	224.533	218.194	21.864
April	440.534	224.483	216.051	18.615
May	428.613	218.553	210.060	17.835
June	427.802	226.227	201.575	17.095
July	425.138	225.060	200.078	17.030
August	438.264	220.981	217.283	16.738
September	410.029	212.693	197.336	15.168
October	401.548	210.426	191.122	14.786
November	419.473	206.036	213.438	14.466
December	418.135	200.859	217.275	13.904

* In conversion to the exchange rate on the interbank currency market of Ukraine

As a result of the financial and economic and political crises the massive outflow of deposits occurred. Since the beginning of 2014 the volume of depos-

its has decreased by 30%, or 60 billion UAH, or $ 9 billion. Total assets (at comparable exchange rates) at the same time decreased by 17%, the financial results amounted to more than 30 billion UAH of damage, the regulatory capital decreased by 18% (Table 2). The occupation of the Crimea is considered by large banks as one of the main reasons for the losses.

Table 2

The dynamics of deposits of non-financial corporations in 2014

	Всего	In national currency	In foreign currency			
	mln. UAH	mln. UAH	mln. USD	mln. EUR	mln. RUB	others
January	186.537	131.170	45.229	8.160	1.853	125
February	197.130	130.705	54.223	9.902	2.108	192
March	194.056	127.555	53.160	10.851	2.285	204
April	196.364	128.557	54.408	11.125	2.030	244
May	199.787	131.516	54.963	11.024	2.005	279
June	192.982	124.250	55.683	10.865	1.887	297
July	194761	126.230	55.562	10.821	1.881	268
August	206.868	131.615	60.946	11.785	2.230	293
September	218.295	149.707	55.913	10.654	1.742	279
October	200.774	131.258	56.934	10.665	1.598	319
November	207.927	129.137	64.586	12.160	1.631	412
December	218.724	136.722	67.121	12.312	2.141	428

In the conditions of confidence falling in the banking system, the sabotage of Russian banks, the depreciation of hryvnia and massive outflow of deposits the NBU took late actions to reduce the scale of the capital outflow. The introduction of temporary administrations to the banks from the risk group was carried out after a long delay or was not carried out at all (for example, Delta Bank, where the problems arose at the beginning of the year, has ceased to fulfill its obligations in the last months of 2014, but no actions were taken).

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At the end of 2014 the NBU approved the methodology for determining systemically important banks, according to which eight banks were listed as system. The activity of these banks affects the stability of the banking system. In case of refusal of shareholders to further capitalize these banks in case of need, the state may nationalize them. Taking into account that the decision on recapitalization at the expense of public funds applies only to those banks, assets or deposits of which are more than 2% of the total banking system, the further whipping of crisis and mass bankruptcy of small banks is expected.

Generally, the forecast of the banking system development is negative. Taking into account the discount rate and economic instability the credit market may meanwhile fall to stagnation. The epidemic of non-repayment of foreign currency loans is also expected due to the depreciation of hryvnia and dominoes effect in case of bankruptcy of legal entities and banks. Most banks will require additional capitalization from the shareholders. There is a significant probability of bankruptcy of subsidiaries of Russian banks, the outflow of deposits from which is the largest and which are likely not to be capitalized by the owners.

Failure of the implementation of the State Budget

The revenue side of the State Budget of Ukraine in 2014 was performed by 94.48%, total revenues amounted to 356.95 billion UAH with the plan, according to the Law of Ukraine No. 719-VII from January 16, 2014 "On the State Budget of Ukraine for 2014" [1], of 377.82 billion USD. In 2013 the revenue side was not implemented, the state budget revenues amounted to 337.79 billion UAH with the plan of 349.58 billion UAH [2]. Thus, shortfalls in the revenue side during the year increased by 9.08 billion UAH or 2.15 percentage points. The very revenue side increased from 349.58 billion UAH to 377.82 billion UAH (by 8.08%) on the plan or from 337.79 billion UAH to 356.96 billion UAH (by 5.67%) of the actual execution.

In 2014, two changes of the revenue side of the budget were made (Table 3).

At first revenues were projected at the rate of 395.303 billion UAH (revision from January 16, 2014). According to the Law of Ukraine "On Amendments to the Law of Ukraine "On the State Budget of Ukraine for 2014" No. 1165-18 from March 27, 2014 [3] revenues were reduced to 372.931 billion UAH. But then by the law No. 1622-18 from July 31, 2014 [4] revenues were increased to 377.821 billion UAH (the main sources of this increase are transfers from foreign governments and international organizations).

Table 3

Changes of the revenue side of the State budget

Article	Revision		
	January 16	March 27	July 31
Total income	395,30	372,93	377,82
Tax revenues	326,27	299,20	299,59
Company income tax	49,62	43,10	40,29
Fee for the subsoil use	13,53	15,60	20,38
Value added tax	177,11	157,91	149,96
The excise duty from excisable goods produced in Ukraine	33,41	31,63	31,92
The excise duty from excisable goods (products) imported into the customs territory of Ukraine	11,24	13,01	13,01
Taxes on international trade and external operations	16,72	15,71	15,71
Non-tax revenues	63,43	68,87	69,37
Income from property and business activity	31,62	28,14	28,14
Other incomes	5,23	2,15	2,15
The fees for compulsory state pension insurance from certain types of business transactions	3,70	12,67	12,67
Fee from operations on purchase of foreign currency in non-cash and/ or cash forms	0,00	9,10	9,10
From foreign governments and international organizations	**1,23**	**1,23**	**5,22**

As a result of the March revision the tax revenues fell by 27 billion UAH, mainly due to the VAT reduction in by to 19.2 billion UAH and corporate income tax by 6.52 billion UAH. A partial reduction of tax revenues was offset by the increase of the non-tax revenue plan by 5.44 billion UAH.

The most important lines of the state budget revenue side are tax revenues that make up 79% of total revenues. The tax revenue plan for 2014 was not fulfilled by 6.48% (by19.41 billion UAH).

The main item in tax revenues is a value-added tax, which amounts ro 39.69% of the total state budget revenues. Plan for VAT collection was increased by 10.52% from 135.680 billion UAH in 2013 to 149.46 billion UAH in 2014, the actual collection having grown only by 8.31%. This item of income was not fulfilled in 2014 by 7.29% (by 10.93 billion UAH). Despite the fact that producer prices rose by 31.8%, while consumer prices – by 21.2%, the actual VAT collection grew only by 8.31%, or 10.66 billion UAH. Moreover, the amount of unrecovered VAT in 2014 increased by 4 billion UAH, and a number of taxpayers included in the register of automatic compensation, were removed from the registry manually. A slight increase in the collection, which can be called negative, taking into account the faster growth of the database, is explained by the unsatisfactory fight against tax pits. Thus, the work of the State Fiscal Service for the collection of value-added tax is not satisfactory. Among the obvious mistakes that have led to this result, it should be noted that the introduction of the transfer pricing legislation is again postponed.

The corporate income tax is at the second place for filling the State budget, which is 10.66% of the income and which charges were almost made in 2014 (the shortfall was 0.86%, or 0.35 billion UAH).

Excise duty from excisable goods made in Ukraine, is at the third place on importance for the income of the State budget, which provides 8.45% of revenues. Despite the increase in excise rates, this item of income was not implemented in 2014 by 12.01%, or 3.83 billion UAH. The shortfall of the plan can be attributed to the placement of a number of major distilleries, wineries and tobacco companies on the occupied territories. Collection of the excise tax from the excisable goods imported to Ukraine, despite not being the biggest part of the income (3.44%), improved the situation of tax revenues due to the fulfillment of the plan by 29.56%. With regard to the plan of 13.0 billion UAH, 16.86 billion UAH was collected. This result is explained by several factors. Firstly, rates of excise duty on imported goods were increased, primarily on petroleum products. Second, the depreciation of hryvnia has allowed accordingly the collection of increased excise taxes established in the currency or as a percentage of the price of imported goods.

The plan for the collection of taxes on the international trade and external transactions (4.16% of the revenues of the state budget) was not ful-

filled; the shortfall amounted to 19.73%, or 3.10 billion UAH. In 2014, there were significant changes in the key factors of this group of taxes. First of all, import to Ukraine in dollar terms decreased by 31.6%. The duties on import to Ukraine of military products were eliminated. At the same time, this abatement was offset in hryvnia terms by the increase of the average official exchange rate of the dollar by 48.55%, as well as by the introduction of new tariff rates and taxable goods.

The plan on non-tax revenues in 2014 was not fulfilled by 1.66% (by 1.14 billion UAH.). The most significant items among non-tax revenues are revenues from property and business (7.45% of all revenues of the state budget), private revenues of budgetary institutions (5.62% of total revenues), other non-tax revenues (4.06% of total revenues) and funds from foreign countries and international organizations (1.38% of total revenues). All these items of income are fulfilled or exceeded, in addition to other tax revenue shortfalls which amounted to 18.45% (2.83 billion UAH). This is explained by traditionally poor planning of this item (in 2013 it was underfulfilled by 25.22%) as well as by the impact of the economic downturn.

In 2014 the plan of other non-tax revenues was increased more than two times (from 7.23 to 15.32 billion UAH). This increase was intended to be implemented for the introduction of a collection of accounts from the operations on purchase of foreign currency (LU from March 27, 2014 No. 1166 "On the prevention of financial disaster and creation of preconditions for the economic growth in Ukraine" [5]) in the amount of $ 9.1 billion UAH. However, taking into account the errors in planning of currency sales volume the plan was not fulfilled, according to preliminary data, by 2 billion UAH. When planning it was assumed that the volumes of currency sales would be at the level of last year, but due to the depreciation of hryvnia and the shortage of currency the net purchases of currency by population in 2014 amounted to $ 2.4 billion compared to $ 2.9 billion in 2013. In the interbank the volume of currency sales decreased by 2.66 times (from $ 299.37 billion to $ 112.17 billion) despite the fact that the real demand for the currency significantly increased as a result of the depreciation of hryvnia and the economic crisis. Much of the demand was satisfied at the expense of the black market. All this is reflected in the implementation of the plan of other non-tax revenue collection. Also, the revenues from the collection of the acquisition of ownership of passenger cars, expected at the level of 1.36 billion UAH, are not fulfilled, despite the decrease in sales of passenger cars by 54% and reducing the number of registrations.

In general, following the results of the performance of the State budget revenue side of Ukraine for 2014 and its comparison with the results

of the budget implementation in 2013, we can conclude that Ukraine has faced a number of new problems causing shortfalls to the budget. The most important of these new challenges were decline of the economic activity and occupation of the part of the territory. The main old problem of Ukraine – high corruption – remained as well.

Energy crisis

The fighting stopped or significantly reduced production of 83 mines, which gave 38% of the total coal production; as a result the coal production in Ukraine decreased by 22%. In general, low-reactive coal of ranks "A" and "T" was got at these mines. Annual decrease in the coal production was 10.9 million tons, mainly of anthracite ranks. This adversely affected the thermal power as 7 of 14 Ukrainian TPPs run on anthracite coal ranks (one of them is located in the occupied territory and another, Slavic, requires a planned long-term reconstruction) (Fig. 2). The annual deficit of coal for thermal power plants amounted to 3.9 million tons. As a result, disruptions to energy supply and sectoral outages appeared.


Fig. 2 The use of bituminous coal, thousand tons

However, it should be noted that in addition to objective reasons, the energy crisis also had man-made causes that are a consequence of the struggle of oligarchic groups. So, the possibilities of compensation of the deficit of electricity by nuclear power plants currently operating at 70% capacity were not used. The electricity generated at TPPs is more expensive and is subsidized from the budget, so it is profitable for the owners to receive subsidies by

various schemes. The information campaign in the media about the quality and prices of the imported coal was organized as well.

In general, the energy crisis can be quite easily overcome. To do this it is necessary to organize in the short term the import of deficient ranks of coal and provide energy balance at the expense of NPP. In the medium term it is necessary TO reequip TPPs to coal of gas ranks. Taking into account the fact that most of the equipment of coal TPPs is worn out and ineffective, the question of their modernization was overdue without the coal crisis.

Conclusions. Russian-Ukrainian relations are at a critical unpredictable state. Political and diplomatic confrontation continues; the basic agreements and arrangements are violated; the institutional system of international relations is virtually destroyed; the economic crisis is escalated, energy opposition continues. In general, the current realities do not give grounds to speak about changes for the better in the foreseeable future. The study examined in detail the main economic consequences of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, which began in 2014 and has continued to this day. Deleterious effects of military confrontation to the public and economic life of the country are defined. The attention is focused on the existence of isolated problems for decades and their worsening in the conditions of political instability.

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Наукове видання

Східноукраїнський конфлікт
в контексті глобальних трансформацій

Збірник статей

(англійською мовою)

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